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Disciplining the Spectator: 
 
Subjectivity, the Body and Contemporary Spectatorship 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this thesis the author argues that although questions of the spectator’s corporeal 
engagement with film are much neglected by film theory, the body is nevertheless a 
central term within contemporary cinema, in its mode of address, as a locus of anxiety in 
media effects debate, and as site of disciplinary practices.  And while the thesis begins 
by demonstrating both the socially and historically constructed nature of spectatorship, 
and the specific practices that work to create contemporary cinema’s corporeal address, 
the latter half of the dissertation devotes itself to revealing the regulatory implications of 
this physical address.  That is, the author shows that cinema’s perceived capacity of 
affect the body of the spectator is a profound source of cultural anxiety.  But more 
importantly, through an analysis of the films Funny Games, Irréversible, Wolf Creek, and 
the genre of ‘torture porn’ more generally, what is revealed in these final chapters is that 
the regulation of cinema in the contemporary era is less a question of the 
institutionalised censorship of texts, and more a question of regulating the ‘self’.  In this 
respect, the author demonstrates the specific disciplinary practices that attempt to 
present the problem of violent, and sexually violent, imagery not as a textual issue per 
se, but a question of the formation of appropriate spectatorial relations.  Moreover, this 
study begins the process of teasing out the ways in which the contemporary spectator is 
induced to see the problem of media violence as one that can be resolved through what 
Foucault would term, techniques of the self.   
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Disciplining the Spectator: 
 
Subjectivity, the Body and Contemporary Spectatorship 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Sitting in the darkened auditorium of the cinema, time and time again I 
marvel at its ability to move me.  I am struck by the adrenaline that flows through 
my veins during an action sequence, by the anxiety that I feel when the hero is 
in danger, by my disgust at the sight of blood and guts flying, by a film’s ability to 
make me lose control and break down in tears in public, and by the myriad other 
shocks and sensations delivered routinely by the cinema.  And I am not alone. 
Looking around at the members of the audience during these films I see agitated 
people, people holding on more tightly to their friends and partners, people 
averting their gaze and searching through their pockets for handkerchiefs.   I 
hear them jump and gasp at the unexpected, signal their revulsion and sniffle 
quietly into their handkerchiefs.   
These are not extraordinary events for the cinemagoer, they are part and 
parcel of the film experience, which leaves me baffled at why there should be 
such a gap between this everyday experience of watching a film and the theory 
that film scholars use to describe, interpret and deconstruct the moving image.  
Film theorists may enrich a text enormously through their ability to unmask the 
hidden structures, to expose the ideological foundations and unveil the 
unconscious desires that make up a mainstream Hollywood film.  But after all is 
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said and done, I find that very little has been said about the way in which 
audiences respond to films physically.   
Contemporary film theory, until very recently, has focussed 
predominantly on the structural and psychological aspects of film viewing.  
Theorists have generally glossed over both the sensual or corporeal address of 
particular films and severely neglected the undeniable physicality of film viewers.  
Despite an overwhelming emphasis on spectatorship and film ‘reception’ within 
film theory, the body of the spectator has been virtually ignored.  Rather, 
spectatorship has been constituted almost exclusively as a psychical process.  If 
the body has been considered at all, it is only insofar as it contributes to the 
functioning of the psychical apparatus.   
The initial purpose of my study then, was to account for the physicality of 
cinema.  To attempt to reinsert the body into film theory, in a way that took 
account of the specific ways in which the spectator’s body has been constructed 
by cinema.  Doing so meant moving analysis beyond the narrow confines of the 
spectator’s encounter with the text, and thinking about the wider discourses of 
cinema and their effect on the cinematic experience.  My contention was that the 
spectator’s encounter with the cinema should be considered as a series of small 
but significant “coercions that act upon the body…its gestures, its behaviour”.  
Indeed that discourses of cinema as a whole represented “a 'mechanics of 
power'…[which] defined how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, not only 
so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one 
wishes”.1  Or to put it another way, I sought to show that spectatorship should be 
considered less as a metapsychological encounter with the filmic apparatus, and 
more as the product of specific disciplinary practices that occur within the wider 
discourses of cinema. 
In this respect my first task was dedicated to uncovering the historical 
roots of contemporary spectatorship, in an attempt demonstrate that the 
spectator’s relations to the screen were by no means a natural or inevitable 
product of cinema technology.  Rather, as Miriam Hansen suggests,2 historical 
audiences were induced to take up particular relations to the screen through the 
concrete regulation of bodies and spaces.  But while recognition of these 
disciplinary practices pervades historical scholarship on cinema, this kind of 
Foucaultian analysis is not necessarily widely applied to contemporary film.  This 
                                               
1
 Michel Foucault, 'Docile Bodies', in The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought, 
ed. Paul Rabinow, (London: Penguin, 1984), 182 
2
 Miriam Hansen, Babel and Babylon: Spectatorship in American Silent Film, (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1991) 
  
 
 7 
brief archaeological foray therefore quickly gave way to a consideration of the 
peculiarly sensational event that is the contemporary cinematic encounter.   
However, as my study progressed it became increasingly clear that 
discussions about the physical, corporeal address of cinema assumed a 
Manichean character.  On the one hand it was clear that the sensational 
qualities of cinema were keenly pursued by spectators, and consistently 
promised by producers, and yet cinema’s capacity to move the viewer in such a 
way formed the backbone of cultural fears about cinema’s potential effects.  
That is, within contemporary discourse about regulation and censorship, the 
body began to emerge as a central term around which cultural anxiety 
resonated.  Cinema’s contemporary corporeal address therefore appeared to be 
strictly delimited in terms of what were considered to be legitimate, and what 
were considered to be illegitimate, perhaps even dangerous, uses.  As my 
project developed therefore it began increasingly to take on the quality of 
chiaroscuro.  Looking on the one hand at the way in which the corporeal 
address was produced and discussed within mainstream cinema, and on the 
other the way in which cinema’s capacity to physically affect its audience was 
problematised.   
So while the last two chapters of my thesis explore the very real cultural 
anxieties that surround cinema’s assumed capacity to affect the spectator 
physically, the chapter on ‘The Promises of Monsters’ explores the way in which 
mainstream cinema attempts to both promote and provoke corporeal 
spectatorship, particularly within action-driven, high concept blockbusters, but 
also within horror cinema.  Indeed, drawing on Annette Kuhn’s analysis of “Big 
budget science-fiction extravaganzas”, I contend that very often the primary 
attraction of high-concept films is that they “offer [a] total visual, auditory and 
kinetic experience” in which “the spectator is invited to succumb to complete 
sensory and bodily engulfment.”3  Moreover, as Kuhn suggests the consumption 
of this kind of spectacle “rests on a particular gaze, a form of looking which 
draws in senses other than vision”,4 and demands a form of analysis that 
“attends to the sensuous immediacy of the viewing experience.”5  In this 
instance, traditional accounts of spectatorship that rest on metapsychological 
models of spectator-text relations are wholly inadequate for the analysis of forms 
                                               
3
 Annette Kuhn, ‘Introduction’, Alien Zone II: The Spaces of Science Fiction Cinema, (London: 
Verso 1999), p.5 
4
 Kuhn (1999), p.5 
5
 Kuhn (1999), p.5 
  
 
 8 
of cinema which are driven by the desire to deliver ‘thrilling’ and/or frightening 
experiences to its audience.   
As a result, I will contend that the production of the contemporary 
corporeal address is not limited to the spectator’s encounter with the film text but 
rather, the physical experience of the film encounter is produced and inflected 
by the wider discourses of cinema.  And indeed, this chapter will endeavour to 
highlight the way in which the cinema industry itself makes use of a corporeal 
address in order to market its films.  I will seek to show that contemporary 
cinema marketing aims, first and foremost, to situate cinema within the 
‘experience economy’.6  That is, cinema promises precisely to deliver ‘an 
experience’ to its audience, and that within mainstream cinema, marketing 
revolves around the film’s promise to deliver a specifically corporeal experience 
to the spectator.  What I will seek to tease out in this analysis, is the way in 
which these commercial promises might influence the quality of the film 
encounter, and work to actively produce or, at the very least, intensify the 
spectator’s corporeal engagement with the film.   
That is, the purpose of these marketing texts is clearly to stimulate 
demand.  But while these adverts, trailers and previews are designed to inspire 
the audience to go and see the movie, they also manage audience expectations.  
These materials prepare the viewer for the filmic experience, by attempting to 
engage the spectator before s/he has even entered the cinema by provoking 
excitement, anticipation or even trepidation before the cinematic event.  But they 
also inform the potential viewer about the level of engagement, as well as the 
kind of responses that are expected from the audience.  While these materials 
may help manage expectations, they also begin to manage or shape cinematic 
subjectivity.  However the audience is by no means to be considered to be 
passively subjected to interpellation either by the film text itself, or by its 
concomitant marketing.  Rather I will seek to show the ways in which this 
promise to deliver a visceral experience to the film viewer, promoted through 
both formal marketing and press reviews and reports, is taken up and circulated 
among audience groups themselves.   And in this way I will seek to demonstrate 
that audience members become active agents in the formation of their cinematic 
subjectivity. 
By contrast, the last two chapters of this thesis attempt to show the 
darker side of cinema’s corporeal address.  In this respect, the first chapter, 
                                               
6
 See B. Joseph Pine II and James H. Gilmore, The Experience Economy: Work is Theatre and 
Every Business a Stage, (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999) 
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‘Fear of The Dark: Media Effects and the Subjectification of Film Regulation’, 
follows a similar pattern to the preceding chapter.  That is, in this chapter I 
attempt to trace models of spectatorship as they have been constructed within 
the law, as well as within media effects debates more generally.  As I have 
already suggested, I will seek to show that within these discourses, the body 
becomes a locus for concern.  Indeed, cinema’s perceived capacity to affect the 
spectator physically becomes a nexus of cultural fears.  But more particularly, 
what becomes evident within an analysis of media effects studies, as well as in 
popular debate about the ‘effects’ of violence on the spectator, is that these 
debates are thoroughly gendered.   
Once again, I will seek to analyse the way in which ideas and concepts 
produced within the regulatory discourse of media effects are taken up within 
popular discussion of film.  In this instance, in an effort to keep my discussion 
focused on the particular way in which the discourse of media effects is 
mobilised by the audience, I have chosen to examine discussions that surround 
the film Wolf Creek,7 although, as we will see, discussions about the film take 
place within the larger context to concern over the genre of ‘torture porn’.  
Nevertheless, what this analysis of discussions and debates by both film 
reviewers and the public more generally seeks to show is that sections of the 
audience are not only thoroughly engaged in the formation of their own 
cinematic subjectivity, but are also actively involved in the process of defining 
and delimiting appropriate responses and relations to ‘problematic’ films.   
While much previous work within audience studies has been conducted on fans’ 
relations with horror and violent film texts,8 this chapter seeks to engage with 
more ‘mainstream’ or ‘non-fan’ discussions of these problematic films.  In doing 
so this thesis sheds light on the more general social context within which the 
consumption of film violence takes place, and attempts to demonstrate that key 
sections of the mainstream audience are central to the disciplinary practices of 
contemporary cinema, insofar as they not only attempt to police the behaviour of 
other members of the audience, but they also endeavour to normatively regulate 
spectator-text relations.  Though perhaps more importantly, these audience 
members can be seen not only to monitor the responses and behaviours of their 
fellow audience members, but to actively interrogate their own responses to 
                                               
7
 Wolf Creek, directed by Greg McLean, (Australia: True Crime Channel, 2005) 
8
 For example see Brigid Cherry, ‘Refusing to Refuse to Look: Female Viewers of the Horror Film’, 
in Identifying Hollywood’s Audiences: Cultural Identity and the Movies, ed. Melvyn Stokes and 
Richard Maltby, (London: British Film Institute, 1999), Matt Hills, The Pleasures of Horror, 
(London: Continuum, 2005) and Annette Hill, Shocking Entertainment: Viewer Response to Violent 
Movies,  (Luton: Luton University Press, 1997) 
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controversial film, in an effort to bring them into line with their own understanding 
of how one ought to respond to such imagery. 
The final chapter of this thesis focuses on two films, Michael Haneke’s 
Funny Games9 and Gaspar Noé’s Irréversible,10 each notorious in its own way 
for its handling of the issue of on-screen violence.  Although both of these films 
approach screen violence in very different ways, both of these films can 
nevertheless be considered to be a self-reflexive representation of the media 
violence debate, and as such they can help us to demonstrate how the 
discourse of media effects is taken up within the practice of filmmaking.   These 
films have been chosen for inclusion in this thesis not only to highlight the 
different ways in which filmmakers might choose to construct the spectator of 
screen violence, but also to explore the ways they might attempt to discipline the 
spectator and reinforce what each of these filmmakers deem to be appropriate 
relations with images of violence on screen.  But here too the body becomes a 
central term.  So while on the one hand, Haneke can be seen to reject screen 
violence as a legitimate mode of expression, Noé on the other, suggests that the 
formation of appropriate spectatorial relations with the screen is to be found in 
both the intensity, and aversive nature of the experience.   
In sum, what this project will attempt to do is to examine the relationship 
between subjectivity, the body and contemporary cinema.  I will argue that the 
body is not only central to the mode of address within contemporary fiction film, 
but that the discourses of cinema actively discipline the spectator in a number of 
concrete ways in order to both produce and delimit this corporeal address.  I will 
argue that the wider public discourse of cinema works to create a particular form 
of cinematic subjectivity that is both complex and contradictory.  For while on the 
one hand the cinema industry, through its marketing and publicity, seeks to 
create and promote cinema as a site of intense physical thrills and pleasure, the 
physical nature of cinematic response also creates cultural anxieties that are 
used to justify the need to curtail engagement with certain cinematic forms.   
What is interesting however, and the key finding from this study, is that 
despite the intensity of the fear that surrounds the spectator’s, or more 
accurately the male spectator’s relations with violent imagery, in the 
contemporary era it is relatively rare that this will lead mainstream viewers to call 
for institutional censorship in the course of their reviews and discussions.  
Instead, the circulation of media violence is increasingly treated as a problem of 
                                               
9
 Funny Games, directed by Michael Haneke, (Austria: Concorde-Castle Rock/Turner, 1997) 
10
 Irréversible, directed by Gaspar Noé, (France: Mars Distribution, 2002) 
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the ‘self’; a matter of simply eschewing engagement with these cultural forms 
(regulating through the market), or by working on the ‘self’ in order to more 
thoroughly align one’s responses and reactions with culturally condoned and 
validated forms of engagement.  Of course, there are resistant voices, but 
nevertheless, what the latter part of this study makes clear, is that in 
contemporary cinema the regulation of film is less and less treated as a matter 
of institutionalised censorship, and increasingly a matter of disciplining the 
spectatorial subject.  
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The Body in the Machine: 
 
From Meta-Psychology to Technologies of the Self 
 
 
 
Any serious attempt to engage with the question of subjectivity, 
spectatorship and the body within contemporary cinema must necessarily begin 
with a return to the ‘golden age’ of classical film theory in the early 1970’s, and 
consider theories of the cinematic apparatus and its concomitant ideologies.  
Drawing predominantly on the disciplines of semiotics and psychoanalysis, 
writers such as Jean-Louis Baudry, and Christian Metz sought to expose both 
‘the cultural determinations of the cinematic machinery’ and the influence of film 
technologies and techniques over the cinematic encounter, as well as the way in 
which representational forms might influence the viewer’s perception and 
experience of the world.  Although the work of these early film theorists is highly 
diverse, what connects them is precisely their concern with the processes of 
subjectivity.  As a result, these different approaches have led to number of 
“interrelated and powerful (though often controversial) formulations which 
variously define the human subject as an epistemological category, a social 
category, and/or a psychoanalytic category”.11   
However, while these wide ranging studies of the cinema have paid 
close attention to the ways in which subjectivity is constituted within cinema, and 
                                               
11
 Philip Rosen, ‘Preface’, in Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader, ed. Philip 
Rosen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), ix 
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have worked hard to account for the particular ways in which the spectator is 
positioned by the text, as I will show in this chapter, what is clearly neglected in 
these formulations is a consideration of the of the spectator as an embodied, 
corporeal subject.  If the issue of the body arises at all within these theories, it is 
most often as a locus of and for desire and fantasy; a necessary precondition for 
the workings of the imaginary; or as an image constituted through ideology.  The 
physical body of the viewer is almost wholly absent from these considerations of 
subjectivity, and where it is mentioned, it is reduced to little more than an object 
immobilised in the cinematic space and pacified by the text. 
As feminist film theorists have successfully argued, this formulation of a 
‘disembodied’ and universal spectator turned out to be constituted as resolutely 
‘masculine’, in terms of its narrative positioning by the text, its consumption of 
‘woman as spectacle’ on the screen, and in psychoanalytic accounts of 
spectatorial desire.12  More importantly for discussion here, these early theories 
of the spectator also depend on a Cartesian model of subjectivity, in which 
subjectivity is constituted through mental processes.  As a result they, like the 
Enlightenment philosophers before them, “have tended to ignore the body or to 
place it in the position of being somehow subordinate to and dependent for all 
that is interesting about it on animating intentions”.13  The problem, from a 
feminist standpoint, is that this sex-neutral, universal subject denies the very real 
impact our physical bodies play in structuring our experience and in the 
formation of our subjectivities.  And moreover, in a world structured by the 
dualisms of mental and physical, mind and body, where the masculine comes to 
be associated with reason and transcendence, while the female comes to 
represent the nature and the materiality, the denial and denigration of the body 
in both philosophy and film theory, is tantamount to the exclusion of female 
subjectivity. 
The radical reinsertion of the body into philosophical thought by writers 
like Rosi Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz, therefore represents a sincere attempt to 
reconceive the traditional model of subjectivity in a way that purposefully 
displaces “the centrality of the mind, the psyche, interior, or consciousness (and 
even the unconscious) in conceptions of the subject”.14  Instead, it presents “a 
new form of materialism” that emphasizes “the embodied and therefore sexually 
                                               
12
 See for example, E. Ann Kaplan, Women and Film: Both Sides of the Camera, (London: 
Methuen, 1983) and Laura Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, in Visual and Other 
Pleasures, 2nd ed, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009) 
13
 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), vii 
14
 Grosz, (1994), vii 
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differentiated structure of the speaking subject.”15  Such a project is clearly of 
enormous value to the feminist endeavour.  However, it is not without 
opposition.  As Nikolas Rose suggests, the danger of this focus on the body is 
that it may rely too heavily on the binary division of male and female and impose 
“a fallacious unification on a diversity of ways in which we are ‘sexed’”,16 
reinscribing the same universalising tendencies they are attempting to 
overcome.   
Instead Rose argues we should see subjectivity “in a complex of 
apparatuses, practices, machinations, and assemblages within which human 
beings have been fabricated, and which presuppose and enjoin particular 
relations with ourselves.” 17  Such a notion of subjectivity not only recognises the 
socio-historical specificity of contemporary personhood and allows for the 
multiple and contested ways in which subjects might be addressed by these 
discourses, but it also permits us to think through the ways in which these 
practices are pervaded by power relations, and in particular to investigate “the 
ways in which subjectivity has become an essential object, target, and resource 
for certain strategies, tactics, and procedures of regulation.”18   
That is not to say that gender does not matter.  Indeed my research into 
the discourses surrounding controversial film showed that both the ‘official’ 
discourse of media effects and the everyday web discussions of viewers were 
pervaded by issues of gender.  That is, ‘gendered subjects’ were categories 
produced by these discourses.  Although in this respect, I find that this study 
raises far more questions than it answers.  So while I work hard to show that 
discussions among viewers operate as subjectifying discourses, time and space 
did not necessarily permit a detailed study of the way in which men and women 
were positioned differently in these discussions.   
Nevertheless Rose’s distinctly Foucaultian formulation allows us to 
investigate the question of subjectivity in contemporary cinema in a highly 
productive manner.  Rose’s contention that “‘the body’ provides no sure basis for 
an analytic of subjectification”19 may be correct, at least insofar as is it rejects 
essentialist and determinist accounts of the body within feminist theory.  
However, what I want to suggest in this thesis is that ‘the body’ is a central focus 
                                               
15
 Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary 
Feminist Theory, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 3 
16
 Nikolas Rose, Inventing Ourselves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10 
17
 Rose, (1996), 10 
18
 Rose, (1996), 152 
19
 Rose, (1996), 10 
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for the discourses of cinema, and as such, it cannot be neglected.  Indeed in 
terms of the constitution of the spectator of contemporary cinema what I want to 
demonstrate is that:  
All the effects of subjectivity, all the significant facets and 
complexities of subjects, can be as adequately explained using 
the subject’s corporeality as a framework as it would be using 
consciousness or the unconscious.  All the effects of depth 
and interiority can be explained in terms of the inscriptions and 
transformations of the subject’s corporeal surface.  Bodies 
have all the explanatory power of minds.20 
This chapter will therefore ask how the body might be successfully reintegrated 
into the theory of cinematic subjectivity without falling prey to deterministic 
accounts of the ‘body as destiny’.   
 
 
 
The Apparatus and the Gaze 
 
 
First published in 1970, Jean-Louis Baudry’s account of the ‘cinematic 
apparatus’ presented a model of the cinema that went beyond the mere analysis 
of the text, to present a metapsychological account of the technologies of 
cinema and its effect on the spectator.  Drawing on the works of Freud, Lacan 
and Althusser, Baudry argued that cinema was an “ideological machine”21 that 
presented an illusion of an ‘objective reality’.  He argued that it operated as an 
optical apparatus which constituted the subject as “the active centre and origin 
of meaning”22.  For Baudry, the cinema created a “transcendental subject”, “no 
longer fettered by a body” but free to take up a position thoroughly aligned with 
the look of the camera.  The subject therefore “becomes absorbed in, ‘elevated’ 
to a vaster function, proportional to the movement which it can perform”, a space 
in which “the world will not only be constituted by this eye but for it”.23   
Spectatorial pleasure therefore derives from the sense of power and 
mastery provided by filmic techniques, which all the while mask the truth that like 
                                               
20
 Grosz, (1994), vii 
21
 Jean-Louis Baudry, ‘Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus’, Film 
Quarterly, Vol.28, No.2, (Winter, 1974-1975), 44 
22
 Baudry, (1974-1975), 40 
23
 Baudry, (1974-1975), 43 
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the prisoner’s in Plato’s Cave who mistook mere shadows for images of the real 
world, those within the cinema “find themselves chained, captured or 
captivated”24 by an ideology that presents itself as reality.  Moreover, the 
physical space of the cinema, “projector, darkened hall, screen”,25 reproduces 
the conditions necessary for the functioning of Lacan’s mirror stage, wherein the 
spectator might misrecognise the image on the screen as his own unified and 
idealised reflection.  And indeed it is this misrecognition, this identification both 
with the camera and the image that completes the illusion that meaning 
originates from the spectator rather than being already constructed by the text.  
As Baudry puts it, cinema 
is an apparatus destined to obtain a precise ideological effect, 
necessary to the dominant ideology…Everything happens as 
if, the subject himself being unable - and for a reason - to 
account for his own situation, it was necessary to substitute 
secondary organs, grafted on to replace his own defective 
ones, instruments or ideological formations capable of filling 
his function as subject.26 
For Baudry then, the very functioning of ideology within cinema requires the 
creation of a transcendental subject, a perceiving subject that precedes the 
bounds of their material and embodied existence.  This spectator is a radically 
dematerialized subject, whose awareness of his own body is merely one of the 
“disturbing effects which result during a projection from breakdowns in the 
recreation of movement, when the spectator is brought abruptly back to 
discontinuity”27.  If the spectator can be said to have a body at all, it is an 
immaterial, illusory, prosthetic body created through the misrecognition of the 
image as a reflection of the self.   
Similarly, in a subsequent paper Baudry likens the experience of cinema 
to that of a dream: a fantasy of wish-fulfilment and desire.  Drawing on Freud’s 
Interpretation of Dreams28 Baudry argues that cinema, like the dream, induces 
the spectator to regress into a narcissistic state characterised as “a mode of 
relating to reality which could be defined as enveloping and in which the 
separation between one’s own body and the exterior world is not well defined.”29  
The dream, according to Freud, mimics the early experience of the suckling 
child where the mother is considered merely as an extension of the self.  And 
                                               
24
 Baudry, (1974-1975), 44 
25
 Baudry, (1974-1975), 45 
26
 Baudry, (1974-1975), 46 
27
 Baudry, (1974-1975), 42 
28
 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, (New York: Avon, 1965) 
29
 Baudry, (1999), 773 
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cinema, Baudry suggests, as an experience analogous to the dream, promises a 
return to this state of satisfaction and fulfilment.  That is, the spectator is 
enveloped by cinema, blurring his corporeal boundaries to the extent that he 
mistakes the representation before him as an object of perception.  The erasure 
of the spectatorial body then, remains central to ‘the impression of reality’ that 
underpins cinema’s ideological effects.  
Here too Baudry suggests that the spectator is ‘held captive’ by the 
apparatus.  Indeed, the effects of the cinematic text depend on the ‘inhibited 
motoricity’ enforced by the arrangement of the physical space of cinema.  Just 
like the dreamer, the physical body of the spectator is immobilized.  And just as 
in a dream, the spectator is unable “to act in any way upon the object of his 
perception.”30  The cinema may grant him a transcendental perspective, but he 
nevertheless lacks the agency to control or transform the content of the images 
presented to him.  And despite the illusion of mastery and control afforded by 
the illusion of movement, the spectator remains entirely passive, both physically 
and perceptually; transfixed by the ‘impression of reality’. 
For Noél Carroll, the weakness of Baudry’s theory is that, he relies too 
heavily on the physical arrangement of the cinema to account for the ‘impression 
of reality’ that cinema provides.  As Carroll suggests, the heightened cinematic 
experience is not a direct result of the projection situation, or of the cinematic 
apparatus itself.  Rather, the ‘impression of reality’ provided by some films is 
“not a function of simply throwing an image on the screen.  It is the internal 
structure of these films that accounts for their effect, not the fact that they are 
projected.  Not all films bestow comparative affective results.”31  The ‘apparatus’ 
is simply a means to an end rather than an end in itself.  The ‘arrangement’ of 
the cinema auditorium is the vehicle through which the particular images of 
particular films might be allowed the opportunity to work their effects.  But for 
Carroll it is the film texts, and the techniques they employ, that produce such 
‘intense affective responses’.   
Moreover, as Annette Kuhn suggests, “in putting forward a monolithic 
model of the apparatus” Baudry effectively “closes off the possibility of making 
distinctions between different types of cinema.”32  The sense of ‘mastery and 
control’ produced by the apparatus, for example, describes a very particular 
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form of cinematic address.  It cannot account for films like Gaspar Noé’s 
Irréversible where the intention of the text, as we will see in the final chapter, is 
precisely to make the spectator feel ‘out of control’, disoriented, and alienated 
from the events onscreen.  But even in its consideration of classical narrative 
films, it neglects the way in which particular genres like thrillers, horror films or 
melodramas make use of specific relations of knowledge in order to frustrate the 
viewer. Within these films a transcendental point of view, at least in the sense of 
having more knowledge than the characters onscreen, is often used to highlight 
the spectator’s very lack of control; their inability to intervene in the course of the 
narrative, to stop the protagonist from meeting their end, from making a 
disastrous mistake, or failing to see the obvious.  If the cinematic apparatus 
were always to impart the illusion of control, then texts that rely on these kinds of 
suspense and pathos would cease to function.  Such an oversimplified account 
of the spectator’s relation to the text therefore ignores the, often complex, 
relations of knowledge that a text develops in order to further the narrative and 
to manipulate the spectator’s narrative desires.  
Baudry of course, recognises that filmic techniques are central to the 
ideological functioning of cinema, but as Carroll’s critique suggests, his 
emphasis on the effect of the physical arrangement of cinema is overplayed.  
One of the primary effects of the fully functioning cinematic apparatus is to 
persuade the viewer to ‘forget’ or abandon his physical body, and to become 
absorbed by the filmic body on the screen before him.  As a result in both of his 
accounts of the cinematic apparatus the spectatorial body is theoretically 
expunged.   
Baudry’s account of spectatorship effectively rips the viewer from the 
social context in which viewing occurs, and supplants this social environment 
with a model of the psyche that is universalistic, essentialist and totalising in its 
effect.  As writers such as Mary Ann Doane, Judith Mayne, Jackie Stacey and 
Jacqueline Bobo have demonstrated, relations to the screen are not as 
homogeneous as Baudry’s writing would suggest, and the very real social 
differences of gender, race and sexuality can and do have an impact on 
identification with and the interpretation of film texts.33  Baudry’s account of a 
thoroughly individualised spectator also neglects the social circumstances in 
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which film may be viewed.  The development of VCR, DVD and Blu-ray 
notwithstanding, going to the cinema is often a social event in which awareness 
of both one’s body, and communication with other people, is not necessarily a 
failure in the apparatus, but simply a different ‘mode of relating’ to that which is 
on the screen. 
Like Baudry, Christian Metz also draws on psychoanalysis in order to 
formulate an explanation of cinema’s extraordinary power.  And like Baudry he 
draws on Lacan’s account of the mirror stage, in which the first formation of the 
ego begins to take place as the child identifies with its own likeness.  However 
as Metz points out, while the film screen may resemble a mirror, it differs from it 
in one essential respect: the spectator’s own body is never reflected on the 
screen.  As Metz puts it, “at the cinema, it is always the other who is on the 
screen; as for me, I am there to look at him...absent from the screen, but 
certainly present in the auditorium, a great eye and ear”.34  The spectator is 
physical in the sense that he is in possession of sensory organs, but like 
Baudry’s conception, Metz’s spectator is a not an embodied subject, he is a 
subject constituted through perception. 
Metz’s spectator may not be fully enveloped by the ‘impression of reality’ 
as Baudry’s is.  Metz’s spectator “knows he is at the cinema”,35 he knows that he 
is “perceiving something imaginary”, that his “sense organs are physically 
affected”, that he is “not phantasising”.36  Moreover:  
The audience is not duped by the diegetic illusion, it ‘knows’ 
that the screen presents no more than a fiction.  And yet, it is 
of vital importance for the correct unfolding of the spectacle 
that this make-believe be scrupulously respected37 
Thus the spectator is aware of himself, his body and the constructed nature of 
the cinematic event, at least insofar as he is aware of the processes of 
perception.  However, the spectator chooses to forget, to disavow, to wilfully 
suspend his disbelief in order to enjoy the pleasurable experience of the 
cinematic illusion.  Metz’s spectator is therefore not entirely passive.  He must 
participate.  Focussed on the experiences and images presented by the film, the 
spectator is ‘disconnected’ from the real world, “he must then connect to 
                                               
34
 Christian Metz, The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and Cinema, translated by The Society 
for Education in Film and Television, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 48 
35
 Metz, (1982), 48 
36
 Metz, (1982), 48 
37
 Christian Metz, in Braudy and Cohen, (1999), 814 
  
 
 20
something else and accomplish a ‘transference’ of reality, involving a whole 
affective, perceptual, and intellective activity”38.   
However, the spectator’s awareness of the apparatus does not 
necessarily allow him the critical distance to achieve an awareness of the 
machinations of the ideological text.  As Metz suggests: 
This perceived-imaginary material is deposited in me as if on a 
second screen…cinema… inscribes an empty emplacement 
for the spectator-subject, an all-powerful position…[And] as he 
identified with himself as look, the spectator can do no other 
than identify with the camera…his identification with the 
movement of the camera being that of a transcendental, not an 
empirical subject.”39   
Metz’s spectator then, is a subject formed through the text, and as such is 
subject to the workings of the ideology contained therein.   
Moreover, despite Metz’s acknowledgment of the presence of the ‘sense 
organs’ within the physical space of cinema, his spectator is no more embodied 
than Baudry’s.  Metz’s spectator is an ‘all-perceiving’40 subject who “identifies 
with himself, with himself as a pure act of perception”41.  The ‘impression of 
reality’ at the cinema therefore depends on the fact that viewer enters a kind of 
sub-motor, hyper-perceptive state within the auditorium.  Indeed, he suggests 
that, “the spectator’s impressions, during a film’s projection, are divided into two 
entirely separate ‘series’:…the ‘visual series’ (that is to say, the film, the 
diegesis) and the ‘proprioceptive series’ (one’s sense of one’s own body…as 
when one shifts around in one’s seat for a more comfortable position).”42 
While at first glance, this division of the cinematic experience into these 
two ‘series’ might seem to provide a theoretical space for the consideration of 
the physical, corporeal spectator, but Metz quickly recovers this potential by 
reiterating Baudry.  For Metz, cinematic effects depend on the fact that these 
two ‘series’ of impressions are of different registers.  That is, it is precisely 
“because the world does not intrude upon the fiction and constantly deny its 
claim to reality…that a film’s diegesis can yield the peculiar and well-known 
impression of reality that we are trying to understand here.”43  The ‘impression of 
reality’ then, depends on the spectator ‘forgetting’ or ‘ignoring’ the viewing body 
in order to take up a position as an ‘all-perceiving subject’ within the text.  In this 
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respect, the cinema screen therefore becomes “a veritable psychical substitute, 
a prosthesis for our primarily dislocated limbs”44. 
Metz’s spectator therefore falls prey to the same universalism, 
essentialism and totalism that arise from a reliance on a singular and 
homogenous account of the spectatorial psyche.  It ignores social and cultural 
difference among the audience, and elides an analysis of the social 
circumstances within which viewing takes place.  Moreover, in both cases the 
spectator is seen to be a disembodied subject, free to take up a position as a 
transcendental being within the text, while his body remains passive and 
immobilised within the cinema auditorium.   
Moreover, the characterisation of the body within Metz’s account is that 
of a ‘two-way conduit’, on the one hand channelling information from the sensory 
organs from the outside, and on the other providing a vehicle of expression for 
the private, and incommunicable psyche.  As Grosz sees it, the problem with 
this model of the body is that “its corporeality must be reduced to a predictable, 
knowable transparency; its constitutive role in forming thoughts, feelings, 
emotions, and psychic representations must be ignored”45.  The body is a purely 
passive object through which the spectator’s relations with the screen are 
channelled. And reading the text is an act of pure perception over which the 
body has little or no influence.  As such the very real social and cultural 
differences that arise from the differences between bodies are easily ignored. 
Furthermore, this account of the body borrows from a long history in 
which “philosophy as we know it has established itself as a form of knowing, a 
form of rationality, only through the disavowal of the body, specifically the male 
body, and the corresponding elevation of the mind as a disembodied term.”46  
Within this tradition, the body comes to be defined in naturalistic, ahistorical and 
passive terms.  And as Grosz points out, the opposition between mind and body 
comes to be correlated with a whole range of other dualisms, not least of which 
is “the opposition between male and female, where man and mind, woman and 
body, become representationally aligned”.47  Man therefore is capable of 
transcendence in a way in which women are not. 
What this analysis suggests is a clear association between embodied 
spectatorship and femininity.  However, as we will see in later chapters in an 
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investigation of subjectivity, the body and contemporary cinema, this turns out 
not to be the case.  Indeed within the discourses of media effects, it is the 
masculine body that is a clear cause for concern.  And while Grosz’s theory 
remains valid insofar as these problematic viewers are identified and 
categorised through the language of deviancy, there is a certain tendency within 
this discourse to problematise masculinity as a whole.   
 
 
 
Challenges to the metapsychological theories 
 
 
Grosz’s criticism of the philosophies of the body which underpin theories 
of the apparatus notwithstanding, direct challenges to the classical 
metapsychological approach have come from three main sources: feminist 
theory, critiques of visual culture and the work of audience/reception studies.  
Foremost amongst feminist critics was Laura Mulvey whose highly influential 
essay ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ came to dominate discussions of 
spectatorship in the years following its publication.  In this paper, Mulvey 
employed the tools of Lacanian psychoanalysis to demonstrate the ways in 
which “film reflects, reveals and even plays on the straight, socially established 
interpretation of sexual difference which controls images, erotic ways of looking 
and spectacle.”48  Moreover, she argued that the classical cinematic apparatus 
created a particular form of spectatorship, rooted in patriarchal, masculine, 
Oedipal desires.   
Mulvey’s essay sought to challenge Metz and Baudry’s universalistic 
account of spectatorship by demonstrating that the ideology of the cinema was 
far from gender neutral.  In terms of both the construction of the image and 
looking relations, the classical narrative film addressed itself to a male spectator. 
That is, as Mulvey herself puts it Hollywood cinema from the Classical era, 
exemplified in the works of Joseph von Sternberg and Alfred Hitchcock, was 
dominated by an “eroticized cinematic look” that was “inscribed on the screen 
through its cinematic organization, point of view, privileged screen space, and so 
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on, and that this way of looking is understood as gendered ‘male’”.49  Mulvey’s 
spectatorial subject sought pleasure in the cinema, and that pleasure was to be 
found in the fulfilment of ‘masculine’ scopophilic and narcissistic desires.  
 Like both Baudry and Metz, Mulvey draws on Lacan’s theory of the 
mirror stage, suggesting that the cinematic apparatus, the darkened room, the 
silver screen, and the spectator’s subordination to the narrative flow, were 
central to promoting both a voyeuristic and a narcissistic relation to the screen.50 
Mulvey argued that the spectator misrecognised the image on the screen as his 
own likeness, and adopted it as representation of an idealised self.  And since in 
classical narrative film it was predominantly male protagonists who were active 
agents, controlling both the narrative events and ‘the look’ within the film, male 
viewers were offered a figure to identify with, a “reflected body of the self”51 to 
enact their desires and fantasies.  For Mulvey, the spectator’s projection of his 
look onto this central protagonist fulfilled a primitive narcissistic desire for 
mastery and control.  That is, “he projects his look onto that of his like, his 
screen surrogate, so that the power of the male protagonist as he controls 
events coincides with the active power of the erotic look…giving a satisfying 
sense of omnipotence.”52  
However, the pleasure gained from looking at the screen is not simply a 
question of narcissistic identification with the central protagonist.  Central to 
Mulvey’s argument is the recognition that in a cinema structured by the male 
gaze, women become objects of sexual stimulation.  Within classical narrative 
films, she suggests, women are displayed for both characters onscreen, and the 
spectator within the theatre.  Hence the appearance of the woman within the 
classical narrative film tends to interrupt the flow of narrative:   
Women are simultaneously looked at and displayed, with their 
appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact…The 
presence of woman is an indispensable element of spectacle 
in normal narrative film, yet her visual presence tends to work 
against the development of a story-line, to freeze the flow of 
action in moments of erotic contemplation.53 
The woman’s body then, becomes a pure spectacle, fragmented by close-ups, 
and styled for maximum eroticism. 
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Within this essay, pleasure in cinema revolves around the spectator’s 
narcissistic and scopophilic look at the human body.  The body therefore 
provides a locus for identification and an object of sexual desire.  However, the 
spectator appears to be no more embodied than Metz or Baudry’s.  Mulvey’s 
spectator is constituted as a physical being, whose body is important only 
insofar as it contributes to the structuring of gendered desire. So while Mulvey is 
principally concerned with providing an account of sexual difference within 
cinematic texts, her model of cinematic subjectivity implicitly incorporates an 
essentialist theory of gender, insofar as anatomy becomes the spectator’s 
identificatory destiny.  Moreover, Mulvey’s universalistic account of the 
masculine psyche/masculine desire within her ‘Visual Pleasure’ essay elides the 
wider social, cultural and historical differences between spectators. 
 In many respects, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ was a product 
of its time.  As a result, its polemical tone asserts a somewhat totalising vision of 
the Classical Hollywood film.54  Indeed as Mulvey herself acknowledges, in her 
emphatic insistence on the masculinity of the spectator, she inadvertently 
“closed off avenues of inquiry that should have been followed up”,55 not least of 
which was the question of the female spectator.  The implications of the essay 
on ‘Visual Pleasure’ were somewhat pessimistic.  That is, in addressing the 
male viewer, Classical Hollywood films had very little to offer women other than 
images of their own objectification and subjection.  While in ‘Afterthoughs on 
‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’’, written some six years later, Mulvey 
attempts to flesh out the ‘dilemma’ faced by the female spectator, which, put 
simply, was to choose between adopting the male gaze, and its concomitant 
‘sadistic’ pleasures, or to “find herself so out of key with the pleasure on offer, 
with its ‘masculinisation’, that the spell of fascination is broken.”56  The choice 
which faced women viewers in other words, was between a form a psychic 
transvesticism in which they became complicit with images of their own 
subjection, a rejection of the film, or an oscillation between the two. 
 Though as Mulvey herself points out, even Classical Hollywood cinema 
is not as monolithic as it first appears.  Indeed she explicitly argues that “no 
ideology can ever pretend to totality: it searches for safety valves for its own 
inconsistencies”.57   One of those ‘safety valves’ was to be found in the 1950s 
melodramas of auteurs like Douglas Sirk, which in presenting a female 
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protagonist’s point of view, and in “witnessing the way sexual difference under 
patriarchy is fraught, explosive, and erupts dramatically into violence within…the 
family”, these films can be seen to “act as a corrective”58 to the male-centred 
genres of the Western and the gangster film.  They worked to expose the cracks 
and fissures implicit in patriarchal culture, opening up spaces for women to 
experience a “dizzy satisfaction in witnessing…the pent-up emotion, bitterness 
and disillusionment well known to women”.59   
 Despite the oppositional potential of 1950s melodrama, by Mulvey’s own 
admission, these narratives often remained confined to issues of sex and the 
family, and as such they were not necessarily either socially progressive, or 
politically efficacious.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s it appeared that the 
only viable alternative to this spectatorial ghettoization of women was to be 
found in the avant-garde, and independent film-making more generally.  Seizing 
the means of filmic production offered the only viable route out of the “monolithic 
accumulation of traditional film conventions”.60  As she puts it, a “break with the 
past has to work through the means of meaning-making itself, subverting its 
norms and refusing its otherwise imperturbable totality.”61  However, this call for 
feminist experimentation with filmmaking practice, outside of the constraints of 
commercial cinema is, from another perspective, a tacit admission that even 
despite the moments of challenge and subversion to be found within Classical 
Hollywood cinema, Mulvey’s spectatrix remains caught in a series of theoretical 
binaries: masculinity and femininity; activity and passivity; spectacle and gaze. 
Mulvey’s early focus on the aesthetic and psychoanalytic dimensions of 
the text has been thoroughly challenged in the intervening years by film 
historians, film sociologists and technological developments alike.  On the one 
hand, scholars have argued that film studies as a whole has chosen to ignore 
the social-historical specificity of both the film industry, and the audience.  While 
on the other, new technologies have opened up novel means of accessing and 
engaging with film texts.  In her later work, Mulvey concedes these elisions.  
Indeed, as she herself puts it, it is not until one moves away from an analysis of 
cinema “within its own aesthetic and psychoanalytic integrity” and instead 
approaches Hollywood “as the specific cinema of the United States at a 
particular moment of its social and economic evolution” that “the simplicity and 
satisfaction of the original theoretical binary opposition of ‘spectacle’ and ‘gaze’ 
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then begins to break down.”62  In this respect, Classical Hollywood’s image of 
woman might be seen to bear witness, “not only to male desire, but also to a 
masking of political conflicts…within American society itself.”63 
Similarly, Mulvey acknowledges the important contribution made by 
feminist film historians in highlighting the centrality of the female viewer in the 
Hollywood of the 1920s, both in terms of Hollywood’s attempts to present the 
aspirations and desires of the 1920s ‘New Woman’ within its narratives, but also 
in the industry’s decision to present a plethora of female-oriented consumer 
goods on-screen, offering itself up as a shop window to young women with 
newly acquired spending power.64  The work of Miriam Hansen suggests that in 
courting female audiences, Hollywood of the 1920s did not necessarily conform 
to the visual or narrative codes described in Mulvey’s 1975 essay.  Indeed, 
Mulvey sees Hansen’s work as “an important corrective” to her early work.  As 
she puts it: 
Valentino, as well as other matinée-idol-type stars of the 
1920’s, upsets my 1975 assumptions about the gendering of 
visual pleasure.  Hansen points out that, as a primary object of 
spectacle for the female audience, Valentino’s persona incurs 
a systematic ‘feminization’, but she ultimately revises the 
unequivocal binarism of Freud’s passive and active 
opposition.65 
While Hansen sees women as being subject to a host of social codes that make 
them more likely to indulge in a “sensuality of vision that contrasts with the goal-
oriented discipline of the one-eyed masculine look”,66 her work nevertheless 
undoes any easy alignment of masculinity with the active, desiring and 
controlling gaze, and femininity with passive, objectified, to-be-looked-at-ness. 
In addition, technological developments have also brought about a 
change in spectatorship.  Cable, satellite, video and gaming technologies all 
clamour for the attention, the leisure time and the disposable income of the 
cinema-going public.  The development and dissemination of these technologies 
has changed both the cinematic marketplace and our understanding of 
spectatorship.  As Miriam Hansen points out,67 under the weight of these 
techno-cultural developments the very category of the spectator developed by 
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film theorists of the 1970s is in some doubt.  It is not simply that the 
universalistic theory of the spectator has been displaced by a theoretical 
emphasis on the historically and culturally situated audience but also that the 
form of spectatorship described by these theories is becoming a thing of the 
past.   
Hansen argues that the proliferation of domestic audio-visual equipment 
significantly challenges cinema by displacing it as the primary site of film 
consumption.  But more importantly, these new technologies also bring about a 
fundamental change in the film/viewer relations.  In the absence of the 
regulatory and disciplinary practices of the cinema, the textual strategies of the 
classical narrative film are no longer adequate to guarantee the spectator's 
absorption in the film.  By providing numerous other distractions and chores the 
domestic viewing environment competes for the viewer's attention, while the 
technologies themselves work to increase the interaction between the film and 
the viewer.  For example, television allows the viewer to comment, criticise or 
even abandon the film without social censure, and video allows the viewer to 
manipulate the viewing experience in an unprecedented fashion.  For Vivian 
Sobchack, the development of these domestic technologies marks a profound 
shift within culture, from the cinematic to the electronic.  As she sees it: 
The ability to control the autonomy and flow of the cinematic 
experience through 'fast-forwarding,' 'replaying,' and 'freezing' and 
the ability to possess the film's body and animate it at will at home 
are functions of the materiality and technological ontology of the 
electronic—a materiality that increasingly dominates, appropriates, 
and transforms the cinematic.68 
There is little doubt that devices such as video, DVD and Blu-ray have 
fundamentally changed our relationship to the filmic text, but the transformation 
of which Sobchack speaks has informed not only our individual relationship with 
film but is exerting an increasing influence over the texts themselves.  As 
Hansen puts it, while "the compulsive temporality of public projection has given 
way to ostensibly more self-regulated yet privatised, distracted and fragmented 
acts of consumption", 69 the spatioperceptual configuration of these 'new' 
technologies within the domestic environment has also shattered "the spell of 
the classical diegesis", and the 'illusionistic absorption' of the viewer that was 
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considered by Baudry to be the hallmark of classical narrative cinema has 
effectively broken down. 
 For Mulvey though, it is the interactive quality of these new technologies 
that mounts the greatest challenge to early formulations of gendered 
spectatorship.  The capacity to intervene in the flow of narrative, to pause, skip, 
repeat or even access additional material, fundamentally undermines narrative 
cinema’s linear structure and attacks the text’s original cohesion.  What it 
delivers in its place is what Mulvey calls an aesthetic of delay, replete with 
multiple and shifting modes of spectatorship.  She argues that on the one hand, 
delayed cinema produces a pensive spectator who is concerned with the 
visibility of time, in particular, halting the relentless flow of narrative time in order 
to perceive and contemplate the moment of the pro-filmic event, while on the 
other hand it produces a possessive spectator who is able to access the film 
fetishistically, and consume individual images in ways that were hitherto 
unknown.   
These new modes of viewing clearly challenge metapsychological 
theory’s construction of a singular, universal spectator, held in thrall to the 
machinations of the cinematic apparatus.  If the spectator is able to control the 
flow of narrative, Mulvey argues, “The process of identification, usually kept in 
place by the relation between plot and character, suspense and transcendence, 
loses its hold over the spectator.”70  Moreover, the male protagonist’s role in 
leading the action and controlling narrative development, and the woman’s role 
in providing indispensible moments of erotic spectacle, are also undone in the 
aesthetics of delay: 
With the weakening of narrative and its effects, the aesthetic of 
the film begins to become ‘feminized’, with the shift in 
spectatorial power relations dwelling on pose, stillness, lighting 
and the choreography of character and camera…The 
‘fetishistic spectator’ becomes more fascinated by image than 
plot, returning compulsively to privileged moments, investing 
emotion and ‘visual pleasure’ in any slight gesture, a particular 
look or exchange taking place on the screen.71   
Under these conditions, images of the male star are easily extracted from the 
narrative flow, making him an overt object of the spectator’s fetishistic look.  As 
such he becomes an object of erotic contemplation for the spectator, shifting the 
locus of mastery and control from the male protagonist to the ‘feminized’ 
spectator. 
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New technologies therefore have the capacity to wholly undermine the 
gendered relations of looking produced by the conflation of the cinematic 
apparatus and the patriarchal culture that underpinned 1950s Hollywood 
cinema.  But perhaps more significantly, this new found aesthetics of delay, may 
also have the capacity to destabilise gendered performance itself.  As Mulvey 
suggests: 
Star performance depends on pose, moments of almost 
invisible stillness, in which the body is displayed for the 
spectator’s visual pleasure…Female screen performance has 
always, quite overtly, included this kind of exhibitionistic 
display.  But the delayed cinema reveals that the stillness and 
pose of the male star may be more masked, but is still an 
essential attribute of his screen performance.72 
As such, the spectator’s ability to freeze the flow of the film has the capacity to 
undermine stereotypical notions that underpin representations of gender and 
sexual difference on the screen.  And by extension, the collapsing of gender 
difference on-screen has the potential to lead the spectator to question essential 
differences between the genders more generally. 
In her later work, Mulvey has done much to assuage her detractors.  In 
contrast to her seminal essay ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, Mulvey 
recognises and acknowledges the specificity of Hollywood cinema in the 
Classical era and the social and historical contingency of the spectatorial 
pleasures to be found there.  Moreover, the proliferation of new technologies for 
viewing film has led her to develop an understanding of spectator-text relations 
that recognises that the spectator’s investments in and engagements with the 
screen might be more multiple and diverse than her original essay suggested.  
In Death 24x a Second Mulvey also undoes the essential passivity that 
characterised her early formulations of spectatorship.  The contemporary 
spectator is no longer at the mercy of the relentless flow of the cinematic 
apparatus, and as a result, the discovery and elaboration of an oppositional 
aesthetic that was central to Mulvey’s original feminist agenda, is to be found not 
only in the technologies of production, but also in the technologies of 
consumption. 
As Mulvey rightly suggests, this kind of digital, interactive spectatorship 
“affects the internal pattern of narrative: sequences can be easily skipped or 
repeated, overturning hierarchies of privilege, and setting up unexpected links 
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that displace the chain of meaning…attacking the text’s original cohesion.”73  For 
Mulvey such an attack has immense political potential in helping to erase sexual 
difference within film.  Indeed the potential for the spectator to use an aesthetic 
of delay to read a text “perversely against the grain of the film”,74 opens up the 
potential for the spectator to resist the prevailing ideology of gender, and in the 
process to become both more active and empowered.  However, this shift in 
power from the producer to the consumer brings with it a number of cultural 
anxieties. 
As we shall see later in this thesis, the capacity of the spectator to 
intervene in the flow of narrative and to wrest images and scenes from their 
original context, is an explicit source of regulatory concern.  As a result, the 
BBFC Guidelines suggest that classification decisions with regard to video 
works will be stricter precisely because they may be “replayed or viewed out of 
context”.75  Similarly, this shift in power has provoked theorists and film-makers 
alike to speculate on the deleterious effects of giving control over the spectator.  
Drawing on an interview with Federico Fellini, Richard Rushton suggests that, 
while the capacity to interact with the film text may to some extent radicalize it, 
this manipulation means that: 
Film loses its autonomy, it loses its separation from me, it 
loses its challenge to me, and merely becomes and object for 
me…with modes of reception like…interactivity, cinema will no 
longer be able to offer any challenges to spectators.  Any 
challenges will be instantly dismissed, obliterated, so that…the 
sanctity of any viewing subject will not be ruffled.76 
What these anxieties and criticisms suggest however, is not so much a 
fundamental problem with Mulvey’s conceptualisation of contemporary, digital 
spectatorship.  Rather they provide a revealing insight into the way in which 
viewers are perceived by certain sectors of our culture.  These formulations of 
the spectator are both somewhat disparaging, suggesting that s/he is at best 
lazy and vulnerable, and at worst dangerous and insular.   
Rushton’s project, it should be noted, is not to criticize the work of 
Mulvey per se, but rather to explore the potential of a Deleuzian formulation of 
spectatorship.  Nevertheless, with respect to his criticisms, the act of choosing 
whether or not to watch a ‘challenging’ or ‘intimidating’ film by Bergman or 
Antonioni pre-dates the invention of the television remote.  Similarly, despite the 
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narrative’s relentless flow in the cinematic apparatus, spectators were never 
forced to endure films they did not enjoy.  Leaving the cinema or simply refusing 
to see the film in the first place has always been an option.  However, the value 
of Rushton’s criticism is in its careful differentiation between being physically 
active, in freezing, skipping and repeating, and being critically active, in 
questioning the ideological assumptions that underpin the text.  Mulvey herself 
sees the process of halting the film as enabling critical intervention, or at the 
very least a kind of pleasure “reminiscent of the processes of textual analysis 
that open up understanding”.77  But for Rushton this new form of spectatorial 
‘activity’ is replete with “an attitude of maintaining the certainty of one’s own 
thoughts and refusing the invitation to think another’s thoughts or to experience 
another’s sensations.”78   
Rushton’s radical reassertion of the liberating qualities of passivity 
notwithstanding, Mulvey’s formulation of the spectator retains a kind of 
technological determinism.  While she may acknowledge the social and 
historical contingency of spectatorship, and the specificity of contemporary 
modes of ‘pensive’ and ‘possessive’ spectatorship, in Mulvey’s view these 
“emerge from a delayed cinema”.79  To put it another way, while new 
technologies have enabled the contemporary spectator to escape the narrative 
flow, seemingly so central to the his or her ideological interpellation within the 
cinematic apparatus, the spectator’s capacity to intervene and undermine the 
deterministic features of the text, depend precisely on his or her use of new 
technologies.  Which leaves the question of how the viewing relations of the 
contemporary cinema spectator have been constructed, entirely unanswered. 
 
 
 
Machines of the Visible 
 
 
The second challenge to metapsychological theory has come from 
studies of visual culture.  In particular, proponents of visual culture have moved 
away from a characterisation of the cinema as a restaging of the universal mise-
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en-scène of the psyche, or as a site of primal desires and drives, and have 
sought instead to highlight the socially constructed nature of cinema and the 
social and historical specificity of spectatorial relations.  Moreover, studies of 
visual culture have criticised the singular focus on visual perception within the 
cinema, and as a result have attempted to account for a more corporeal relation 
with the screen. 
Precursors of the contemporary concern with the analysis of visual 
culture include Jean-Louis Comolli who during the late 1970s and early 1980s 
worked to explore the notion of the apparatus without relying on speculative 
accounts of the mirror stage, oedipal desires or scopic drives.  Instead, Comolli 
asserted a ‘materialist’ account of the development of cinema, which argued that 
cinema is more than simply an arrangement of instruments: camera, screen, 
projector.  It is a social machine, born “from the anticipation and confirmation of 
its social profitability; economic, ideological and symbolic.”80  Indeed, Comolli 
argues that all the elements of cinema, (camera, projector, ‘strip of images’) 
“were already there, more or less ready, more or less invented, a long time 
already before the formal invention of cinema”. 81 What was missing from these 
early technologies however, was “the arrangement of demands, desires, 
fantasies, speculations (in the two senses of commerce and the imaginary): an 
arrangement which gives apparatus and techniques a social status and 
function.”82  But while the cinema may depend on the fantasies and desires of 
the public for its invention, Comolli does not attempt to account for their source 
or structure.  Rather he sketches a history of cinema “as an intersection of 
technical, aesthetic, social and ideological determinations.”83 
For Comolli cinema participates in what he terms the ‘ideology of the 
visible’.  The ‘impression of reality’ is not the result of the arrangement of the 
cinematic machinery.  Rather it arises through a cultural insistence on the 
relation between truth and vision.  As he puts it, “cinema postulated that from the 
‘real’ to the visual and from the visual to its filmed reproduction a same truth was 
infinitely reflected, without distortion or loss.”84  Comolli suggests that this 
assertion is the result of technologically determinist accounts of the origins of 
cinema, which stress the technical nature of the machinery involved, and 
                                               
80
 Jean-Louis Comolli, ‘Machines of the Visible’, in The Cinematic Apparatus, ed. Teresa de 
Lauretis and Stephen Heath, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1980), 122 
81
 Comolli, (1980), 122 
82
 Comolli, (1980), 122 
83
 Lev Manovich, ‘Assembling Reality: Myths of Computer Graphics’, Afterimage 20, no.2, 
(September 1992): 12 
84
 Serge Daney, ‘Sur Salador’, Cahiers du Cinema, no. 222, (July 1970) : 39, in Comolli, (1980), 
126 
  
 
 33
emphasise the precision of the camera/lens in capturing the profilmic event.  
However, this description of cinema not only neglected an analysis of cinema as 
a ‘social machine’, but in collapsing the whole machinery of cinema to a single 
optical instrument such analyses were symptomatic of a wider ‘hegemony of the 
eye’, which places human vision at the centre of representation, to the exclusion 
of other forms of representational practice: 
It is therefore necessary to change perspective, that is, to take 
into account what the gesture picking out the camera sets 
aside in its movement, in order to avoid that the stress on the 
camera – necessary and productive – is not reinscribed in the 
very ideology to which it points.85 
For Comolli then, these accounts of the history and functioning of cinema are 
clearly reductive, precluding questions about the wider economic and ideological 
forces that work to shape both the technology of cinema and the codes and 
conventions that govern its texts. 
 
 
 
The Corporeal Subject 
 
  
 Like Comolli, Jonathan Crary is also concerned with the ‘hegemony of 
the eye’, but for him, the question is not how we have come to understand 
cinema so much as how subjectivity itself has been produced.  As he suggests 
in Techniques of the Observer,86 film theory, like the history of art, tends to rely 
on the shifts in representational practice in order to account for changes in the 
viewing subject; a perspective which simply cannot account for the ways in 
which vision itself has been historically constructed.  Like Metz and Baudry, 
Crary’s project is to reveal the apparatus that structures the subjectivity of the 
viewer.  However, Crary eschews any metapsychological approach to the 
apparatus, and draws instead on a more Foucaultian notion of the dispositif in 
his analysis of the social, technological, institutional and discursive relations that 
shape both models of vision and the observer.  His project is to uncover the 
“massive reorganization of knowledge and social practices that modified in 
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myriad ways the productive, cognitive, and desiring capacities of the human 
subject.”87 
By analysing the discourses of physiology in the early 1800’s and tracing 
the development of certain optical technologies Crary aims to sketch the “crucial 
ways in which vision was discussed, controlled, and incarnated in cultural and 
scientific practices”88 in this era.  In particular, he seeks to demonstrate that the 
spectator was not always conceived as a disembodied subject constituted 
through a ‘pure act of perception’.  But rather, in the early nineteenth century 
there was a radical rupture in the way in which the “observer was figured in a 
wide range of social practices and domains of knowledge.”89  More specifically, 
Crary contrasts two kinds of visual technologies, the camera obscura and the 
stereoscope, “not for the models of representation they imply” 90, but as “points 
of intersection where philosophical, scientific, and aesthetic discourses overlap 
with mechanical techniques, institutional requirements, and socioeconomic 
forces."91  That is, Crary interprets these optical devices “as sites of both 
knowledge and power that operate directly on the body of the individual.”92   
For Crary, the camera obscura represents more than a simple form of 
entertainment.  Rather, since the beginning of the 1500s, the camera obscura 
has been the dominant model used to explain human vision, and the relationship 
between the perceiving subject and external reality.  For over two hundred 
years, Crary explains, the camera obscura was not only a means of scientific 
inquiry and artistic practice, but it also acted as the singular metaphor used 
within philosophy to explain how the act of observation can yield truthful 
inferences about the world.  Moreover, this model of ‘objective’ vision presented 
a corollary account of subjectivity, which has persisted in contemporary 
accounts of spectatorship. 
Indeed Crary suggests that these theories of the spectator posit cinema 
as the culmination of technologies that began with the ‘camera obscura’.  As a 
result they see cinema as analogous to a prior technology which necessarily 
isolates and individuates, creating in the process an “observer who is nominally 
a free sovereign individual and a privatised subject confined in a quasi-domestic 
space, cut off from a public exterior world.”93  In addition, the model of the 
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camera obscura decisively severed the connection between the act of seeing 
and the physical body of the observer.  In Crary’s terms, it ‘decorporealised’ 
vision, by positing a site in which “the observer's physical and sensory 
experience is supplanted by the relations between a mechanical apparatus and 
a pre-given world of objective truth”94, becoming in the process “a disembodied 
witness to a mechanical and transcendental representation of the objectivity of 
the world.”95  
As a result, theories of subjectivity based on the model of the camera 
obscura, including the discussions of cinematic spectatorship which followed, 
present the spectator as a disembodied, masterful eye; a transcendental subject 
of vision.  But further, as Comolli would suggest, the model of the camera 
obscura becomes a cornerstone of the ‘ideology of the visible’ insofar as it both 
posits a veridical relationship between truth and vision, and it suggests a 
spectator who is “independent of the machinery of representations”, a machinery 
which “prevents the observer from seeing his or her position as part of the 
representation.”96 
However, in the early nineteenth century, a number of medical 
researchers began to challenge the idea that the eye was simply a neutral 
register, like the empty interior space of the camera obscura.  Goethe, for 
example, used the example of the retinal afterimage to demonstrate that vision 
was an amalgam of physiological processes and external stimulation.  These 
afterimages, which had been observed since antiquity, had previously been 
considered only as illusions, outside the margins of the domain of optics.  But in 
the early nineteenth century these experiences became central to the 
understanding of vision.  Goethe had produced an image of “a newly productive 
observer whose body had a range of capacities to generate visual 
experience…visual experience that does not refer or correspond to anything 
external to the observing subject.”97 
This privileging of the body as visual producer immediately began to 
collapse the distinction between inner and outer upon which the model of the 
camera obscura was based.  The eye was no longer considered to work in a 
disembodied fashion, capturing sights in an objective manner.  Vision was found 
to be subjective, a distinctly temporal unfolding of processes within the body.  
For Crary, this new science of vision produces “a moment when the visible 
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escapes from the timeless incorporeal order of the camera obscura and 
becomes lodged in another apparatus, within the unstable physiology and 
temporality of the human body.”98  Vision therefore, came to be understood as 
an organic, bodily mechanism fundamentally implicated in the failings of the 
human body, and entirely susceptible to misperception.  The eye and the mind 
could be tricked.  But more than this, the eye was reconfigured as part of the 
body, vision was as much a sensation as touch, and moreover, the sensations 
of the body were understood to be linked.  Vision had a physiological and bodily 
basis.   
In contrast to the camera obscura then, the stereoscope was developed 
on the basis of research carried out in the 1820s and 1830s on subjective vision.  
It presented two non-identical images of the same scene, that when viewed 
through a device with two lenses, offers the viewer a three-dimensional image.  
The stereoscope, in Crary’s view, radically breaks down the disembodied, 
monocular and centred subject implied by Renaissance perspective.  Indeed, as 
Crary puts it: 
Perspective is not even a possibility under the terms of this 
technique of beholding. An observer no longer sees an image 
that has an intelligible or quantifiable location in space, but 
rather a hallucinatory composite of two dissimilar images 
whose positions refer to the anatomical structure of the 
observer's body.99 
The stereoscope therefore incorporates the body in its mode of consumption in 
two ways.  Firstly, the ability to perceive the three-dimensional image depends 
on a direct physical engagement with the optical apparatus, itself modelled on 
the ‘awkward binocular body’.  And secondly, the text or image depends on the 
human observer for its verisimilitude.  Indeed, as Crary suggests, the 
stereoscopic image doesn’t actually exist, it is an illusion created as a direct 
result of the observer’s physiologically determined experience of the two 
images. 
The observer of the stereoscopic image therefore, has achieved a new 
‘corporeality of vision’.  Within his model, the boundaries between the body and 
the image break down.  Looking at an image stimulates the eye; it is, in itself, a 
sensation.  Moreover, it also blurs the boundaries between the body and the 
machine.  The eye does not passively observe an external reality presented by 
the workings of the apparatus; the body must become part of the optical 
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machinery in order for a coherent image to exist.  The stereoscope cannot 
function without the presence of, and without the specific qualities of the 
physical, bodily eye.   
  The demise of the stereoscope as a popular form of visual consumption, 
and the radical reassertion of the camera obscura as a model of representation, 
vision and subjectivity in the development and dissemination of photography and 
cinema throughout the twentieth century, does not undermine the insight 
provided by these alternative forms of spectatorship.  Crary however, may not 
put it in such terms.  Throughout his study he self-consciously abandons the 
term spectator in favour of the term observer.  Unlike ‘spectator’, which has its 
roots in the latin spectare, ‘to look at’, Crary adopts the term ‘observer’, from 
observare, ‘to conform one’s actions, to comply with’.  But this is no mere 
semantic quarrel.  Crary chooses the term in order to highlight the fact that 
questions of vision and technologies of the image and representation are 
“fundamentally questions about the body and the operation of social power.”100  
That is, “vision and its effects are always inseparable from the possibilities of an 
observing subject who is both the historical product and the site of certain 
practices, techniques, institutions, and procedures of subjectification.”101  The 
cinematic spectator then is not the inevitable result of the arrangement of 
cinematic space, nor yet a simple effect of the text, but a subject produced 
through a plethora of discourses and practices.   
Despite the triumph of the monocular perspective in popular visual 
entertainment, and the re-emergence of the camera obscura as an explanatory 
model within classical film theory, both of which are founded “on the denial of 
the body, its pulsings and phantasms, as the ground of vision”102, the value of 
Crary’s project lies in the fact he 
begins to speak of spectatorship without invoking the 
judgement against its bodily implications that have been in 
effect since Plato: that the image’s seduction of the body is to 
be defended against by models of vision that emphasize 
control, mastery, and knowledge rather than pleasure, 
implication, and assault.103 
As Williams suggests, Crary’s work profoundly affects our thinking about 
spectatorship and the pleasures of cinema.  However, while Crary’s sketch of 
nineteenth century discourses of the observer help us to see the socio-historical 
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specificity of classical film theory’s ‘disembodied spectator’, I am sceptical about 
the degree to which the reinsertion of the body into discourses cinematic 
consumption breaks down the moral suspicion that accompanies such bodily 
pleasures.  Indeed as I will seek to show within this thesis, while the physicality 
of cinematic pleasure is clearly emphasised within film marketing to the extent 
that the typical Hollywood action film is likely to offer itself up as a ‘roller coaster 
ride of a movie’, and the contemporary horror film will highlight, perhaps even 
exaggerate its capacity to provoke the physical experience of fear or revulsion, 
the rigorous policing of cinema in the United Kingdom by the British Board of 
Film Classification, as well as the frequent moral panics about the effects of sex 
and violence in the moving image, reveal the profound anxiety that the ‘image’s 
seduction of the body’ provokes.  Even amongst the more legitimate or 
mundane sections of cinema, those genres which conspicuously display bodies 
on screen and consciously attempt to register their sensational effects in the 
bodies of the viewer, have been a allotted a conspicuously low cultural status,104 
highlighting the profound mistrust that cultural commentators have of the bodily 
pleasures.   
Moreover, attempts by writers such as Steven Shaviro to radically 
reinsert the body into film theory, have perhaps inadvertently strengthened the 
moral suspicion that surrounds the visceral thrills of cinema.  Shaviro’s intention 
in his book The Cinematic Body is, of course, quite different.  Most obviously, he 
is concerned to sweep away the legacy of psychoanalytic film theory and assert 
a model of spectatorship that rests upon the physical and affective experience of 
cinema.  Drawing on the work of Deleuze and Guattari, Shaviro suggests that 
“the overwhelming experience of visual fascination in the cinema…is one of 
radical passivity.”105  This notion of ‘radical passivity’ seeks to undo the active- 
male/passive-female binary that underpinned Mulvey’s early film theory, at the 
same time as it suggests a mode of relating to the screen as a thoroughly 
embodied process. 
For Shaviro, “cinematic images are not representations, but events”.106  
That is: 
Film viewing offers an immediacy and violence of sensation 
that powerfully engages the eye and body of the 
spectator…Images confront the viewer directly, without 
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mediation…We respond viscerally to visual forms before we 
have the leisure to read or interpret them.107  
As such, the spectator experiences the film directly through the body, with a 
speed and intensity that precludes any critical or analytic distance from the 
images and sensations that bombard him or her.  Shaviro sees this intense 
physical engagement with the screen as preceding any act of analysis or 
interpretation, indeed ruling out this kind of activity of ‘reading’ at the moment of 
consumption, in favour of a ‘raw’ experience of visceral affect.  As he puts it, “the 
experience of watching a film remains stubbornly…prereflective…any 
detachment from ‘raw phenomena’…is radically impossible.”108 
In contrast to the figurations of the classical apparatus theories of Metz 
and Baudry, the spectator does not respond to an image as if it were a real 
object; s/he responds to the image itself.  S/he is affected not by any supposed 
representational verisimilitude of the image, but by the visceral insistence of its 
presence and its movement.  It is not a question of cinema’s ‘reality effect’, the 
reactions of viewers cannot be characterised as a hallucinatory belief in the 
reality of the illusion.  Rather, the spectator’s heightened involvement with the 
image is more in the order of the direct stimulation of the optic nerves, 
bypassing the cognitive and reflective faculties altogether. 
The value of Shaviro’s work lies in his recognition that the body is 
absolutely central to cinematic subjectivity.  Moreover, Shaviro takes pains to 
remind us of the constructed nature of the body when he argues that, “the 
opposition between the biological and the cultural is a false one, for the…body is 
[always] steeped in and invested by culture.” 109  Bodies then are not ‘natural’ 
entities, they are objects thoroughly invested with power.  A power which has 
the potential “to colonise bodies” and to “channel the modes of sensory 
perception”.110  Indeed as Foucault argues, “deployments of power are directly 
connected to the body – to bodies, functions, physiological processes, 
sensations, and pleasures”.111  Bodies, and hence the experiences and 
sensations gained through those bodies are profoundly shaped by the culture in 
which we live.  Indeed Shaviro suggests that contemporary theory ought to be “a 
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question of learning to analyse the politics of the regulation of bodies, and of the 
distribution of pleasures and pains”.112   
There is, therefore, a significant disjuncture between this argument and 
his insistence on the “primordial forms of raw sensation: affect, excitation, 
stimulation and repression, pleasure and pain, shock and habit.”113  Shaviro’s 
insistence on the violence and the immediacy of the image is partly a concern to 
break down the mind/body divide that lies behind classical film theory and 
eradicate the idea of the transcendent, disembodied subject.  It is also partly a 
demonstration of his commitment to a Deleuzian notion of radical passivity, in 
which it is only through giving up control and forgetting oneself in the face of the 
cinema screen that one is able to truly open oneself up to another’s way of 
seeing, experiencing and knowing the world.   
So while in the first instance Shaviro’s intention is to refute the idea that 
the cinematic experience is primarily a cognitive one, his insistence on the 
‘rawness’ of film, and the ‘immediacy’ with which the spectator is affected, 
means that he elides the culturally constructed nature of experience itself.  That 
is, the body is never ‘raw’, and nor is it simply a palimpsest upon which culture 
has been inscribed, rather the body itself is culturally constructed,114 and as a 
result our direct experiences are always in some way mediated by the culture in 
which we live.  Indeed, as we have learned from anthropologists, even our most 
visceral of reactions are profoundly shaped by culture.115  In seeking to dispel 
the Cartesian myth through an insistence on the physicality of cinema, I would 
suggest that Shaviro has also expelled the ‘layers’ of culture which shape our 
perception at the most fundamental level.   
Moreover, any political commitment to Shaviro’s notion of ‘radical 
passivity’ is inherently risky.  Firstly, as Richard Rushton suggests, opening 
“ourselves up to other ways of experiencing and knowing…is by no means a 
tactic free of peril – one can be as much absorbed by Triumph of the Will (Leni 
Riefenstahl, 1935) as by Sans Soliel (Chris Marker, 1983); and films can deliver 
to us the brains of idiots as much as it can deliver brains of inspiration of 
genius.”116  Rushton’s choice of films is illustrative here as it suggests his 
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residual discomfort at simply giving oneself over to a text suffused with ideology 
with which he (presumably) does not agree.  
The second related issue is with Shaviro’s characterisation of the 
cinematic experience itself:  
Images…affect me in a manner that does not leave room for 
any suspension of response.  I have already been touched and 
altered by these sensations, even before I have had the 
chance to become conscious of them…There is no way to 
watch a film without allowing this to happen; I can resist it only 
by giving up on the film altogether, by shutting my eyes or 
walking out… as I watch, I have no presence of mind: sight 
and hearing, anticipation and memory, are no longer my own.  
My responses are not internally motivated and are not 
spontaneous; they are forced upon me from beyond.117  
While there is certainly a universalising tendency at work here, Shaviro’s 
description pertains to what he calls ‘cinematic fascination’, and indeed in this 
regard, the account above speaks volumes about Shaviro’s own cinephilia.  The 
difficulty with Shaviro’s model of spectatorship however, is not the passivity of 
the spectator per se, but rather it is his description of the immediacy and force of 
the image.  That is, it appears to wrest any sense of agency or interpretive 
capacity away from the spectator in favour of a text which does not merely 
determine but forces a particular response.  This characterisation of 
spectator/text relations therefore flies in the face of the many audience studies 
which seek to highlight the diverse range of readings and responses viewers 
have in relation to media texts.  Shaviro might argue that audiences only come 
to report a diverse set of responses and readings after the filmic event, thereby 
reflecting on the experience only after it has occurred, and as such they do not 
necessarily undermine his description of the event itself.  He nevertheless 
leaves very little room for any consideration of how those immediate responses, 
(in the sense of happening in the present rather than in the sense of 
unmediated), might themselves be shaped both by the context of viewing and by 
the prevailing culture within which this occurs. 
The other more troubling issue with Shaviro’s model of cinematic 
fascination is that it sits uncomfortably close to the models of viewing that 
underpin the ‘media effects’ debates.  In that Shaviro describes not just an 
‘opening of oneself to an experience’, but in his choice of language he attributes 
to the film text a form power and control that the viewer is seemingly helpless to 
resist.  In Shaviro’s words he is ‘altered’ by the sensations of film quite before he 
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has the opportunity to reflect on what is happening on the screen, and before he 
is even conscious of them.  Moreover, he suggests those responses are ‘forced’ 
on the viewer by the text.  The ‘risk’ Rushton identifies in opening oneself up to 
the experience of a film that may be ideologically unsound, becomes all the 
more acute in the context of viewing depictions of sexual violence.  As we shall 
see, the fears that circulate around such images are, precisely, that one might 
be ‘altered’ without being conscious of it, that one’s responses might be wholly 
determined by the text, and that one is helpless to resist unless one chooses to 
look away or to leave the cinema.  Indeed, it is these very suggestions that form 
the basis for the argument for the institutional censorship of film.  As such, the 
choice to adopt Shaviro’s model of spectatorship risks exacerbating the cultural 
anxiety provoked by the ‘image’s seduction of the body’ rather than helping us to 
challenge it.   
In contrast to Shaviro’s assertion of ‘radical passivity’, Vivian Sobchack 
adopts a more phenomenological approach to the problem of the body within 
film theory.  Unlike Metz and Baudry, Sobchack does not see the cinema as a 
re-enactment of the mise-en-scène of the psyche.  Rather, as Laura Marks point 
out, the mirror phase upon which their theories are based construct a 
“fundamentally alienated selfhood that is constructed visually”.118  As such, 
these theories have “ignored or elided both cinema’s sensual address and the 
viewer’s ‘corporeal-material’ being.”119  In using phenomenology to approach 
and describe the film experience then, Sobchack’s project is to challenge this 
elision and counter the separation of visuality from the body.  As Sobchack 
explains: 
Our vision is always already "fleshed out".  Even at the movies 
our vision and hearing are informed and given meaning by our 
other modes of sensory means of access to the world: our 
capacity not only to see and to hear, but also to touch, to 
smell, to taste, and always to proprioceptively feel our weight, 
dimension, gravity, and movement in the world.  In sum, the 
film experience is meaningful not to the side of our bodies, but 
because of our bodies.120 
Cinema, in other words, does not merely address “a disincarnate eye and 
ear”,121 rather it should be conceived as a medium that addresses the whole 
body.  However, unlike Shaviro’s radically passive and somewhat masochistic 
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notion of the spectator, Sobchack’s spectator is not subjected to the text.  
Instead she elaborates an encounter between the spectator and the text that is 
fundamentally dialogical, in that both the spectator and the film are mutually 
constituted for and by one another.   
For Sobchack, a film is not an empty set of flickering images; it is 
experienced by the viewer as an intentional subject.  That is, “the moving picture 
makes itself sensuously and sensibly manifest as the expression of experience 
by experience.”122  Or to put it another way, when watching a stream of moving 
images the spectator not only sees a world opening out before him or her, but 
also interprets those images as the product of the lived choices of another 
subject.  Moreover, Sobchack suggests, the vision with which the viewer is 
presented “is informed and charged by other modes of perception, and thus 
implicates a sighted body rather than merely transcendental eyes.”123  The film 
experience then becomes a ”shared space of being, of seeing, hearing, and 
bodily and reflective movement performed and experienced by both film and 
viewer.”124  As Marks explains: 
If one understands cinema viewing as an exchange between 
two bodies – that of the viewer and that of the film – then the 
characterization of the film viewer as passive, vicarious, or 
projective must be replaced with a model of a viewer who 
participates in the production of cinematic experience.125  
Far from being subjected to a text then, the viewer must negotiate its meaning, 
“contribute to and perform the constitution of its experiential significance.”126 
For Sobchack then, meaning does not have a discrete origin in either the 
body or the image but emerges from their fusion in what she calls the cinesthetic 
subject.  The cinesthetic subject is a neologism that Sobchack derives from both 
cinema, and two scientific terms synaesthesia and coenaesthesia.  The first is a 
psycho-neurological condition which is defined as an “involuntary experience in 
which the stimulation of one sense causes a perception in another”,127 though 
Sobchack uses the term more generally to refer to the exchange and translation 
between and among the senses.  While the second, “names the potential and 
                                               
122
 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye. A Phenomenology of Film Experience. (Princeton,: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), 3-4 
123
 Sobchack, (1992), 133 
124
 Sobchack, (1992), 10 
125
 Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media, (London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002) 
126
 Sobchack, (1992), 10 
127
 Richard E. Cytowic, M.D., The Man Who Tasted Shapes: A Bizarre Medical History Offers 
Revolutionary Insights into Emotions, Reasoning, and Consciousness, (New York: warner, 1993), 
52, quoted in Sobchack, (2004), 67 
  
 
 44
perception of one’s whole sensorial being.” 128 It is a foundation upon which 
culture acts, arranging our senses according to the dominant hierarchy of the 
time.  In short, “coenaesthesia refers to the way in which equally available 
senses become variously heightened and diminished, the power of history and 
culture regulating their boundaries as it arranges them into a normative 
hierarchy.”129 
In watching a film, all of our senses are mobilised, and perception 
becomes a bodily act.  But “often, depending on the particular solicitations of a 
given film or filmic moment, our naturalized sensory hierarchy and habitual 
sensual economy are altered and rearranged.”130  The sensing body of the 
spectator then, in Sobchack’s view is malleable, and film itself has the potential 
to enable a re-ordering of the lived experience of the body.  Sobchack’s 
cinesthetic subject therefore, is a ‘lived body’ that subverts the dominant model 
of objectifying vision that reduces our experience of cinema to the limited level of 
sight.  The spectator’s body becomes the site that mediates between vision and 
language, between experience and the image, in order to ‘make sense’ of the 
film.  As such, Sobchack’s theory not only challenges classical notions of the 
‘disembodied’ spectator, but in presenting such a highly malleable notion of the 
sensing body produced through culture, Sobchack presents a model that not 
only recognises the sensual vagaries of culture but also highlights the particular 
ability of film to form, manipulate and even subvert dominant perceptive modes.  
Sobchack therefore highlights that the ‘perceptive sensorium’ is never natural, 
even at the point where the viewer is most immediately affected by a film, the 
experience is nevertheless produced through the ‘immanent mediation’ of the 
encultured body.  In this respect, Sobchack has much in common with the work 
of Laura Marks. 
In her study of a range of intercultural films, Marks is concerned to 
produce a model of what she terms ‘haptic visuality’.  As Marks explains, “haptic 
perception is usually defined as the combination of tactile, kinaesthetic, and 
proprioceptive functions, the way we experience touch both on the surface of 
and inside our bodies.  In haptic visuality, the eyes themselves function like 
organs of touch.”131  Haptic visuality is distinct from what Marks terms the optical 
visuality that characterises much of mainstream cinema.  As such, haptic 
images do not appeal to visual mastery, and nor do they address a distant and 
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disembodied viewer.  On the contrary, “haptic images invite the viewer to 
dissolve his or her subjectivity in the close and bodily contact with the image”.132  
However, as Marks suggests this appeal to the body can be profoundly 
uncomfortable for the viewer, since in Western culture olfactory, tactile and other 
forms of bodily knowledge are little valued.  Indeed, “’sensual abandon’ is a 
phrase of Enlightenment subjectivity, implying that the senses…dull the powers 
of the intellect.  It implies that the…desire for the sense experience…is in part a 
desire to stop thinking”.133  Haptic cinema refutes the opposition between the 
mind and the body, and instead asks the viewer to think through the body, which 
as Marks explains, “this is not a call for wilful regression but to recognizing the 
intelligence of the perceiving body.”134 
Marks therefore expounds a theory of embodiment in which bodies are 
not merely inscribed with meaning, but have the capacity to produce meaning.  
Further, Marks argues that, in contrast to Steven Shaviro, her exploration of the 
sensuous experience is not an attempt to uncover the ‘raw’ sensation of the 
cinematic experience.  On the contrary, “by paying attention to bodily and 
sensuous experience, we will find that it is to a large degree informed by culture.  
Perception is already informed by culture, and so even illegible images are 
(cultural) perceptions, not raw sensations.”135  Moreover, this process of somatic 
enculturation also leads to the encoding of power relations within the body.  The 
experience of intercultural film can therefore lead the viewer to recognise the 
ways in which “power relations are built into cultural organizations of 
perception.”136  
Like Sobchack then, Marks sees intercultural cinema as having the 
potential to challenge the dominant cultural hierarchy.  However, it cannot 
transform the cultural organisation of the senses in any simple way.  Like 
Sobchack, Marks draws on a phenomenological account of the film experience.  
She sees the spectator as being engaged in a dialogical relation with the film, 
rather than being wholly produced through the process of textual positioning.  
The film and the spectator mutually constitute one another, and as such, they 
are never “precisely congruent”.137  For Sobchack this means that the viewer is 
always in a position to witness the activity of the film body in its perceiving of the 
world.  The viewer can see the act of seeing as well as the seen, and feel the 
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act of movement as well as see the moved.  Film therefore possesses its own 
distinct bodily agency, intentionality, and subjectivity, that is experienced by the 
viewer as “an anonymous, mobile, embodied, and ethically invested subject of 
worldly space.”138  The spectator therefore is never fully absorbed by the image, 
but always retains some degree of awareness of their difference from the film 
subject. 
In the context of intercultural film, Marks suggests: 
The cinematic encounter takes place not only between my 
body and the film’s body, but my sensorium and the film’s 
sensorium…One could say that intercultural spectatorship is 
the meeting of two different sensoria, which may or may not 
intersect viewers may miss some multisensory images…For 
example, when a work is viewed in a cultural context different 
from that within which it was produced… And then again, 
viewers in the intercultural encounter may discover sense 
information that was not obvious in the original context 139 
The reading of the intercultural image therefore depends on the kinds of 
embodied knowledge the viewer brings to the film encounter.  However, since 
sense experience is something that can be learned and cultivated, perhaps even 
through the medium of film itself, Marks suggests that intercultural cinema has 
the potential to generate new forms of relation to the world that fundamentally 
challenge “global culture’s increasing simulation of sensory experience.”140 
The value of this approach to the question of the spectator is to be found 
partly in the presumed agency of the spectator.  However, Marks is keen to point 
out that while the spectator might be seen to be active, it is not a reformulation 
of the critically active, Brechtian spectator.  Rather, in haptic visuality the viewer 
is invited to relinquish “her own sense of separateness from the image – not to 
know it, but to give herself up to her desire for it.”141  In this respect, Marks 
shares Shaviro’s commitment to giving oneself over to the image in order to see 
the world from another’s perspective.  However, Marks also explicitly addresses 
the way in which our bodies are shaped and invested by power and culture, 
producing forms of experience and perceptions of the world that have become 
so naturalised that they appear to be ‘raw’ or innate rather than culturally 
constructed.  In recognising that culture pervades the body and shapes even our 
most immediate responses Marks helps us, precisely, to ‘denaturalise’ or ‘make 
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strange’ the taken for granted responses that viewers have to cinema more 
generally. 
 Further, Sobchack suggests that the development a sense of the 
viewer’s embodied experience of film  
lays the foundations for a materialist…understanding of 
aesthetics and ethics.  That is…an appreciation of how our 
lived bodies provide the material premises that enable us, from 
the first, to sense and respond to the world and others – not 
only grounding the logical premises of aesthetics and ethics in 
‘carnal thoughts’ but also charging our conscious awareness 
with the energies and obligations that animate our ‘sensibility’ 
and ‘responsibility’.142 
That is, the intersubjective quality of being in the world that allows us to 
experience others, not as objects but as subjects, and more particularly to 
experience this materially, through the body, allows us to develop an empathetic 
relation with others based on one’s recognition of the commensurate quality of 
their subjective experience.  In other words a recognition that others are made of 
the ‘selfsame flesh’ that we are.143  In this respect, witnessing an act of suffering, 
at the hands of a natural disaster, in the grip of debilitating illness or, “more 
horrific to contemplate”, at the mercy of “wilful acts of torture”, invites us to 
consider what it is to suffer a “diminution of subjectivity” and come to an 
awareness of what it is to be treated merely as an object or thing.  As Sobchack 
puts it: 
The passion of suffering not only forces recognition of oneself 
as an objective subject always…open to being externally acted 
upon against one’s volition – but also it enhances the 
awareness of oneself as a subjective object: a material being 
that is nonetheless capable of feeling what it is to be treated 
only as an object.144 
The scene of torture or suffering then powerfully impinges on the viewer’s own 
sense of their subjectivity, and activates in the body a sense of his/her own 
vulnerability to the vagaries of circumstance. 
 Moreover, in the cinematic encounter the viewer’s ability to witness not 
just the events that occur within the world, but also the film body’s seeing of that 
world, constructs cinema as an ethical space.  In this respect the filmmaker’s 
ethical relation to the world “is open to slow scrutiny by the spectator.”145   
Sobchack, in this instance is talking explicitly about the representation of actual 
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scenes of death within documentary film.  Here the profoundly taboo nature of 
this kind of depiction leads the viewer to question the filmmaker’s ethical relation 
to the scene.  Indeed, Sobchack argues that the vision of the film must visibly 
respond to the fact it has broken this taboo and justify this “cultural transgression 
as not only responsive but also responsible and must make the justification itself 
visible.”146  In other words, the filmmaker must inscribe the scene with ethical 
meaning. 
But further, the intersubjective nature of the cinematic encounter leads 
the viewer to recognise s/he too is a subject for others.  That is, s/he is visible to 
others as a subjective and intentional being.  As such, faced with the non-
fictional scene of death  
the very act of looking at the film is ethically charged, and this 
act is itself an object of ethical judgement.  That is, the viewer 
is – and is held – ethically responsible for his or her visible 
visual response.  The cinematic signs of the act of viewing 
death provide the visible grounds on which the spectator 
judges not only the filmmaker’s ethical response to death but 
also his or her own ethical response147 
At its heart, Sobchack suggests the scene itself becomes a question of ‘moral 
conduct’ both on the part of the filmmaker and on the part of the spectator. 
While Sobchack is keen to point out that fictional scenes of death are not 
subject to the same stringent ethical criteria as documentary footage.  Fictive 
death is commonplace rather than taboo.  It may even be the foundation of 
fiction film.  As such “the emotion we feel as viewers in face of it, the values we 
put at risk in looking at it, the ethical significance we find in out encounter with it 
differ in kind as well as degree from the way we respond to death in the 
documentary.”148  However, Sobchack’s notion of the ethical space of the film 
might be more instructive in the case of sexual and sexualised violence which is, 
in many respects, still constructed as ‘taboo’.  In this instance, Sobchack leads 
us to regard the depiction of rape and sexual violence as a scene in which both 
the filmmaker and the viewer are ethically inscribed.  It allows us to think through 
the way in which the viewer performs his or her ethical relation to the screen, as 
well as to trace the multiple ways in which s/he is held accountable for his/her 
response by others.  That is, I would contend, the viewer’s visible ethical 
response is open to immediate scrutiny by fellow viewers, it is open to continued 
scrutiny as the viewer performs a considered and reflective response after the 
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film has ended, and crucially the viewer’s response may also be ethically judged 
and evaluated by the film itself, as in the case of Funny Games, an issue to 
which we will return in the last chapter of this thesis. 
 For Sobchack, the peculiarity of the scene of non-fictional death 
produces what she terms ‘the charge of the real’ which exceeds the mere 
“’response-ability’ of our actual bodies” to produce  
an ethical charge: one that calls forth not only response but 
also responsibility – not only aesthetic valuation but also 
ethical judgement…the viewer takes on and bears particular 
subjective responsibility for watching the action and, as a 
justification for watching, responsibility for judging the action 
and for calling into account – and consciousness – the criteria 
for doing so.”149 
In other words, faced with such a scene the viewer is ‘charged’ with a 
responsibility that requires that they do not merely respond physically, but that 
those physical responses are informed by a conscious, critical process of ethical 
judgement.  Such an engagement with the text appears qualitatively distinct 
from Sobchack’s characterisation of the cinesthetic relation to the screen, which 
she describes as ‘pre-reflective’.  For example: 
Leaving the theater because one has become literally 
sickened or covering one's eyes is hardly ever the outcome of 
a thought.  It is a reflexive, protective action that attests to the 
literal body's reciprocal and reversible relation to the figures on 
the screen, to its sense of actual investment in a dense, albeit 
also diffuse, bodily experience"150 
While I am certain that Sobchack herself would not see these two forms of 
response as being mutually exclusive, for me it begs the question of whether 
and how ethical responsibility might be cultural encoded within the body.  That 
is, as Sobchack herself suggests, the viewer’s experience of, and response to, a 
scene of death is profoundly shaped by both personal experience and cultural 
knowledge,151 not least of which is his/her awareness of genre.  What this 
implies is that the viewer’s ‘sense-ability’ and ‘response-ability’, as Sobchack 
terms it, might be heightened or diminished as a result of the degree to which 
s/he perceives the depiction to transgress a cultural taboo, or to cross a 
personal ethical boundary.  In this sense, Sobchack helps us to see how culture 
might not only shape the manner in which we sense and perceive the world, but 
how the prevailing culture in which we view a morally ambiguous or 
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transgressive film might fundamentally affect not only our judgement of it, but 
the physical/material response we have to it.  In this respect, Sobchack’s 
phenomenological approach to cinema can help us to see how bodies 
themselves become subject to ethical discourse, and to follow Laura Marks, how 
these particular relations of power might pervade the cultural organisation of the 
viewer’s immediate physical responses. 
 
 
 
Audience and Reception Studies 
 
 
The third and final challenge to metapsychological theory came from 
audience and reception studies.  Spurred on by the theoretical failure of the 
psychoanalytic project, and by the rise of Cultural Studies as a pedagogical 
discipline, audience and reception studies sought to investigate the interaction 
between texts and audience members, as opposed to the textually constructed 
spectator.  Adherents of this approach argued that while contemporary 
subjectivity was inevitably bound up with the many media representations that 
pervade the social world, the response of the individual audience member was 
by no means determined by the text.  The subject of audience and reception 
studies was multiply constructed in a continuous negotiation between material 
conditions and ideology, as well as a range of social and historical categories, 
which are brought to bear at the moment of viewing.   
The central problem of metapsychological theory from this perspective, 
was not simply the elision of difference, rather it was the construction of an 
essentially passive spectator, at the mercy of the ideological machinations of the 
text.  Proponents such as David Morley sought to overturn this passive notion of 
subjectivity and “formulate a position from which we can see the person actively 
producing meanings from the restricted range of cultural resources which his or 
her structural position has allowed them access to.”152  This more active 
spectator, was not simply ‘subjected’ to the text, but actively entered into the 
process of reading it.  As Morley suggests, the meaning of a text was as 
heterogeneous as the reading positions adopted by its viewers.  However, this 
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was about more than the mere possibility of ‘negotiated meanings’, or ‘resistant’ 
readings.153  As John Fiske points out, Morley’s work suggests that there is no 
intrinsic meaning within a text until the “moment when the discourses of the 
reader meet the discourses of the text”.154   
The cultural studies project then, to paraphrase John Fiske, was to 
discover how actual audience groups use film as part of their own (local) 
cultures, “that is, use it to make meanings that are useful to them in making 
sense of their own social experiences and therefore of themselves.”155  This 
approach to the viewing subject has been applied far more thoroughly to 
television than it has to cinema.  Nevertheless, the result of this approach has 
been to force a recognition amongst film theorists that neither the text nor the 
spectator are singular, stable or pre-constituted and that both the text and the 
spectator are involved in the process of constituting one another.  From this 
perspective, the cinematic experience is no longer simply a metapsychological 
event; it is also a deeply social one.  And approaching cinematic texts in this 
way helps us to understand both the value of cinema within the social world, as 
well as the very real social and political resistances audiences have to the 
prevailing ideology circulated within cinema.  As a result, empirical analysis has 
effectively challenged both the universalising and totalising tendencies of 
metapsychological theory. 
However, the danger in focussing too narrowly on the individual 
pleasures and uses of cinema made by specific subcultural groups is that we 
end up with a series of very disparate texts.  Much like the three blind men, 
trying to describe an elephant, specific studies of resistant groups and fan-
cultures do little to help us understand the socio-historical shifts that are 
occurring within cinema more generally.  Indeed, as Robert Stam points out, this 
shift in the theoretical foundations of film theory has gone hand in hand with the 
shifting institutional arrangements of contemporary media.  As Stam puts it:  
Media theorists have stressed spectatorial agency and 
freedom, ironically, just as media production and ownership 
have become ever more centralized.  Resistant readings, 
moreover, depend on a certain cultural or political preparation 
that ‘primes’ the spectator to read critically…[I]f disempowered 
communities can decode dominant programming through a 
resistant perspective, they can do so only to the extent that 
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their collective life and historical memory have provided an 
alternate framework for understanding.156 
In finding an alternative approach to the issue of spectatorship then, one must 
be careful to avoid the trap of an overly celebratory account of the 
heterogeneous relations and freedoms of the audience, and find a way to hold in 
tension the various structural shifts that occur within the institution of cinema, at 
the same time as we recognise the socio-historically variegated nature of 
spectatorship. 
Any discussion of spectatorship must then be cognizant of the diverse 
ways in which the spectator is constructed.  In the analysis of the “moment when 
the discourses of the reader meet the discourses of the text”157, one must 
explore the multiple discourses that shape this encounter.  This is about far 
more than simply producing an account of the socio-historical construction of a 
particular group of people and balancing this against the ideological construction 
of a particular text.  The study of spectatorship must recognise that cinema is a 
site in which text, apparatus, discourse, history and social relations work 
together to produce a very specific experience for the individual.  
Janet Staiger for example, in her study Perverse Spectators offers up 
what she calls a “historical material approach to audiences”.158  Here she 
presents a series of case studies that recount specific acts of reception, within 
the context of broader social and historical circumstances.  Indeed Staiger, in 
contrast to classical film theory, asserts that these contextual factors are far 
more important in shaping the experience of film than the text itself.   And as she 
sees it, “these contexts involve intertextual knowledges (including norms of how 
to interpret sense data from moving images and sounds), personal 
psychologies, and sociological dynamics.  The job of the reception historian is to 
account for events of interpretation and affective experience.”159  For Staiger 
then, meaning is not fixed within the text but arises out the interaction between 
the text and the spectator, a spectator who brings to bear a whole set of 
heterogeneous and contradictory social and historical relations in which they are 
‘embedded’.  As a result these spectators both interpret and use the text in their 
own multiple and unpredictable ways.  Staiger’s work therefore overcomes the 
textual determinism and universalism of classical film theory, as well as the 
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implication in Sobchack’s work that certain kinds of sensuous depiction will 
determine particular forms of responses. 
But while Staiger suggests that the meaning of a film cannot be reduced 
to a single interpretation, she also criticises the work of cultural studies 
generally, and audience researchers specifically, who rarely “go beyond 
describing readers’ responses in either a very general way (readers take up the 
position offered by the text, they resist it, or they negotiate it) or very specific 
ways (at best, lists of what readers do in creating alternative texts or in 
identifying with stars).”160  Instead Staiger argues that the meaning of a text is 
shaped and informed by the social and historical circumstances within which 
these readings and interpretations take place.  To demonstrate this she draws 
on a range of sources from critical reviews and journalistic debates, to viewers’ 
letters to the editor, advertisements and fan mail.  As a result, Staiger not only 
highlights the variety of responses to films in any given era, but she uses these 
texts to try and uncover what these films meant to the viewer, and crucially, how 
that interpretation was guided by wider discourse.  Staiger therefore, focuses of 
the ‘experience’ of cinema without suggesting an essential relationship between 
the spectator and the text.   
Similarly, in her study of the spectators of early film, Miriam Hansen has 
attempted to reconcile the cinematic subject with the real socially and historically 
situated viewer, and hence to situate cinema within the context of culture.  For 
Hansen, spectatorship was to be considered as the mediation between the 
theoretical spectator and his/her real counterpart within the audience.  Her work 
focused on historical spectatorship, and like Staiger, she sought to demonstrate 
that this spectator was subject to the vagaries of their social and historical 
placement.  Hansen’s spectators were not only differentiated by their position in 
the social world but she showed spectatorship itself was subject to change over 
time.   
Hansen argued that spectatorship was the deliberate construction of the 
film industry.  It was regarded as a means by which a socially and ethnically 
diverse cinema audience could be integrated into a standardised ‘mass’ to which 
film could be sold as a product.  The spectator, in this conception, is not an 
inevitable result of the machinations of the apparatus.  Rather, a particular form 
of spectatorship is produced as an effect of the development of classical modes 
of narration and address that occurred between 1909 and 1916.  So where early 
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film depended on the audience’s pre-existing knowledge of the story or an 
introduction by a lecturer, this dependence on extra-diegetic resources was 
rejected in favour of self-contained, self-explanatory narratives.  To that end, the 
resources of cinematic discourse, of framing, editing and mise-en-scène were 
increasingly employed in the service of the narrative.  In contrast to cinema 
before this period, “classical narration tailored every detail to the spectator’s 
attention” and attempted “to enlist the spectator in the narrative by the way in 
which it was structured, [and] to integrate cinematic techniques in such a way as 
to control the vision of the audience.”161  Spectatorship then, was not an 
inevitable result of the cinematic apparatus, but a particular organisation of a 
film’s internal structure.   
Moreover, Hansen showed that the spectator’s relation to the text was 
also influenced by the mode of exhibition.  The demise of the nickelodeon, with 
its variety format, and its replacement with more traditional movie theatres 
dedicated to the films themselves, saw the restructuring of the social space and 
a decline in the typically social, distracted mode of viewing to a more absorbing, 
identificatory mode.  However, Hansen believed that there might well be a gap 
between the intended effect of this reorganisation of public space and the 
response of the audience.  She suggests that, far from being subordinated to the 
intentions of the film industry, early cinemagoers were able to develop an 
alternative social sphere, a space in which they could negotiate imaginatively 
between images and discourses on the screen and their own experience of life.   
This kind of ‘active’ spectatorship contrasts both with the intentions of the 
film industry and with much of classical film theory, but further, in emphasising 
the ‘public’ dimension of cinema, Hansen’s theory neatly escapes the 
universalistic conception of the theoretical spectator without descending into an 
unmanageable juggling act between the multiplicities of different audience 
views.  As she puts it: 
This public dimension is distinct from both textual and social 
determinations of spectatorship because it entails the very 
moment in which reception can gain a momentum of its own, 
can give rise to formations not necessarily anticipated in the 
context of production…Although always precarious and 
subject to ceaseless – industrial, ideological – appropriation, 
the public dimension of the cinematic institution harbours a 
potentially autonomous dynamic162 
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This concept of the ‘public’ maintains the tension between the textually 
constructed spectator and the audience member.  It emphasises not only the 
contingency of individual acts of reception, but also the social contingencies 
within which the historical spectator is able to interpret the films they see. 
The value of Hansen’s work for a theory of cinematic subjectivity lies in 
the empirical nature of her work.  Her analysis of the films of Rudolf Valentino, 
for example, Hansen finds a feminine address and a male body represented as 
a desirable object.  Her methodology escapes the bounds of a universalising 
tendency among film theoreticians by focussing on the particularities of the 
internal structure and modes of address within film.  Moreover, Hansen gives a 
broader vision of cinema by moving outside of the narrow confines of the 
spectator/text relationship.  She emphasises changes in the modes of exhibition, 
helping us to understand cinema as a lived social experience, rather than a 
reified act of ‘reading’.  And in doing so, situates the reception of films within a 
broader public sphere of cinematic discourse. 
As Hansen puts it, her project is “to delineate the contours of female 
subjectivity, with all its contradictions and complicity, in the institution of cinema 
and the text of film history.”163 And in order to do so she, like Staiger, places her 
textual analysis in the context of the public discourse that surrounded Valentino 
early in the twentieth century.  Drawing on a number of resources, from the film 
texts themselves, to reviews, interviews, studio publicity, articles in fan 
magazines and the general press, as well as popular biographies, Hansen 
demonstrates how these sources at once document, manipulate and constitute 
the reception of Valentino’s films.   
What Hansen shows us, is how the cinematic subject of representation, 
as well as the cinematic spectator is constituted by the social discourses of 
cinema.  Moreover, she demonstrates that a consideration of the filmic text, a 
concern for the formation of the cinematic apparatus, and reflection on the social 
and historical constitution of cinematic reception are not mutually exclusive 
enterprises.  So while, neither Hansen nor Staiger concern themselves with the 
physicality of the spectator, they share an enterprise which is focussed on the 
cinematic experience and the various ways in which that experience is 
constituted.  As a result, the contribution of this form of reception studies to the 
debate about the embodiment of the cinematic subject lies less in their 
consideration of the place of the body within cinema and more in the 
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methodology that is used to discern the contours of socio-historical 
spectatorship. 
 
 
   
Technologies of the Self 
 
 
How then are we to account for subjectivity in contemporary cinema?  
And further, how are we to conceive of the role of the body within it?  As we 
have already seen, theories of the apparatus focus on the presumed interaction 
between spectators, texts and technology.  They examine the material 
conditions of the film viewing, the technology involved in the viewing process, 
the way in which the text itself has been constructed, and of course, the 'mental 
machinery' of the viewer. Cinema is seen as a 'social machine', leading theorists 
to investigate not only the physical machinery of cinematic technologies but the 
"demands, desires, fantasies, speculations (in the two senses of commerce and 
the imaginary)"164 involved in the cinematic encounter. 
In their analyses of the material conditions of cinema, writers such as 
Baudry, Metz and Mulvey showed that the spectator was positioned by cinema 
in very specific ways.  They argued that the cinema did not offer a 'value-free' 
reflection of reality, but that it was a thoroughly constructed experience.  They 
showed that while cinema purported to show the unfettered and unvarnished 
'truth' of life, cinema actually worked to 'naturalise' their conditions of existence, 
and as such, they concluded that cinema was a key ideological mechanism.  
Moreover, while the spectator may have felt as though s/he was the source of 
meaning, the active interpreter of meaning within the film, Mulvey in particular 
showed that cinema often allowed for only a limited set of interpretive positions 
within the text, and that these positions often forced the spectator to collude with 
an ideology that oppressed them.   
These theories of spectatorship have already been well criticized for their 
universalism and, particularly with respect to gender, their essentialism.  The 
ideological machinery of cinema, according to these theories leaves little or no 
room for resistance, for refusal, or for competing visions of 'reality'.  It is 
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presented as, what Constance Penley would describe as a 'bachelor 
machine',165 a perfect ideological assemblage, it never breaks down, it is not 
subject to sabotage, it effects are always total, and are always totally successful.  
Such a concept, as Penley suggests, is not only counterproductive to those with 
a political interest in dismantling the ideology that underpins cinematic texts, but 
is also neglects the very real, everyday acts of resistance and refusal that occur 
within culture.   If the effects of cinema were always total it is not simply differing 
ideological interpretations that would disappear, but the entire industry of cinema 
would change.  A 'perfected machine' would dispense with the need for 
technological development.  Box office flops would be unheard of, as spectators 
would be unable to resist their positioning by any given film, and arguments 
about 'intention' or 'meaning' among both high theorists and lay viewers would 
simply never occur. 
Cinema then, is not a 'perfect machine' in either theory or practice.  But 
nevertheless we cannot deny its influence over contemporary culture.  It is a 
massive global industry, and a key institution within our cultural landscape, and 
this, I think, is the central insight of theorists of the apparatus.  The recognition 
that cinema is an institution, that does not simply reflect, but actively shapes our 
culture.  That it is a vast economic, technical and ideological institution that not 
only inflects our understanding of the world around us, but actively shapes 
spectatorial subjectivity.   
The central problem with classical film theory’s approach to the 
apparatus however is in its singular focus on the theoretical relations between 
the spectator and the text, effectively ignoring the possibility that the text is just 
one of a range of potentially conflicting cinematic discourses that work to 
produce spectatorship.  It is here that the work of reception studies proves to be 
instructive.  As we have seen, scholars like Miriam Hansen and Janet Staiger 
look at the way in which codes and conventions within the text, as well as the 
wider discourses, institutional arrangements and modes of delivery, not only 
shape the social and historical reception of a film, but also work to constitute 
dominant forms of spectatorial relations in any given era.  Their work helps us to 
understand spectatorship as a highly mutable cultural activity.  But further, as 
Staiger takes pains to point out: 
Every period in history (and likely every place) witnesses 
several modes of cinematic address, several modes of 
exhibition, and several modes of reception.  Moreover, any 
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individual viewer may engage even within the same 
theatregoing experience in these various modes of 
reception…[no] viewer is always one kind of spectator.166 
Any account of the apparatus must therefore be able to accommodate 
the possibility of failure, of resistance, and of multiple, often conflicting, forms of 
expression and reception.  In this respect it is fruitful to move away from the 
metapsychological model of the apparatus, bound as it is to a singular, 
universalistic model of the spectator, and adopt a more Foucaultian paradigm.  
For Foucault, the apparatus was: 
A thoroughly heterogenous set consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral, and philanthropic propositions…The apparatus itself is 
a network that can be established between these elements...a 
set of strategies of the relations of forces supporting, and 
supported by, certain types of knowledge.167  
Applying this notion of the apparatus to cinema is of course, not without its 
difficulties, particularly as Foucault saw this apparatus as a network of power 
that was mobilised in order to address a perceived social problem.  It is the 
arrangement of heterogenous forms of knowledge that are assembled as a 
matter of urgency in order to provide a strategic ‘solution’ to this perceived threat 
to the social order. 
So why should we pursue such an approach?  Firstly, this view of the 
apparatus allows us to move beyond a homogenous concept of ideology.  In this 
view, cultural values are neither singular and nor are they simply imposed upon 
society by a select group of people.  Rather, they arise from a number of 
competing, and often conflicting discourses, and are negotiated within the 
context of even the most intimate of relationships.  But perhaps the most crucial 
aspect of this Foucaultian view of the apparatus is that it expressly 
acknowledges that where there is power, there is also resistance.  And that 
"these points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network."168  
Cinema, and the discourses that surround it are not the totalising or 
deterministic force that metapsychology might have us believe. 
Further, Foucault's notion of the apparatus does not depend on a 
universalistic or essentialist notion of the psyche.  Indeed, for Foucault 
psychoanalysis is an apparatus of power in its own right.  For Foucault, rather 
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than helping us to get at the 'truth' of the individual, psychoanalysis is, at least in 
part, responsible for the creation of modern subjectivity.  Foucault's concern 
therefore, turns to the human body, or more precisely, to the use of disciplinary 
practices in the production of the 'docile body'.  Foucault suggests that in the 
eighteenth century there was a proliferation of 'projects of docility', that acted 
upon the body: 
What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act 
upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its 
gestures, its behaviour.  The human body was entering a 
machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and 
rearranges it.  A 'political anatomy', which was also a 
'mechanics of power', was being born; it defined how one may 
have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so that they may do 
what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one 
wishes169  
Bodies then, are not ‘natural’ entities, they are objects that are both 
'coerced' and 'manipulated'. The body is an object that is thoroughly invested 
with power.  Power may work to control the body, but this power is not simply 
repressive.  Rather, its effects are highly productive.  In his view, these 
“deployments of power are directly connected to the body", but they do not 
simply regulate anatomical functions and physiological processes, they also 
generate "sensations, and pleasures”.170  Indeed he argues that in the 
nineteenth century, the explosion of discourses of sexuality allowed bodies to be 
invested with sensational potential; areas were intensified and surfaces were 
electrified by power.171  In many ways, Foucault suggests that history has 
created what Deleuze might call a 'body without organs',172 an empty, hollow 
sphere, a site of pure potential, subject to a constantly shifting arrangement of 
potential intensities.   
In Foucault’s view then, ‘experience’ is not simply a matter of 
apprehending external objects through our senses, and nor, as audience and 
reception studies might suggest, is it only mediated by the individuals’ social 
identity.  Rather, forms of experience are highly socio-historically specific.  
Experience, therefore, is always implicated in and produced by various 
knowledges and social practices.  It is gained in relation to the external world, 
and shaped by the world in which it is gained.  This concept of ‘lived experience’ 
is not outside social, political, historical and cultural forces.  Experience is 
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differentially gained, and embodiment differentially formed according to the 
culture in which one finds oneself.  And within culture, the formation of 
experience and the arrangement of the human body, indeed one’s very 
experience of one’s own body, will vary: 
Differences between bodies, not only at the level of experience 
and subjectivity but also at the level of practical and physical 
capacities, enjoy considerable social and historical variation.  
Processes and activities that seem impossible for a body to 
undertake at some times in some cultures are readily possible 
in others.  What are regarded as purely fixed and 
unchangeable elements of facticity, biologically given factors, 
are amenable to wide historical vicissitudes and 
transformations.173 
For Foucault, experience has a history, and as his work on sexuality and 
mental illness demonstrate particular kinds of experience have been formed, 
developed and subsequently transformed through regimes of knowledge and 
power.  In The History of Sexuality in particular, Foucault sought to: 
Undertake a history in which sexuality would not be conceived 
as a general type of behaviour whose particular elements 
might vary according to demographic, economic, social, or 
ideological conditions, any more than it would be seen as a 
collection of (scientific, religious, moral) representations which, 
though diverse and changeable, are joined to an invariant 
reality.174 
Instead he showed that sexuality was a historically singular form of experience, 
and that the discursive formation of this particular kind of experience was 
organized as a regime of power and knowledge, that is, as a domain of 
knowledge, a type of normativity and a mode of relation to the self.  His task 
then:  
To decipher how, in Western societies, a complex experience 
is constituted from and around certain forms of behaviour: an 
experience which conjoins a field of study (connaissance) (with 
its own concepts, theories, diverse disciplines), a collection of 
rules (which differentiate the permissible from the forbidden, 
natural from monstrous, normal from pathological, what is 
decent from what is not, etc.), a mode of relation between the 
individual and himself (which enables him to recognise himself 
as a sexual subject amid others).175 
Sexuality, for example, was obviously constituted as a field of study, and was 
strictly governed by rules of normative acceptability, but for Foucault, what made 
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sexuality such an interesting area of study was the relative weight of importance 
that ‘relations to the self’ played in the constitution of this kind of experience.  
Freudian psychology in particular, saw sexuality as being absolutely central to 
the constitution of the self, and so the experience of both sex and desire 
become central not only to the subject’s social identity, but to their 
understanding of who they are.  Under this domain of knowledge, sexuality 
moved from being a set of behaviours that an individual may or may not engage 
in, to an ontological category.  Under this regime, sexual desire takes on more 
significance than sexual acts, and the subject’s experience of their desires may 
be understood less as a bodily demand for satisfaction, than the basis of a way 
of life. 
Mental illness, on the other hand, was constituted, in the main, as a 
domain of knowledge.  It delineated its object of study through a series of 
“statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its 
developments, indicated its various correlations, [and] judged it”.176  The effect of 
these particular institutional systems of discourse and relations of power was to 
develop techniques for ‘governing individuals’ and ‘guiding their conduct’.177  
Indeed, in differentiating between illness and health, sanity and insanity, normal 
and abnormal, psychiatry gained governance not only over those suffering 
mental illness, but over social subjects more generally.  For in the process of 
constituting its object of study, psychiatry also defined its subjects, and through 
this construction of the parameters of illness and deviancy, it marked out the 
limits of acceptable, ‘normal’ behaviour.  That is, in both constituting and 
deploying the category of ‘the insane’, psychiatry both described ‘the sane’ and 
proscribed a set of behaviours that allowed the particular subject to inhabit that 
realm.  In effect, the two categories, like notions of male and female, rich and 
poor, criminal and law-abiding, were both mutually exclusive and hence mutually 
constituting, and in gaining a rehabilitative power over one set of subjects, 
psychiatry gained de facto power over the ‘normal’ social subject.   
The effect of these three axes of power/knowledge then, was to 
constitute and articulate specific forms of subjectivity.  Developments and 
transformations in these regimes of power do not simply mean tighter juridical 
control over the individual.  The genius of the effective operational power of 
these regimes in the modern age is that such power is internalised by the 
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individual.  The subject, in effect, internalises ‘the law’ and actively polices their 
internal world.  Hence shifts in the constitution of the domains of knowledge can 
actively transform the subject’s experience of the world, and actively produce 
certain kinds of experience.178  As Agamben puts it:  
Every apparatus implies a process of subjectification, without 
which it cannot function as an apparatus of governance, but is 
rather reduced to a mere exercise of violence.  On this basis, 
Foucault has demonstrated how, in a disciplinary society, 
apparatuses aim to create - through a series of practices, 
discourses, and bodies of knowledge - docile, yet free, bodies 
that assume their identity and their "freedom" as subjects.179 
Foucault's notion of the apparatus therefore, allows us to escape the 
limitations of traditional 'apparatus theory'.  It acknowledges that ideology can 
only ever be an effect of competing discourses, not an expressive totality that 
guarantees its own self interests.180  It helps us to extend our analysis beyond 
the actual situation of viewing itself, allowing us to consider the wider discourses 
of cinema that help to both create, manage and police the spectatorial 
"demands, desires, fantasies and speculations"181 that underpin the cinematic 
event, without falling back on a universalistic or essentialist notion of the psyche.  
And it allows us to explore a much neglected aspect of the cinematic 
experience: that of the bodily, or the physical sensations that are created and 
deployed by this mechanism of power.   
In addition, Foucault’s concept of the apparatus also allows us to identify 
cinema as a site of struggle.  That is, in the contemporary world, cinema is not 
merely a site of vacuous entertainment, distributed and consumed without 
thought or intervention.  What can and cannot be said within the cinema is 
thoroughly circumscribed by regulatory practices.  What is represented, and 
representable, within the text is clearly governed by socially and historically 
specific codes and conventions, but further, these texts are situated within a 
network of discourses directed towards the treatment of cinema (and media 
more generally) as a potential social problem.  What makes the study of 
contemporary cinema so compelling however, is that this struggle to demarcate 
the bounds of acceptability within the cinema occurs at a time of increasing 
‘liberalisation’ of censorship practices.  
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Contemporary cinema then, as an institution, is a disciplinary practice 
concerned with the production of ‘docile bodies’.  That is not to say that viewers 
cannot or do not resist.  I suspect that everyone has had the privilege of sitting in 
the cinema next to a person who talks through the movie, who throws popcorn 
at the screen, who jeers, heckles or laughs inappropriately, who refuses to stay 
in one place, or who simply eats too loudly.  The official regulatory practices of 
the cinema management that run infomercials reminding us not to smoke or to 
turn off our mobile phones, who send ushers to intervene when behaviour 
becomes ‘intolerable’ or truly ‘disruptive’, work to reinforce a ‘proper’ (read highly 
culturally specific) form of spectatorial relations.   
Even the practice of refusing entry to an auditorium after a certain point 
in the film is reached works to reinforce the predominance of the self-contained 
narrative structure.  Cinemas reinforce certain standards of appropriate 
behaviour and in doing so they strengthen certain forms of engagement with the 
text.  However, the proprietor of the cinema is not necessarily the locus of 
behavioural regulation.  In the cinema, normative rules of behaviour are often 
paramount.  And indeed, the commercial interests of the cinema may well be at 
odds with public perception of ‘appropriate standards of behaviour’ within the 
cinema.  In a recent newspaper article by Mark Kermode for example he 
suggested that “the sound that now echoes around multiplexes is that of the 
rustling, chewing and slurping of an ever-expanding range of cinema 
snacks…isn't it time we added 'no eating' to the 'no smoking' and 'no talking' 
rules?”182  And he wasn’t alone, his diatribe was warmly received and reiterated 
not only by the editor but by several members of the public, motivated enough to 
write to The Observer183 about the “appalling manners of picturegoers…even [at] 
my local arthouse cinema”!  The annoyance expressed by these viewers at this 
relatively minor infraction of a cinephile’s sensibilities, highlights the very real 
public pressure exerted within a cinema to conform to certain, locally defined, 
standards of behaviour.  ‘Appalling manners’ is a relative term, and what passes 
as acceptable at a Saturday night showing of a blockbuster at the local 
multiplex, may not be tolerated at the ‘Special Event: Q&A session with the 
Director’ at the NFT.   
Moreover, what I want to investigate within this thesis is the creation of a 
peculiarly modern form of spectatorship, one that is rooted in corporeal 
subjectivity.  What I will seek to show is that contemporary cinema actively 
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seeks to engage its audience on a physical level, and further, that audiences 
actively seek out films that will provide intense physical experiences for 
pleasure.  However, the corporeal address of contemporary cinema is not a 
‘naturally occurring event’.  It does not function automatically.  Rather, corporeal 
spectatorship demands a certain form of engagement from the viewer, which as 
I will demonstrate, is actively produced by the discourses of cinema.  Before 
entering the cinema, for example, cinema marketing and journalism incite the 
spectator to prepare, mentally and emotionally, for a certain form of engagement 
with the text.  And as I have just suggested, upon entering the cinema, the 
spectator is further compelled to engage with the text in a certain (culturally 
determined) fashion.  But further I will demonstrate that these normative codes 
that exert such pressure on the spectator do not simply refer to the physical 
environment and behaviour of the spectator.  On the contrary, the individual 
responses of the spectator to the text are also rigidly policed. 
Indeed I will argue that the capacity of film to provoke such intense 
responses, and in particular physical responses, from its viewers, can and does 
become a source of cultural anxiety that provokes calls for regulation and 
control.  While ostensibly this regulation refers to the dissemination of images, 
what I will seek to show in this thesis is that the discourses of regulation do not 
limit themselves to filmic texts.  Rather, they focus on the spectator and 
encourage the development of normative models of spectatorship which work 
not only to differentiate between ‘normal’ and potentially ‘deviant’ spectators, but 
also work to encourage a kind of ‘affective literacy’ by disseminating knowledge 
about ‘appropriate’ responses to particular kinds of images.  The regulation of 
film then, does not simply affect the kinds of images the viewer might encounter 
at their local cinema but actively assists in the construction of a particular kind of 
‘cinematic experience’.  And through a regime of normativity, acts to delimit the 
range of ‘acceptable’ textual responses, and thereby encourage particular forms 
of engagement with and response to film. 
The regulation of contemporary cinema is therefore an exercise in 
Subjectification, where the individual is free to choose the kind of entertainment 
s/he desires, at the same time s/he becomes ethically responsible both for the 
choices s/he makes, and for her or his responses to them.  As such, the 
regulation of cinema can be seen as a process of ‘governmentality’.  For 
Foucault, the notion of government is not restricted to the exercise of power by 
the state.  “Government also signified problems of self-control, guidance for the 
family and for children, management of the household, directing the soul, and so 
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forth.  For this reason, Foucault defines government as conduct, or, more 
precisely, as ‘the conduct of conduct’”184  In this respect, governmentality also 
describes the operation of power on the autonomous and ‘free’ subject, who is 
compelled to govern him or herself.  So while, “the autonomous subjectivity of 
the modern self may seem the antithesis of political power…Foucault’s 
argument suggests an exploration of the ways in which this autonomization of 
the self is itself a central feature of contemporary governmentality.”185  In a 
liberal state therefore government is intrinsically linked with what Nikolas Rose 
calls “the practice of freedom”,186 where the individual must identify him or 
herself as a free subject who is responsible for their choices and actions within 
society.  “Thus, in a very significant sense, it has become possible to govern 
without governing society – to govern through the ‘responsibilized’ and 
‘educated’ anxieties and aspirations of individuals and their families.”187 
On the one hand then, with regard to the regulation of cinema, it is very 
clear that ‘the family’ is the central locus for contemporary regulation.  The 
steady movement away from censorship of cinematic texts, and toward the 
provision of ‘age classifications’ and ‘parental guidance’, is a clear example of 
the way in which parents have taken on greater responsibility for the control of 
their children’s viewing.  This control however, is accompanied by a demand that 
parents act in a ‘socially responsible’ manner.  The very real public pressure for 
parents to regulate their children’s viewing, particularly of films aimed at an adult 
audience can be readily seen in the rhetoric that surrounded the ‘video nasties’ 
in the 1980s, which explicitly linked children’s viewing of violent films with the 
kind of ‘bad parenting’ that comes along with being a member of Britain’s 
‘underclass’188.  Moreover, this pressure to regulate children’s media 
consumption is regularly reinforced by news reports about child killers compelled 
to commit their crimes after watching violent films.  Parental guidance in this 
respect can be viewed, not so much as the provision of information, but as a 
prescription for parental regulation.  Or to put it another way, parental guidance 
supplied by the BBFC might be seen as a way of instilling and using “the self-
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directing propensities of subjects to bring them into alliance with the aspirations 
of authorities.”189   
This is not to say that acts of censorship have disappeared entirely.  
Within the UK the BBFC still regularly intervenes in film and video works.  
Indeed, under the auspices of the Video Recordings Act,190 brought into effect in 
the wake of the video nasties debacle, the BBFC has become the statutory body 
responsible for the regulation of DVDs and videos.  And as a result, the Board 
requests a great deal of cuts, and refuses classifications for works intended for 
consumption in the home, even when, or perhaps more accurately, particularly 
when the intended audience is an adult one.191  Adults are therefore seen to 
have responsibility for determining their children’s access to film material, but 
this responsibility is strictly delimited by the state.  This issue that was made 
especially stark in a Government Consultation Paper on the regulation of R18 
(pornographic) works in 2000.  Where “the responsibility given to adults…to take 
reasonable care to prevent a child from seeing”192 sexually explicit works was 
clearly recognised, but nevertheless, the Government mooted the strengthening 
of the Video Recordings Act to make it an offence to allow or to fail to take 
reasonable care to prevent a child from viewing such works. 
My intention in this thesis however, is not to investigate children’s 
viewing, or the work of the BBFC per se.  To do so would require a book length 
work in itself.  Instead I have chosen to focus on adult consumption of film 
works.  Partly because state or institutional intrusion on adult choice is less 
easily justified by moral campaigners, but more particularly, because in an age 
where even works that are refused classification in the UK can be bought from 
distributors in other countries, and/or downloaded from the internet with relative 
ease, the regulation of film increasingly becomes a matter of individual choice.  
My intention then, is not only to look at the legislative framework within which 
certain ‘controversial’ films are produced and distributed, but to consider how 
adults come to be self-regulating.   
In this respect, I wish to argue that viewing choices made by adults are 
not entirely free, but rather that this spectatorial conduct has been shaped by the 
discourses surrounding controversial cinema.  In the first instance, we might see 
adult viewers as being subject to “regulation through desire, consumption and 
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the market”193.  That is, the adult viewer’s conduct is regulated through a regime 
of choice: 
The modern self is institutionally required to construct a life 
through the exercise of choice…every choice we make is an 
emblem of our identity, a mark of our individuality, each is a 
message to ourselves and others as to the sort of person we 
are…Individuals are expected to…account for their lives in 
terms of the reasons for those choices.194  
The cinematic subject then, must account for his or her choices, and must justify 
those decisions in terms of the motives and pleasures of viewing.  And as we 
will see the demand for justification becomes very pressing when we consider 
films featuring extreme violence, and especially sexual violence.  In this case the 
consumption of such films becomes a very public question of individual health 
and personal morality.   
 The choice to view therefore takes place within a discursive context that 
identifies such films as a threat to the social body.  Such films are perceived to 
be hazardous to the psychological health of the individual, and the decision to 
view is framed as a moral choice.  In this respect, the governing of free and 
autonomous individuals requires that those individuals are persuaded to 
regulate themselves.  Viewers of these highly problematic films are therefore 
“addressed on the assumption that they want to be healthy, and [they are] 
enjoined to freely seek out ways of living most likely to promote their health”195.  
And further, they are “urged and incited to become ethical beings, beings who 
define and regulate themselves according to a moral code.”196  The individual is 
therefore conceived as “an autonomous individual capable of monitoring and 
regulating…their own conduct”197.  But more importantly, this “notion of 
government extends to cover the way in which an individual questions his or her 
own conduct (or problematizes it) so that he or she may be better able to govern 
it.”198 
 As I will seek to show, this question of health and morality does not 
simply apply to the decision to view problematic films.  But rather, it also extends 
to the spectator’s relations with and responses to the events occurring on 
screen.  In this very real sense therefore, the spectator is constituted through the 
                                               
193
 Rose, (1999), 87 
194
 Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self, (London: Free Association 
Books, 1989), 231 
195
 Rose, (1999), 86-87 
196
 Rose, (1989), 245 
197
 Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, (London: Sage, 1999), 12 
198
 Dean, (1999), 12 
  
 
 68
discourses that circulate around cinema as much, if not more so, than through 
the texts of the films themselves.  Moreover, as I will show in this thesis, these 
discourses are not only produced and distributed by ‘experts’, they are actively 
produced by viewers themselves on film databases, review sites, and discussion 
forums.  Such sites are perhaps far removed from the therapeutic spaces 
identified by Nikolas Rose, like the analyst’s couch or the circle of chairs in the 
therapeutic group, nevertheless, what is at stake in these discussion sites is: 
The production of the self itself, as a terrain upon which our 
relations with one another and with our bodies, habits, 
propensities, and pleasures is to be understood…[These sites] 
constitute the subject as one responsible to its self because it 
is responsible to others, incorporating each person, apparently 
equally, into a democratic field of confession and judgement by 
all.199 
That is not to say that viewers do not resist these enjoinders to self-regulation 
and the formation of ‘appropriate’ responses to the screen.  However, what I will 
seek to demonstrate is that participants in these public discussions, whether 
they are compliant or resistant, produce themselves as subjects of a discourse 
that defines their activities as highly problematic, and potentially deviant. 
My task in this thesis then will be threefold.  First I will seek to trace the 
historical roots of spectatorship, in order to show how this highly socially and 
historically specific relation to the screen came to be produced through the 
diverse apparatus of cinema.  Here I will draw on a number of discussions of 
early cinema, in order to demonstrate that spectator/text relations are neither a 
natural, nor an inevitable product of technologies, but the result of a network of 
discursive relations that held sway over the development of cinema as a 
particular mode of consumption.  Secondly, I want to address the particular 
changes in spectatorship that are taking place within contemporary cinema.  
Here I will focus in particular on the breakdown of classical narrative cinema as 
the dominant mode of expression, and the proliferation of the high concept film.  
This shift, I will suggest, allows us to pay particular attention the way in which 
the spectator is addressed as a corporeal, rather than a metapsychological 
subject, both within the cinema, and in the discourses that surround these films.  
And finally, I want to engage with the cultural anxiety that surrounds particular 
controversial films.  In this latter case, I will look at the legal framework for the 
regulation of film, before moving on to discuss the regime of governmentality 
that surrounds contemporary film regulation. 
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Disciplining the Masses: 
 
Constituting the Modern Spectator 
 
 
 
 As Daniel Czitrom puts it in his article on the politics of early cinema in 
New York, “The movies were born in the city”200.  At the very moment of 
cinema’s inception it took its place among a plethora of popular urban 
entertainments.  It was an industry born into a set of controversies that 
surrounded not only the contemporary visual culture, but the very specific 
problems associated with increasing urbanisation in both America and Europe.  
In the US, the urban population had quadrupled between 1870 and 1910,201 
while in London alone the population had grown from three to six million 
between 1851 and 1901.202  Such rapid expansion brought with it a number of 
social and environmental problems.  Turn-of-the-century newspapers were 
replete with stories about the particular dangers of the new urban landscape, 
while cartoonists emphasised the horrors, the dangers and the dehumanising 
influence of living in such a densely populated area,203 and cultural 
commentators cited the ever more sensational popular entertainments as both 
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evidence of moral decline and the likely cause of increasing crime within the city.  
As a product of both the Victorian culture of spectacle and a modern urban 
leisure pursuit cinema was inevitably drawn into arguments about these 
contemporary social problems, and as cinema’s popularity increased it came to 
be seen as a significant source of these social problems. 
 Within the popular imagination, the physical dangers of living in a 
densely populated city were matched only by the psychological dangers of the 
newly burgeoning mass culture.  As Graham Murdock suggests in ‘Reservoirs of 
Dogma’,204 by the 1850s a familiar pattern of lurid popular fictions, 
sensationalised newspaper coverage and blood-soaked, spectacular and 
thrilling entertainments had all found purchase within British culture.  Social 
commentators of the era not only saw this change as a clear symptom of social 
and moral degeneration but argued that such depictions were likely to incite 
further instances of immoral and anti-social behaviour.  At the root of this fear 
was the particular way in which the ‘mass audience’ of these popular 
entertainments was conceived.  The threat posed by the ‘masses’ was 
verbalised by Charles Mackay in 1841 when he suggested that “Men…go mad 
in herds, while they only recover their senses slowly, and one by one.”205   
 The concept of ‘crowd psychology’ was popularised by the publication of 
Gustav Le Bon’s influential book The Crowd in 1895.  For Le Bon, the 
psychology of the crowd was a simplistic one: by becoming part of an 
anonymous crowd individuals abandoned personal responsibility and 
succumbed to the influence of the group.  Under the influence of the crowd each 
individual became an uncultivated ‘barbarian’ driven by instinct, prey to 
‘emotional associations’ and incapable of exercising any critical faculties.   
In Le Bon’s view, the will of the crowd could be easily guided.  A 
charismatic leader like Napoleon could be hailed as a hero, even a god, and 
invite blind submission from his followers.  But his ability to lead their actions 
depended, at least in part, on his ability to sway the emotions of the crowd.  And 
for Le Bon, the most effective way to do this was through the use of images.  In 
his view, “the imagination of crowds…is particularly open to the impressions 
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produced by images.”206  Indeed even the “power of words is bound up with the 
images they evoke”.207  Crowds therefore, could be easy led through the cogent 
use of both real imagery and evocative speech.   
Although The Crowd ostensibly presented a dispassionate and objective 
view of the psychology of the crowd and argued that the effects of the crowd 
psychology would be felt by any individual, regardless of the particular social 
and cultural position they inhabited, the politics that underlie his views are 
clearly evident.  The Crowd was written in a period that Le Bon saw as the “the 
era of crowds”, an era characterised by the entry of the popular classes into 
political life.  As he saw it these ‘masses’, particularly in their formation of labour 
unions, sought nothing less than the complete destruction of society as it 
existed, preferring to revert back to a “primitive communism”.208  For Le Bon, the 
formation of a mass culture was nothing short of an omen of an impending class 
war that had the potential to end ‘civilisation’ as he saw it.  His characterisation 
of the of the crowd as suggestible, irrational and easily led, therefore appears as 
little more than an extended metaphor in the service of thinly veiled political 
rhetoric, based on his fear of the working-classes.   
Le Bon’s arguments clearly drew on ideas that were already well 
established by the end of the nineteenth century.  Criminology in particular, 
already tended to characterise crowds by their irrationality and its propensity for 
criminal behaviour.  As Rachel Vorspan points out in her article on the historical 
transformation of urban leisure,209 by the middle of the nineteenth century the 
perceived danger posed by large gatherings of the working-classes had already 
led both local authorities and the judiciary in the UK to regulate, and in some 
cases criminalise, urban working-class leisure pursuits.  Group entertainments in 
urban spaces were treated with open hostility by the authorities.  Rowdy and 
undisciplined street games were perceived to be not only immoral, but 
potentially criminal, and almost inevitably linked to both violence and gambling, 
and as such were treated as a danger to society.  Indeed Vorspan suggests 
that, “the governing classes feared that even a crowd assembled for recreational 
purposes might suddenly dissolve into a menacing political mob.”210 
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Eradicating street crowds became one of the judiciary’s highest priorities.  
The new policy of fostering a ‘rational recreation’ for the urban masses took two 
routes according to Vorspan.  The first was in the creation of ‘new’ municipal 
police forces “who would discipline urban life by dispersing and arresting people 
who gathered in thoroughfares”.211  The police forces kept close surveillance of 
working class areas in an attempt to enforce acceptable standards of public 
behaviour.  But this more general concern with public order, gave way to a 
specific concern with boisterous working-class leisure pursuits as police action 
specifically targeted street sports, popular festivals and itinerant musical 
entertainment.   
This dissolution of the street entertainment was complemented by a 
second judicial policy to foster more regulated and therefore disciplined forms of 
urban leisure.  Worries about the health of the working-classes, and fear that 
disease would incite political unrest, led both the government and the judiciary to 
seek appropriate alternative urban spaces where the working-classes could 
participate in more ‘rational’ and disciplined forms of physical exercise.212  Urban 
walks, parks, playgrounds, and sports fields, alongside the promotion of 
athleticism were seen to be the key to improving both public health and working 
class morality.213  In essence, British courts pursued a policy of spatial 
segregation.  By the turn of the century, the popular right to recreation in a public 
place had been repealed. 214   
Similarly, the courts attempted to ‘rationalise’ indoor mass 
entertainments.  A series of statutes in the nineteenth century served to 
introduce controls on commercial entertainments on both a local and a national 
level.  Local authorities were given leave to apply their own licensing schemes 
on public houses, music halls and theatre, and eventually cinema.  The courts 
upheld magistrates’ right to apply moral criteria in their decisions to grant 
licenses to applicants.  And in the enforcement of both legislation and regulatory 
decisions, the courts often took into account the relative ‘respectability’ of the 
establishment.  As such, courts dealt with public houses relatively severely, 
while theatres, which by the middle of the nineteenth century were a popular 
middle class leisure pursuit, were shown a leniency that sought to foster both 
their establishment and development.215 
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During the nineteenth century then, the leisure pursuits of the urban 
working-classes, underwent a remarkable transformation.  The mass 
participation in what Vorspan terms ‘pre-industrial soccer’, characterised by the 
sheer number of “unrestrained people [who] took possession of the streets”,216 
gave way to a more ‘civilised’, more disciplined, mass spectatorship.  The 
rowdy, brutal and disorganised crowd, that provoked such fear among the 
governing classes, had been dissipated in favour of ‘respectable’ activities and 
entertainments that took place in thoroughly regulated and intensely monitored 
urban spaces.  Although, as we will see, these indoor mass entertainments were 
not considered to be wholly respectable, especially those associated with the 
working-classes.   
 Le Bon’s arguments were influential, partly because the book drew on 
these ‘respectable’, middle-class fears and anxieties that surrounded the growth 
of the urban working classes, but also because his ideas resonated with the 
cultural shift towards a more visually-oriented popular culture.  Building on these 
fears Le Bon suggests:  
Nothing has a greater effect on the imagination of crowds of 
every category than theatrical representations.  The entire 
audience experiences at the same time the same 
emotions…[and sometimes] the sentiments suggested by the 
images are so strong that they tend, like habitual suggestions, 
to transform themselves into acts.217 
At this time of course, the connection between working class theatre and 
juvenile crime was already perceived to be well established.  What is notable 
about his arguments however, is the way in which his conception of the crowd 
clearly prefigures debates about the psychology of the spectator in the 1970s: 
The images evoked in their mind… are almost as lifelike as the 
reality. Crowds are to some extent in the position of the 
sleeper whose reason, suspended for the time being, allows 
the arousing in his mind of images of extreme intensity which 
would quickly be dissipated could they be submitted to the 
action of reflection.218 
Le Bon’s analogy between the sleeper and the spectator is not developed.  And 
of course, we must be mindful of the fact that he is not actually talking directly 
about a mass audience, but crowds more generally.  Nevertheless, Le Bon’s 
ideas about the appeal of images to the unconscious mind, and their capacity to 
produce ideological effects, is clearly a precursor to later notions of spectator-
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text relations, demonstrating perhaps, just how thoroughly his study is implicated 
in the rapidly expanding visual culture of the late nineteenth century.   
 
 
 
Constituting Spectatorship 
 
 
 In nineteenth century Britain then, popular urban leisure underwent a 
radical transformation.  Supported by the efforts of the judiciary, authorities 
succeeded in bringing boisterous, mass street entertainments to an end, and 
fostered more ‘rational’, disciplined, morally respectable, and physically 
segregated pastimes.219  The unruly and aggressive games of street football that 
invited the participation of large crowds, for example, were vigorously policed 
and prosecuted, while local authorities sequestered discrete urban spaces in 
order to encourage more ‘desirable’ forms of sport such as amateur athleticism.  
Similarly, regulatory bodies like the Football Association and the Amateur 
Athletics Club were set up, not only to establish rules, but to encourage 
discipline among the participants.  This regulation of sporting activities, 
particularly in the case of football, which demanded just 22 players on the field 
at any given time, brought mass participation in matches to an end, and 
encouraged a different form of engagement with the game, in the form of mass 
spectatorship.   
As Rachel Vorspan persuasively argues, the nineteenth century courts 
played a crucial role in “demarcating English (sic) cultural life into a series of 
physically discrete and morally ordered spaces.”220  But what I want to suggest 
is that it is through this control of space, that the juridico-political system seized 
control of the working-class body at leisure.  As we have already seen, newly 
established police forces explicitly monitored working-class areas in order to 
enforce ‘correct’ standards of public behavior, and this surveillance of 
unregulated street sports and entertainments was complemented by a drive 
towards greater regulation and the fostering of disciplinary practices and 
techniques within more ‘desirable’ forms of leisure.   
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The impetus for the development of both designated urban recreational 
ground and regulated sport was, of course, motivated by a fear of ill-health and 
disease, but this was more than a fear of contagion.  Ill-health among the 
working classes might mean lower productivity, an increase in the likelihood of 
political unrest, and a potential threat to national security if British citizens 
proved to be unfit for military service.221  As such, during the course of the 
nineteenth century the working-classes clearly became bound up in a form of 
bio-politics,222 and bio-power was exerted at the level of everyday leisure.  In the 
pursuit of regulated sport, the body was clearly subjected to disciplinary 
practices.  As Foucault would have it, regulated physical leisure engaged in an 
‘anatomo-politics of the human body’, which concerned itself with “the body as a 
machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its 
forces, the parallel increase in its usefulness and its docility”.223  This conflict 
over urban space that took place in both the British courts and on city streets 
was only part of a larger socio-historical shift that concerned itself with the both 
the welfare and the disciplining of the urban working-classes.  But for Foucault, 
this struggle over urban leisure was part of a wider process that was necessary 
“in order for the proletariat to be granted a body and a sexuality…[and] establish 
a whole technology of control which made it possible to keep that body and 
sexuality, finally conceded to them, under surveillance”.224   
The application of juridical power and disciplinary techniques over urban 
working-class leisure did more than simply produce athletic bodies of course, as 
the transformation of football demonstrates, the constitution of more ‘rational’ 
forms of leisure contributed to a different form of engagement with entertainment 
forms.  That is, the deployment of disciplinary practices within the arena of urban 
leisure did not simply prohibit street entertainments, but actively produced 
modern mass spectatorship.  That is not to suggest that some form of 
‘spectatorship’ did not exist prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, clearly 
theatre predates this period by several hundred years.  Rather as Richard 
Butsch argues in his book The Making of American Audiences,225 from the 
middle of the nineteenth century there is a pronounced shift from active to 
passive forms of engagement within American Theatre.  As Butsch suggests the 
very concept of ‘the audience’ is culturally contingent, and what audiences are 
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expected to do within a theatre is subject to change.  In the eighteenth century, 
for example, it would have violated social order for aristocratic audiences to 
maintain silence and pay attention to the actors, since actors held a lower social 
station, and such an act would be construed as an inappropriate act of 
deference.   As late as 1830 it was common practice for members of the 
audience to sit on the front of a box, turning their back on the stage, in order to 
create a circle for conversation.226  Indeed, as one visitor to a theatre in 
Philadelphia in the 1830s notes, the young men of the audience “paid not the 
slightest attention to the stage, but walked about, drank together, and argued as 
if nothing else were going on.”227  
As Butsch suggests, until the middle of the nineteenth century the 
predominantly male audiences were expected to be very active within the 
theatre.  For the upper-classes, attendance was as much about being seen, 
socialising with one’s associates and fraternising with prostitutes as it was about 
the play, and it was not uncommon for privileged young men to take the 
opportunity to parade their finery on the stage during a performance.228  This 
activity was understood by the audience, by the theatre managers and by the 
players as a fundamental right of the audience.  The working-classes in 
particular, exerted ownership over their theatrical experience, expressing their 
delight and dismay in equal measure: hissing and booing, throwing things at the 
stage, calling out for songs, chastising the performers and even physical 
assault.  Indeed, Butsch suggests that audiences of all levels were not above 
rioting to enforce their will.229   
Of course rioting, physical assault and throwing things at the stage were 
not exactly desirable.  Theatre managers often published requests that 
audiences should refrain from throwing things during performances on their 
playbills.  But nevertheless, such activity was treated as a self-evident right of 
the audience; a “conception…rooted in a European tradition of audience 
sovereignty that recognised audiences’ rights to control the performance.”230  By 
the 1840s however, this kind of behaviour came to be pejoratively labelled as 
‘rowdy’, and was perceived less as the audience exercising their rights, and 
associated more the ‘poor manners’ of the lower-classes.  Such behaviour not 
only contravened newly established middle-class codes of propriety but came to 
                                               
226
 Richard Butsch, ‘Bowery B’Hoys and Matinee Ladies: The Re-Gendering of Nineteenth 
Century American Theatre Audiences’, in American Quarterly 46, no.3, (Sept 1994), 379 
227
 Alexis de Tocqueville, quoted in Butsch, (1994), 379 
228
 Butsch, (2000), 23 
229
 Butsch, (2000), especially Chapter 1 
230
 Butsch, (2000), 3 
  
 
 77
be seen as a working-class menace, as all too “easily such collective power 
might be applied to larger economic and political purposes”.231   
 Over the course of the 1840s, standards of behaviour within middle-class 
theatres had shifted so radically that by 1849 the theatre managers’ appeals to 
prevent the throwing of objects at the performers had been replaced by a 
request that “’fidgety individuals’ not stand and put on coats early as ‘it is most 
distressing to the ladies and gentlemen on stage’ and ‘to respect the feelings of 
those who wish to see the whole play in quiet’”.232  Taming the audience was a 
challenge for the theatre manager.  Structural strategies, such as replacing 
moveable benches with individual chairs that were bolted to the floor facing the 
stage and dimming the house lights, were complemented by social strategies: 
prostitutes were barred from entry, theatres became segregated along class 
lines, there was an insistence on the proper deportment of the clientele, and 
more middle-class women were encouraged to attend, in order to provide a 
‘civilising influence’.  That is, theatre managers began to insist on ‘manners’ and 
‘decorum’ from the middle-classes, as well as enforcing dress codes for the 
elite. 
 On the whole, however, this insistence on new standards of conduct, at 
least from the middle and upper classes, was facilitated by a cultural shift in 
middle-class culture in the 1830s and 1840s.  A new concern for ‘respectability’ 
pervaded all aspects of daily life, and a sharp distinction was drawn between 
what was ‘respectable’ and what was ‘disreputable’.  This binary opposition 
created norms of behaviour that were fractured along class lines.  Class status 
was to be gained in the exercising of manners, of observing etiquette, and in 
acting in accordance with strict rules of behaviour, while ‘respectability’ hinged 
on being seen with the right people in the right places, that is, in avoiding 
associations with the disreputable working-classes.   
Such a concern for respectability was clearly implicated in the 
segregation of theatres along class lines.  In the pursuit of respectability, certain 
theatres closed their doors to the working-classes, and chose to show “a 
particular type of drama for a particular class of audience”.233  But for the 
audience, “attendance at respectable theatres became an occasion for 
exhibiting the manners, detailed in etiquette manuals, that defined the 
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boundaries between respectable and other.”234  Coarseness, rowdiness, 
boisterous behaviour and emotional outbursts were marked as attributes of the 
‘disreputable’ working-classes, and by contrast, the middle-classes performed 
their status through self-control and restraint.  “Body management called for 
proper posture and gesture, even control of one’s gaze and walk.  Spitting was 
prohibited.  Emotional control was also part of this elaborate etiquette.  Anger 
and conflict were to be avoided; even laughter was restrained.”235   
As Butsch points out, such exaggerated restraint soon gave way to the 
pressures of consumer culture, where indulgence was positively encouraged.  
Women in particular, indulged in new, more elaborate fashions, which were 
complemented by gaiety and theatricality in behaviour.236  But nevertheless the 
transformation of the notion of appropriate behaviour within the theatre, which 
occurred during 1830s and 1840s, had left a lasting legacy in the formation of 
spectatorship.  The concept of audience sovereignty had been fundamentally 
overturned, and strict rules of conduct and response were rigidly enforced by 
theatre managers, by the audience members themselves, and also, 
occasionally, by the actors.237  Moreover, as Butsch himself argues, the quelling 
of audience expression effectively “privatized audience members’ experiences, 
as each experienced the event psychologically alone, without simultaneously 
sharing the experience with others.”238  In effect, spectatorship itself had been 
transformed.  Ontologically, the spectator was no longer a casual witness to an 
event, but a rigidly constructed subject position, characterised as much by its 
docility as its engagement with the performance.  Spectatorship had, in essence, 
become a disciplinary practice.  
 The concern of the middle-classes in Britain, like those of America, to 
both develop and preserve their own ‘respectability’, led to a decline in middle-
class audiences between the 1820s and 1850s, as they sought to distance 
themselves from associations with the working-classes.239  The increasing 
emphasis on differentiation between the classes during this period occurs, not 
only in the physical separation of theatres catering for the different audiences, 
but also within social discourses.  Within journalistic reviews of the theatre in 
particular, there is an increasing concern with the differentiation between middle-
class and working-class audiences, particularly in terms of their behaviour.  
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William Hazlitt, for example, writing in the early nineteenth century, built upon 
the pre-existing dichotomies of ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ theatre.  He 
differentiated between theatre as ‘art’ and theatre as mere ‘leisure’.  For Hazlitt, 
the theatre was a space of potential aesthetic refinement that could bestow 
social status on its spectators.  But such a transformation could only occur 
firstly, if theatre itself could be dissociated from the escapist pleasures of the 
working-class leisure, and secondly, if the theatre audience could be persuaded 
to demonstrate both appropriate behaviour and critical discernment.240 
Writing about the ‘fashionable’ audiences of the Covent Garden Opera, 
Hazlitt suggested that these audiences exercise fastidious restraint by 
maintaining silence and carefully avoiding touching one another during the 
performance.  However, the audience members who observed such ‘polite’ 
behaviour at the Opera, did not necessarily adhere to the same standards within 
the theatre, and as such, Hazlitt suggested “a system of distinction making 
indecorous behaviour the subject of severe social sanction”.241  In essence, a 
system of normative social practice, perhaps even the exercise of the panoptic 
power of the audience as a whole, where each member is forced to internalise 
the codes of appropriate spectatorial behaviour and enact them on each visit to 
the theatre.  This spectator is not exactly a subject position produced through 
interpellation by the text, but a performative activity engaged in by the individual. 
 
 
 
The Arrival of Cinema 
 
 
Like nineteenth century theatre, early cinema was shot through with 
class divisions.  And while, in the US at least, films were shown in a variety of 
different contexts, catering for a wide range of clientele, from private viewings at 
society balls and first-class theatres, through to vaudeville houses and 
nickelodeons, 242 it was the storefront nickelodeon that dominated the public 
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image of film exhibition.243  In the US, the audience of the nickelodeon “was 
defined as a group by the price of admission”244 and hence was associated 
predominantly with working-class and immigrant communities.245  Similarly, in 
the UK cinema’s early home in the ‘penny gaffs’ assured its conflation with the 
lower-classes, fuelling ‘respectable fears’ about both the morality and the 
behaviour of early cinema audiences. 
As Richard Butsch points out, although descriptions of audience 
behaviour are few, what is remarkable about them is their resemblance to 
descriptions of nineteenth century working-class theatre audiences.246  As 
Miriam Hansen puts it: 
The neighbourhood character of many nickelodeons – the 
egalitarian seating, continuous admission, and variety format, 
nonfilmic activities like illustrated songs, live acts, and 
occasional amateur nights – fostered a casual, sociable if not 
boisterous, atmosphere.247 
The nickelodeon, it would seem, was appropriated by its audience as a public 
space where “people chat in a friendly manner, children move freely about the 
house”248 and “regulars stroll up and down the aisles between acts and visit 
friends”.249   
 Moreover, Butsch suggests, the nickelodeon audience had effectively 
reasserted its sovereignty over the performance.  Within the cinema there was 
significant interaction between the audience and the theatre staff, and 
“Managers of small theatres attempted a delicate balance between acquiescing 
to their audiences’ wishes and ‘managing’ the audience”250  Films could be 
edited for the audience’s tastes, reels could be run backward or at varying 
speeds, and musical accompaniments could deviate from provided scripts in 
order to alter the mood or tone of a film; turning serious dramas into farces.  And 
as a rule managers were supportive of efforts to please the audience 
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“regardless of the impact on the dramatic effects of the movie, and despite [the] 
objections of movie producers”.251   As such, working class audiences exerted a 
degree of control over the use of the cinema space, and over the meaning of 
film texts.  As Butsch argues, the reception activities of these early audiences 
shaped the reading of early film in order to “fit their own working-class 
experience, and thus used the nickelodeon as a site for producing alternative 
culture.”252 
 This positive, progressive reading of the activities of working class 
audiences within early cinema however, was not shared by moral majority of the 
time, who saw both the clientele and their behaviour as a problem.  As Barton 
Currie points out in 1907, the nickelodeons were seen to be ‘haunted’ by 
“undesirables of many kinds”, including pickpockets, who “found them splendidly 
convenient, for the lights were always cut off when the picture machine was 
focussed on the canvas.” 253  Indeed the lack of lighting, ironically introduced 
within mainstream theatre as a means of subduing the audience and 
encouraging a more passive spectatorial engagement with the performance, 
was seen to be at the root of many of the problems of cinema.  As the Edinburgh 
Chief Constable reported in 1917 “the darkness, combined with the low standard 
of morality of the individual” not only led to crime within the theatre, but opened 
up the possibility of sexual congress.254  
The potential for such conditions to lead to ‘immorality’ and ‘indecency’ 
within the theatre was oft repeated on both sides of the Atlantic.255  And while 
concern circulated around the potential for young women to be induced into 
‘improper conduct’, anxieties were also frequently expressed about the danger 
of sexual assaults on children.256  The problem with cinema performances was 
“the conditions under which so many are given – the dark room, filled with adults 
and children, absolutely without supervision, affording no protection against the 
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evil-minded and depraved men who frequent such places.”257  Questions about 
the validity of at least some of these claims notwithstanding, what is clear is that 
the problem of cinema is twofold.  On the one hand, concern centres on the 
moral character of the audience, while on the other, it is the physical conditions 
of the theatre, rather than the content of films themselves, that are at issue.   
As these examples demonstrate, during these early years of cinema, 
concerns about health and safety were absolutely central to the rhetoric 
surrounding film houses, and provided the cornerstone of early cinematic 
regulation.  The crowding together of large numbers of people into small 
makeshift auditoria led to fears about the spread of epidemics.258  And early 
efforts to legislate for this ‘new kind of amusement’ were prompted, in no small 
way by the threat of fire posed by the new technology.259  In the UK, even 
though the risk of fire was considered to be overstated, in 1909 the 
Cinematograph Act260 was passed in an effort “To safeguard the public from the 
danger which arises from fires at cinematograph entertainments, which are 
especially liable to outbreaks of fire on account of the long highly inflammable 
films which are used in the lanterns.”261  The Act required all buildings in which 
films were to be shown to be licensed under a set of regulations drawn up by the 
Home Office.  The regulations themselves were exclusively concerned with the 
safety of the buildings.  However, responsibility for issuing licenses was passed 
down to County Councils who were also granted the authority to “determine the 
conditions under which licenses were granted”262; paving the way for the local 
censorship of a film’s content. 
 Similarly, in New York in 1909 the National Board of Censorship (NBC), 
under the leadership of Charles Sprague Smith and John Collier dedicated itself 
to the dual goals of ‘uplift’ of the industry and the principle of voluntary 
censorship.263  Collier in particular, vociferously rejected any legal impetus 
enforcing the censorship of film, insisting instead on a policy of voluntary 
submission of films by producers to the board.  But while the NBC were clearly 
focussed on bringing about ‘morality’ and ‘decency’ in cinema through 
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censorship, the matter of the physical space of cinema remained central to their 
concerns.  Together with the Mayor’s Office, Smith and Collier, like the UK 
government, sought to change the process of theatre licensing in order to 
improve the conditions of film exhibition by “finding cleaner, less crowded, and 
less hazardous exhibition spaces than the current nickelodeons”.264  
 The small matter of making cinema ‘respectable’ of course, would take 
more than the tightening of safety codes for the theatres.  The audience itself 
would need quelling.  Indeed, in a report on ‘motion picture theatre’ conditions 
made by Raymond Fosdick for the Mayor’s Office in 1911, Fosdick makes 
pointed reference to the fact that in some theatres, “No attempt was made to 
maintain order. Quarrels were frequent.”265  While in others, “The crowd was 
surging back and forth, pushing and shoving for vantage points of view.  
Quarrels were frequent.”266  The quarrelsome character of the picture-going 
crowd, it is suggested, is a result of theatre owners’ efforts to fill the space to 
capacity, and the inadequate provision of either seating or ventilation.  
Nevertheless the report confirms popular conceptions of the ‘character’ and 
behaviour of the nickelodeon audience.    
   The principle of ‘uplift’ championed by the NBC in the US, that sought to 
improve not only the conditions of the theatres, but also the ‘quality’ of the 
pictures being offered, was also applied to the audience of cinema.  Like 
Vaudeville before it, US cinemas attempted to ‘improve’ the character of the 
audience through a number of strategies.  Reformers, for their part, attempted to 
protect the audience from the dangers posed by the darkened theatre by calling 
for laws requiring the segregation of the sexes267 and the hiring of "women of 
good moral character, not under forty," who had "two statements from reputable 
New York citizens attesting to her character"268 to supervise children and 
adolescents in a separate part of the theatre.  These efforts however, proved 
unsuccessful, although, at least in New York, legislators conceded to demands 
and passed an ordinance requiring theatre owners to turn up the house lights in 
order to discourage ‘immoral’ behaviour.269   
Ultimately, however, it was the theatre owners themselves who worked 
to improve the character of the audience.  The provision of adequate, fixed 
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seating of course, may well have helped to subdue at least some of the 
‘quarrels’ highlighted by Fosdick, as well as help to foster a more ‘classical’ 
spectatorial orientation to the screen.  But it was not just legislative demands 
that were changing the face of cinema in the US.  Commercial pressure from an 
increasingly competitive market meant that many exhibitors upgraded their 
theatres in an effort to appeal to more affluent clientele.  For while early cinema 
may have been popularly regarded as a working-class pastime, theatre owners 
themselves pursued a middle-class market.  
Like theatre before it, early cinema in the US courted the patronage of 
the middle-class woman in order to lend their theatres respectability.  In Boston 
circa 1910, the Theatre Premiere offered free admission to women for pre-noon 
shows, while others charged half price for women and children at all shows, a 
practice which spread rapidly to other cities.270  Luxurious interiors borrowed 
from department stores, baby photograph competitions, free gifts of teddy bears 
and perfume, and space for baby carriages were all coupled with “a conscious 
effort to transform the rowdy space of nickelodeons to polite standards of 
decorum.”271 
Similarly, certain kinds of workers were “discouraged and occasionally 
even banned from the movies.”272  In Charlestown and Portsmouth for example, 
theatres refused admittance to enlisted men, while at the same time offered 
incentives for Officers to attend.  The policy reflected the attitude that “One way 
to keep trouble out of the theatre is not to admit it in the first place.”273  US trade 
journals, like The Moving Picture World and Motography offered advice on how 
to solicit trade from the middle-classes.  They recommended improvements both 
inside and outside the theatre, as well as setting out the ground rules for 
attracting a ‘mixed house’ by: avoiding nationally slanted programmes, 
eschewing ethnic vaudeville acts, and stopping sing-alongs in foreign 
languages.274  The advice was founded, at least in part, by the moral problems 
posed by live acts themselves.  Exclusion of these acts was crucial because of 
“the tendency of vaudeville to become degraded, and the increased difficulty of 
regulating the general physical and moral conduct of the show if Vaudeville is 
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allowed.”275  Nevertheless, it is clear that the impetus to remove these non-filmic 
activities from the theatres is motivated less by the inherent difficulties of the 
medium than by a concern to discourage the mass participation of immigrant 
audiences.  The result however, Hansen argues, was not just a change in the 
audience demographic, but a seismic shift in the perception of film. 
As Hansen suggests, in streamlining their shows and reducing all non-
filmic activities exhibitors succeeded, at least in part, in encouraging the 
audience to engage with the film, and promoted the absorption of the viewer 
within the narrative space.276  By undermining the episodic, distracted 
engagement, inherent within the variety format, exhibitors pursued a ‘totality of 
effects’, characterised by the prolonged attention and absorption of the 
spectator.  This effort was underscored by the revival of the on-stage film 
lecturer within the theatre circa 1908.  The lecturer provided a commentary that 
accompanied the projection of the film, elaborating the narrative and aiding the 
spectator’s “comprehension of, and involvement with, the more complex 
stories.”277  As such, the role of the lecturer was to quell the activity of the 
audience, and promote engagement and absorption.  As one professional 
lecturer of the time put it: 
even at its very beginning, those gifted with a little imagination 
and the power of speech will begin to comment, to talk more or 
less excitedly and try to explain and tell their friends or 
neighbours…The gifted lecturer will gather up and harness this 
current of expressed thought...the buzz and idle comment will 
cease, and he finds himself without an effort the spokesman 
for the particular crowd of human beings that make up his 
audience.278 
The role of the lecturer then, was not simply to lend an air of legitimacy to 
cinema, or to underscore its potential for social and moral ‘uplift’ through its 
capacity to educate and inform its audience.  Rather, the lecturer was an 
effective tool in controlling the behaviours of the audience, as well as in 
contributing to the formation of a classical spectatorial relation to the screen.  
And indeed it is notable that around 1910 the commonly used term audience 
was in fact, joined by “the more abstract term ‘spectator’”.279 
                                               
275
 National Board of Censorship, Suggestions for a Model Ordinance for Regulating Motion 
Picture Theatres, (New York, 1915), quoted in Czitrom, (1992), 548 
276
 Hansen, (1991), 83-4 
277
 Tom Gunning, D.W. Griffith and the Origins of American Narrative Film, (Urbana: University of 
Illinios Press, 1991), ch4, quoted in Hansen, (1991), 96 
278
 W. Stephen Bush, ‘The Human Voice as a Factor in the Moving Picture Show”, Moving Picture 
World, Jan 23, 1909, 86, quoted in Hansen (1991), 97 
279
 Hansen, (1991), 84 
  
 
 86
 In the UK on the other hand, the principle of ‘uplift’ was not so well 
received.  Reformers who attempted to use cinema as a means to educate the 
film-going public met with fierce resistance from the newly formed British Board 
of Film Censors, particularly over issues of morality and sexuality.  Films dealing 
with issues of social purity and hygiene were deemed to be ‘propaganda films’; 
unsuitable for commercial cinema, and hence refused a certificate.  In contrast 
to the NBC in New York, the BBFC defined cinema as “a medium dedicated to 
the diversion and amusement of the working classes.”280  And while the cinema 
industry was initially opposed the de facto censorship of these ‘propaganda 
films’, this dissent “gave way to an acceptance of the BBFC’s line as soon as it 
became clear that respectability could prove costly for business.”281   
Nevertheless, despite the BBFC’s refusal to award certificates to 
propaganda films, many local authorities made arrangements to show these 
films in their areas.  The problem with these screenings however, was not simply 
in the depictions of sexuality contained within the film, but that the audience 
could actively refuse the ‘social hygiene’ message of the film, and consume it 
simply as pornography.  Here too a lecturer was employed to undermine this 
most limited of interpretative sovereignty, and undermine ‘undesirable’ readings 
by explaining and supplementing the ‘important’ points of the film.282 
Despite the differences between the US and the UK, what remains 
absolutely clear is that on both sides of the Atlantic efforts to improve and 
regulate early cinema underwent a profound shift in these early years.  In both 
cases, official attempts to bring cinema under the remit of the law were based in 
the regulation of cinematic space.  But concerns about the physical state of the 
buildings in which films were shown went hand in hand with ‘respectable’ fears 
about the working class and immigrant audiences of cinema.  But “just as the 
‘dirty little dumps’ had been sanitized, the behaviour typical of neighbourhood 
audiences – ‘the buzz and idle comment’, booing and applause, the ‘howling of 
small boys’”283 was also subdued, and efforts were made by theatre owners to 
shape an audience of individuals into a homogenous groups of spectators.284  
But as exhibitors accomplished their goals to improve the conditions of the 
theatre, and domesticate its audience, attention turned towards the effect of the 
films texts on the viewer. 
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Here too the class character of the audience presented problems.  On 
both sides of the Atlantic, the popular appeal of cinema was the precise reason 
it needed censorship.  For the NBC, moving pictures were considered to be “the 
most important form of cheap amusement in the country, they reach the young, 
immigrants, family groups, the formative and impressionable section of our 
cities, as no other form of amusement, and cannot be but vital influences for ill 
or good.”285  While the BBFC were far more blunt: “The Cinema differs greatly 
from the Theatre: the audience is less intelligent and educated and includes far 
more children and young people.”286  Indeed, in 1914, the chairman of the NBC 
confirmed that the Board’s censorship activities only applied to five and ten-cent 
theatres, allowing legitimate theatres, who catered to the middle-classes to play 
films (like white slavery films and sex education shorts) that were prohibited in 
the nickelodeons. 
 What is clear from the discussion above, is that the activities of both 
theatre owners, local authorities and censorship boards all contributed to both 
the formation of classical spectatorship.  Cinema here is an institution that 
sought to orchestrate the activities of viewers, both in order to bring troublesome 
behaviour under control, and to reinforce certain modes of cinematic 
consumption.  But what is also evident is that this formation takes place within 
the context of ‘respectable’ fears, particularly about the working-classes, 
working-class children, and immigrant communities.   
These early discourses of cinema are haunted by these ‘Others’; 
constructed as vulnerable, dangerous, and particularly susceptible to the effects 
of cinema.  Some of these fears have persisted.  Children for example, were one 
of the first targets for control in the cinema, and have remained the locus for 
regulation to this day, while other groups identified as peculiarly dangerous or 
vulnerable, like rural communities, or immigrant groups, have been supplanted 
by more contemporary ‘bogeymen’, like sex offenders, and as I will demonstrate 
in a later chapter, young adolescent men more generally.  What remains 
consistent however is that both then as now, the particular groups identified as 
‘troublesome’ “have remained a central target and resource for authorities.” And 
as we will see, “attempts to invent and exercise different types of political rule 
have been intimately linked to conceptions of the nature of those who are to be 
ruled.”287 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 What all of this seeks to show is that spectatorship is not a ‘natural’ 
phenomenon.  Rather, spectatorship, as we conceive it in the contemporary 
world, is more than a peculiar socio-historical construction; it is a continuously 
monitored and policed disciplinary practice.  As I have shown, the juridico-
political power that was exerted over forms of leisure in the mid-nineteenth 
century, sought to foster more ‘rational’, disciplined forms of entertainment for 
the working-classes, and demarcate ‘respectable’ from ‘demoralizing’ leisure 
pursuits.  This cultural shift was complemented by a similar transformation in 
middle-class culture.  As we have seen, the actions of both local authorities and 
the judiciary in the UK, in the mid-nineteenth century, worked to impose 
restrictions on traditional urban leisure pursuits.  The action brought to an end 
the mass participation in street sports and entertainment.  Within sport, 
individuals were offered a choice between participation in the disciplinary 
practices of athleticism, or a more respectable engagement with sport through 
mass spectatorship.  At the same time, as Vorspan shows, the courts fostered 
the development of theatre as a more ‘respectable’ form of leisure.  As such, the 
mid-nineteenth century is a period distinguished by a drive toward more 
‘disciplined’ forms of leisure, which are themselves characterised by an 
emphasis on spectatorship.   
Moreover, during the same period theatres themselves became more 
regulated and disciplined places, where strict codes of behaviour came to be 
enforced.  In effect, at the same time as there is a greater emphasis on 
spectatorship as a ‘desirable’, ‘appropriate’ and ‘moral’ form of leisure, the act of 
spectating itself becomes more thoroughly codified, and subject to both 
institutional and social opprobrium.  As such, spectatorship can be seen to be 
the end point of social and historical strategies of social control that determine 
how and where the individual should most appropriately spend their leisure time.  
The cultural impetus toward spectatorship in the nineteenth century then, not 
only successfully regulated urban space but helped to shape what Guy Debord 
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calls the ‘society of the spectacle’.  The political and judicial policy of pursuing 
‘rational entertainment’ emphasised viewing rather than participation as an 
appropriate form of leisure.  And as we will see in the case of cinema, through a 
system of licensing of places of entertainment and leisure, these same 
institutions of legal and political power effectively exerted a continuing pressure 
that helped to shape the quality of the experience therein.   
By the time of cinema’s emergence, spectatorship was already a 
thoroughly codified disciplinary practice.  Over the course of the nineteenth 
century, theatres had become more thoroughly managed and controlled public 
spaces, designed to subdue interaction and activity amongst the audience 
members, and promote a more attentive and absorbed relation to the theatrical 
production.  And at least among middle class audiences, models of appropriate 
behaviour within the theatre were thoroughly codified and internalised, and as a 
result spectatorship as a ‘privatised’ and individual psychological relation to the 
theatrical event became the standard model of ‘respectable’ theatrical 
consumption.  In short, the nineteenth century preoccupation of the middle-
classes to both distinguish and dissociate themselves from the working classes, 
led to the formation of a unique set of disciplinary practices.  These were 
supported by deeply normative social judgements, and the willing 
subjectification of the individual theatre-goer, that ultimately produced a 
peculiarly modern form of subjectivity: the spectator. 
This drive toward more disciplined leisure, that effectively increased 
docility among the working-classes, was compounded by the codification of 
spectatorial behaviour.  The restructuring of theatres and the emphasis on 
disciplined and orderly behaviour that had occurred within society theatres in the 
nineteenth century, was not necessarily so rigidly enforced within working-class 
leisure pursuits such as the cinema.  Nevertheless, this emphasis on the 
conduct of the audience, that determined both the institutional arrangement of 
lighting, seating etc within the space of theatre, also, eventually, exerted 
pressure on the behaviour of cinema audiences.  As such, spectatorship, or 
more specifically, theatrical and cinematic spectatorship, can be fruitfully viewed 
as a disciplinary practice that exerts control over the body of the individual.  The 
act of sitting in a darkened auditorium, in individual seats, silent, motionless and 
with rapt attention to the performance at hand, was never an inevitable feature 
of the consumption of either theatre or cinema, but an end point of a series of 
strategies aimed at both social control and the docility of the individual body. 
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For film theorists like Metz and Baudry, of course, these features of the 
social and institutional apparatus are singled out as the preconditions of 
metapsychological spectator/text relations, but in demonstrating that 
spectatorship is a disciplinary practice that exerts significant control over the 
body, we can begin to see how thoroughly the body is bound up in the process 
of spectatorship.  The docility of the body is not simply a precondition for 
spectatorship, but a normatively defined social practice that is performed by the 
individual in the process of viewing; a docility that is stringently policed by the 
institution, but perhaps more importantly, even those activities that are actively 
condoned by the theatre staff, such as eating and drinking within the auditorium, 
may still be subject to social sanction by other members of the audience. 
 Writing of disciplinary practices more generally, and of systems of 
normativity specifically, Foucault sketches the range of techniques that were 
used within institutions like the army, the school or even orphanages during their 
development.  He suggests that: 
The workshop, the school, the army were subject to a whole 
micropenalty of time (lateness, absences, interruptions of 
tasks), of activity (inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of 
behaviour (impoliteness, disobedience), of speech (idle 
chatter, insolence), of the body (‘incorrect’ attitudes, irregular 
gestures, lack of cleanliness), of sexuality (impurity, 
indecency).288 
Although Foucault is clearly not talking about social practices within cinema, if 
we consider this list in the context of the institutional arrangements of many 
cinemas within Britain, we quickly see how thoroughly policed the cinematic 
experience is.  Entrance to and exit from an auditorium is often rigorously 
controlled with regard to the start and finishing time of the film, and often no 
admission will be granted after a certain predetermined point in the movie.  
Activity, behaviour and speech are subject to a range of techniques that ensure 
that appropriate standards are adhered to, from the disapproval of other 
audience members, through the onscreen adverts that tell the audience that one 
must not smoke, or use a mobile phone, to warnings from staff, and perhaps 
even eviction from the cinema if the individual refuses to comply.  Similarly, the 
attitudes of the body are monitored and policed.  For example, one is expected 
to sit only in a designated seat, as opposed to the aisle or the proscenium; to 
occupy just one seat rather than to lie down; to arrange one’s body in the seat 
appropriately, that is, to face front and pay attention, not to put ones feet over 
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the chair in front, or to interfere with personal space of other members of the 
audience etc; to respond to the film appropriately, since even laughing in the 
‘wrong’ places in a film can elicit strong reactions from other members of the 
audience; and of course, expressions of sexuality within the cinema are rigidly, 
though not always successfully, policed. 
 However, this physical and corporeal quality of spectatorship, which is 
largely ignored by film theory, extends beyond the activity of cinema-going.  The 
docile body of the spectator is a useful body.  Not just in the management of 
cinema business, but in the formal qualities of narrative and spectacular film, in 
which particular forms of audience engagement are absolutely crucial to the 
achievement of their effects.  Spectatorship is already a disciplined practice, but 
it is also a productive one.  Through observing the disciplinary techniques of 
spectatorship, one gains access to particular forms of cinematic pleasure that 
would not necessarily function in a less disciplined environment.  Narrative, for 
example, especially if we are talking about a film like The Sixth Sense,289 which 
is built on suspense and the twist at the end, absolutely depends on watching 
the film in a sequence from the beginning to the end, and being able to both see 
and hear the clues on screen before the final reveal.  The deployment of such 
cinematic effects is facilitated by the disciplinary practices of cinemas; for 
example, restricting admissions after a certain point in the film, rather than 
allowing individuals to enter the cinema toward the end and stay through to the 
repeat showing to catch up on what happened at the beginning.  These varied 
disciplinary practices not only help to create certain cinematic forms, but 
observance of these disciplinary techniques on the part of the individual is also 
productive in the sense that it allows her/him to gain access to certain forms of 
spectatorial pleasure. 
Control of the body and its behaviours, through the disciplinary practices 
of spectatorship is, therefore, central to the development of contemporary 
cinematic forms, as well as the pursuit of contemporary forms of cinematic 
pleasure.  Indeed, as we will see, contemporary cinema often explicitly 
addresses the body in its marketing, and promises the viewer intense physical 
experience while in the cinema.  Experiences which are themselves achieved 
through the institutional and individual management of the spectating body.  But 
if the disciplined body of the spectator is a useful body, it is also a source of 
considerable concern.  Cinema’s immediacy and its ability to ‘arouse’ and to 
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physically affect the viewer, are seen to be highly problematic, and as we shall 
see, certain groups are singled out by authorities as particularly vulnerable to 
such effects.  While the particular constitution of these cinematic others has 
changed over the course of the last century, what remains constant is the idea 
that cinema is a medium that is capable of bringing about specific undesirable 
social effects.  And in particular, fear can be seen to circulate around the twin 
figures of the ‘vulnerable’ and the ‘deviant’ viewing subject.  Or to put it another 
way, the regulatory discourses of cinema can be fruitfully seen as disciplinary 
practices that perform normalising judgements and exert normative social 
pressure over the spectator.  And moreover, these discourses particularly 
concern themselves with monitoring, normalising and ultimately controlling the 
body and the behaviour of the spectator. 
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The Promises of Monsters: 
 
Cinema and ‘The Experience Economy’ 
 
 
About two-thirds of the way into Jurassic Park (1992), there is 
a scene where Hammond and Sattler talk in the Jurassic Park 
restaurant about the nature of illusion and reality.  The scene 
begins, however, with the camera exploring the adjacent gift 
shop.  It is a slightly eerie moment, because it is as if the 
movie was at this point turning round and looking at us.290 
 
For Thomas Elsaesser, the discomfort he experienced in watching this 
scene is rooted in the film’s reflexive acknowledgement of its own commodified 
nature.  That in scanning the gift shop, the film tips a wink to the ‘knowing’ 
spectator about the extensive merchandising that accompanies this particular 
film, at the same time as the text itself becomes an advertisement for the 
games, gadgets, and toys produced by the film brand.  Indeed, in an era where 
merchandising, horizontal integration and the search for synergy prevail, it is 
doubtful whether we should even talk specifically of ‘the film industry’.  As 
Graeme Turner points out, today, film is only “one of a range of cultural 
commodities produced by large multinational conglomerates whose main 
interest is more likely to be electronics or petroleum”.291 
 
                                               
290
 Thomas Elsaesser, ‘The Blockbuster: Everything Connects, but Not Everything Goes’, in The 
End of Cinema As We Know It: American Film in the Nineties, ed. Jon Lewis, (London: Pluto 
Press, 2001), 11 
291
 Graeme Turner, Film as Social Practice, Third Edition, (London: Routledge, 2001), 6 
  
 
 94
To some extent, cinema has always acted as a vehicle of consumerism.  
As Charles Eckert’s study of early Hollywood demonstrates, as early as 1910, 
cinema was used to display luxury items, and by 1930 cinema was formally 
recognised by corporations like Coca-Cola, General Motors and General Electric 
as a powerful marketing tool, with the potential to stimulate demand for 
American products on a global scale.  The films themselves, in Eckert’s view, 
were often little more than a showcase for fashions, cosmetics, furnishings and 
luxury goods, and a vehicle for celebrity endorsements and commodity tie-ins.292  
Moreover, endless make-over movies and rags to riches tales demonstrated that 
identity could be transformed through the purchase of consumer goods.  For 
example, films like Now Voyager 293 and Sabrina Fair 294 both demonstrated how 
a well-chosen wardrobe and a few cosmetic treatments could transform a 
woman into a vision of sophistication, elegance and desirability.  The cinema 
screen was, from the earliest days of Hollywood, the equivalent of a ‘display 
window’ replete with luxury goods and aspirational images of glamorous stars, 
which invited the spectator to purchase and consume; to transform their lives 
through conspicuous consumption. 
 However, there is no doubt that the contemporary Hollywood drive 
towards merchandising has intensified considerably since the first few decades 
of the twentieth century.295  In the case of Jurassic Park for example, “500 
licensees marketed 5,000 products with licensed merchandised sales of $1 
billion”,296 figures unknown and possibly undreamt of in the early 1900s.  
Although as the opening quote from Elsaesser suggests, the film is not unaware 
of its own status as the centre of a massive merchandising industry.  Moreover, 
as Constance Balides argues, the initial self-referential celebration of its own 
commercial success quickly gives way to a critique of the rabid 
commercialisation of the diegetic Jurassic Park experience.297 
 The critique of the diegetic theme park with Jurassic Park is doubly 
reflexive, particularly in view of the fact that the film itself was redeveloped as an 
attraction at Universal Studios Hollywood, but also in the sense that the film 
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makes extensive use of CGI in order to create an intensely sensational ‘movie 
ride’ experience for the viewer, in which the “visceral sense of an amusement 
park ride becomes part of the attraction for spectators.”298  Coupled with a 
plethora of intertexts exploring how the special effects were achieved, 
Hammond and Sattler’s discussion of the illusory nature of the Jurassic Park 
encounter can be seen to draw attention not only to the economic conditions 
which shape the film’s production and reception, but to the very nature of its own 
technological artifice.  This particular mode of address undermines the 
constitution of an innocent and naïve spectator, helplessly absorbed by the 
cinematic illusion.  But more importantly, the question of whether the spectator 
actually believes in “a virtual – and realistically impossible – scene, as well as a 
kinaesthetic effect of dinosaurs hurtling towards her/his position associated with 
movie rides”,299 is far less interesting than the question of how the intensely 
visceral experiences associated with many contemporary films are constructed.   
Like much of Steven Speilberg’s oeuvre, Jurassic Park is a clear 
example of the ‘high-concept blockbuster’,300 a style of filmmaking that 
dominated Hollywood in the 1980s and 1990s, and a business strategy that was 
designed to pull the Hollywood film industry out of the doldrums.  The rise of 
television in the 1950s and 1960s had led to a sharp decline in cinema 
attendances, and was compounded by the introduction of the video recorder in 
the 1970s.  If cinema was to survive, the cinema industry had to compete with 
these new technologies; it had to attract new 'media literate' consumers, brought 
up on a steady diet of television and popular music.  It had to find a means not 
only of attracting people out of their homes and into the cinema, and of 
assimilating changing relations between the viewers and texts, but also of 
overcoming the industry's profound difficulties in identifying a coherent audience 
to market their products to.  Television had stripped classical Hollywood of the 
family audience, traditionally the one reliable market they could be sure of, while 
Hollywood's increasingly globalised markets left the film industry with "an 
audience fragmented beyond any controllable identity."301   
High-concept filmmaking concentrated on producing striking yet easily 
reducible narratives and easily identifiable visual styles which, coupled with 
heavily foregrounded images and music, provided the cinema industry with a 
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powerful new marketing tool, capable of being developed into a succession of 
global film brands that facilitated not only the primary marketing of the films, but 
also of the numerous ancillary products.  These blockbusters were, in effect, 
"multi-purpose entertainment machines that breed music videos and soundtrack 
albums, TV series and video cassettes, video games and theme park rides, 
novelizations and comic books"302   
As well as these economic and aesthetic changes, the blockbuster 
worked to overcome the difficulties presented by an increasingly fragmented and 
heterogeneous audience, and of the shifting terms of film/viewer relations, by 
fundamentally changing its mode of address.  The high-concept blockbuster 
distinguished itself from the 'classical narrative film' by abandoning its traditional 
"unifying strategies of spectator positioning",303 such as identification or 
voyeurism, and focused instead on producing films that were "increasingly plot-
driven, increasingly visceral, kinetic, fast-paced, increasingly reliant on special 
effects, increasingly 'fantastic' (and thus apolitical), and increasingly targeted at 
younger audiences."304   Rather than try to homogenize its empirically diverse 
viewers the Hollywood blockbuster gambled instead on "offering something to 
everyone, of appealing to diverse interests with a diversity of attractions and 
multiple levels of textuality."305   
One of the most significant attractions of course, was an increasing 
emphasis on the use of spectacle.  Although as Geoff King reminds us 
"spectacle has always been an important part of the equation in Hollywood".306  
The classical narrative film often delivered visual pleasures to its audience: from 
spectacular mise-en-scène, through the spectacles of performance in musicals 
and comedies, to the very appearance of a star, whose very presence routinely 
disrupted the narrative coherence of the film.  Furthermore, narratives often 
revolved around scenes of emotional intensity, where the use of fear, horror or 
'tear-jerking' devices was central to the film, disrupting the steady progression of 
the narrative in order to create an emotional experience for the audience.  
Similarly, the spectacle of action and motion was used routinely within the 
classical narrative film as a 'thrilling' device.  The chase scene, for example, 
common to many classical narrative films, was as much about the creation of 
suspense within the spectator and the presentation of spectacular images as it 
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is about overcoming obstacles or resolving enigmas, in some cases perhaps 
even more so.   
Nevertheless, within the high-concept film, the 'visual spectacle' gained 
an increasingly important place.  Indeed one might suggest that the presentation 
of the spectacle has, in many instances, become the raison d'être for the 
blockbuster.  This concentration on the spectacle, of course, has done nothing 
to harm the global dissemination of Hollywood’s products, where a simple 
narrative and relatively sparse dialogue are a positive advantage in a 
multilingual marketplace.  Spectacular sequences need little, if any, translation.  
But further, Hollywood's emphasis on the production of 'visually spectacular' 
action and effects-based films also works to reinvigorate cinema as a site of 
consumption, for while the average narrative film is perhaps more easily and 
conveniently consumed at home, the impact of the spectacle is significantly 
ameliorated by its transfer to the 'small screen'.  Visual effects demand to be 
viewed at the cinema, and through the production of these high-impact, visually 
spectacular films, the Hollywood blockbuster has attempted to reinstate cinema 
as the primary site of its consumption.  As one website for a multiplex puts it, 
“Some films deserve to be seen as the director intended - on the big screen.”307 
This textual strategy is also complemented by the specific institutional 
arrangements of the multiplex.  The multiplex is an institution that has grown 
alongside the high-concept film, and may even be considered to be an intrinsic 
part of its apparatus.  Certainly in terms of reinvigorating the fortunes of cinema 
under considerable market pressure, the multiplex has been an invaluable 
asset.  In competing with domestic audio-visual technologies, the multiplex has 
seemingly adopted two primary strategies.  First, it offers viewers ‘cinema on 
demand’.  By showing popular films at numerous times throughout the day the 
multiplex allows the viewer to fit cinema into their own schedule.  Secondly, it 
has sought to distinguish itself from domestic technologies by making use of 
cinematic technologies like Dolby digital surround sound, high quality projection 
and larger screens designed to “maximize the corporal, sensory affect of 
cinema.”308  The multiplex, therefore, with its emphasis on the more corporeal 
aspects of the cinematic experience provides a perfect partner to the Hollywood 
blockbuster with its "increasingly visceral [and] kinetic"309 address.   
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Moreover, what is implicit in the institutional arrangements of the 
multiplex is made explicit in the marketing of attractions like IMAX, which 
announces itself as “the ultimate movie experience”310, or “the world’s most 
immersive movie experience”, capable of “making the audience feel as if they 
are in the movie”.311  The fact that what was once a special venue attraction is 
increasing being absorbed into the multiplex, and used to show high-concept, 
effects-laden Hollywood blockbusters, clearly suggests the centrality of the 
immersive experience to contemporary cinema exhibition.  Contemporary 
cinema then, sells an experience to its consumer, an experience predicated on 
its sheer intensity.  Indeed, the IMAX Corporation have gone so far as to 
trademark the phrase 'IMAX Experience', and use it ubiquitously both to market 
their technologies, and to mark out those films that are shown on IMAX screens, 
but perhaps more importantly, these technologies attempt to engage us on a 
physical level. 
Both the institutional arrangements of the multiplex and the spectacular 
displays of the filmic texts conspire to create a mode of address that is 
profoundly corporeal in its nature: a mode of address that is fundamentally 
different from the disembodied, illusionistic absorption described by classical 
metapsychological theory.  The prolific use of first-person perspectives that rush 
through diegetic space, dangle vertiginously over cliff faces and present 
explosions and objects that threaten to fly into the space of the auditorium, 
attempts to immerse the viewer in the experience of movement and speed.  
While digital surround sound provides sound effects powerful enough for us to 
feel the vibration run through our bodies.  Popular contemporary cinema can 
therefore be seen as a congruent set of texts and technologies, designed to 
immerse the spectator in an intensely physical experience. 
The ‘experience’ of film however, is not to be considered as an inevitable 
result of cinema technologies, nor yet wholly determined by the address of the 
text.  As Elsaesser puts it, “film essentially commodifies an experience, which by 
its very nature is highly subjective and context-dependent”.312  It is my aim in this 
chapter therefore, to explore the particular ways in which the intensely visceral 
experience of cinema is produced within contemporary cinema, and to look at 
the ways in which both the context of viewing, and the subjectivity of the viewer, 
are disciplined and regulated by a wider cinematic discourse.  My contention is 
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that cinema, as an institution, should be seen as a site of disciplinary practices, 
which aim to ‘govern’ the individual.  In this respect the discourses of cinema 
should be seen as ‘technologies of government’, which as Nikolas Rose 
explains, “are those technologies imbued with aspirations for the shaping of 
conduct in the hope of producing certain desired effects and averting certain 
undesired events.”313  So while in the next part of this thesis I will look at the 
particular ways in which the discourse of media effects has been mobilised in 
both regulatory policies and the popular press in order to shape the adult 
viewer’s relations with socially problematic films, for the moment I want to 
concentrate on the discourses of film marketing.   
 From this perspective we can sidestep debates, inspired by the Frankfurt 
School, over the issue of how the increasing commodification of film might lead 
to an inevitable denigration of film ‘art’ and pose serious ideological risks to the 
passive, and vulnerable mass audience.  Indeed, to some degree, this 
pessimistic view of the audience will be exposed as a discursive construction 
central to the contemporary regulation of film.  Instead, the commercial 
discourses of contemporary cinema will be treated as part of the wider 
heterogeneous apparatus of cinema; technologies of governmentality, which 
attempt to construct particular kinds of relations between viewers and the text.  
However, this is not to suggest that these discourses, determine spectator-text 
relations, any more than the text itself.  Rather, film marketing should be seen as 
part of an apparatus directed towards subjectification, where subjectification is 
understood in the first instance as the “processes of being ‘made up’ as a 
subject of a certain type.”314 
 What I will aim to demonstrate is that the discourses of marketing on the 
one hand, and film regulation on the other, construct both the spectator and film 
in remarkably similar ways.  In particular, both suggest that cinema is a site of 
an intensely arousing physical experience, which has the capacity to produce 
certain kinds of lasting effects, but where this potential is seen as a desirable, 
perhaps even necessary feature of contemporary film when it is applied to the 
high-concept, or mainstream film, the very same capacity that is construed as a 
problem when dealing with images of violence, and/or sexual violence.   
 In both of the following chapters, it is my intention to explore the 
institutional discourses of cinema, discussions of cinema in the popular press, 
as well as viewers’ own reports of their encounters with contemporary film.  In 
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this way, I hope to uncover how the corporeal address of cinema is constituted 
within our culture, the way in which people situate themselves in relation to the 
visceral thrills of cinema, and perhaps most importantly, how popular discussion 
itself might become a subjectivising, regulatory force. 
 
 
 
Cinema as Experience 
 
 
As we have already seen, the rise of the multiplex, with its large screen 
formats and digital sound systems, and the development of extensive 
merchandising strategies, has gone hand in hand with a shift in textual relations 
and modes of address.  But further, as Janet Harbord argues in her book Film 
Cultures, the multiplex has also relocated cinema within the cultural landscape.  
That is, the multiplex has relocated the cinema to the shopping mall, where 
cinema itself is redefined as one commodity among many.  Where once cinema 
was conceived as a specific cultural practice, the multiplex has recontextualised 
cinema as a site of leisure; a more general and hybrid activity than it once 
was.315  And so today going to the cinema is “an activity in which the film is only 
one of the elements, and maybe sometimes not even the crucial or memorable 
one.”316 
Moreover, this repositioning of film to a space of consumption means 
that not only can the cinema screen be seen as a shop window, advertising its 
own ancillary products, but the film becomes just one of many possible ways of 
engaging with the brand experience available in the same location.  As Harbord 
puts it, “this signifies an important transformation of both the practice of film-
going and the conceptualisation of the film text.  If both the activity and the text 
are less bounded or discrete, the blurring of definitions shifts film culture from 
object to experience.”317  Indeed Harbord suggests that this transition represents 
“a more general trend in the organization of production and consumption away 
from material forms towards the ephemeral, dematerialized experiential 
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commodity.”318  In other words, contemporary Hollywood aims to provide its 
consumers with an altogether different ‘genre of economic output’ to the 
classical narrative film.  It aims to provide the viewer with an experience, defined 
by the intensity of the sensations it can provide.    
For Pine and Gilmore, pioneers of the corporate drive towards the 
creation and selling of the brand experience, cinema is itself the prototypical 
model of an ‘experiential offering’.319  More importantly, as they see it, the key to 
success in marketing any product is orchestrating events for the consumer.  
These events must be immersive and engaging, but above all they should be 
memorable.  So while the time-based nature of the experience means that they 
are “used up in the moment”, 320 the experience might be extended through the 
purchase and consumption of memorabilia.   
Moreover, what these writers suggest is that the sensory experiences 
provided by this ‘new economy’ are not only powerfully engaging, but they are 
also capable of transforming our lives profoundly.  Indeed, Pine and Gilmore go 
as far as to suggest that while companies can provide experiences with highly 
memorable sensations, the experience economy is driven by something more: 
people want to be affected by their experiences.  As they put it, the “experiences 
we have affect who we are, what we can accomplish, and where we are 
going…Human beings have always sought out new and exciting experiences to 
learn and grow, develop and improve, mend and reform.”321  The ‘experience 
economy’ they suggest, is driven not simply by the pursuit of sensory pleasure 
but by the desire to “transform ourselves, to become different”.322  The ‘new 
economy’ then, is guided not simply by hedonism and the pursuit of pleasure, 
but by aspirations to develop and improve, to be challenged by our experiences 
and to grow as individuals. 
However, in this shift from simple experience to transformation, a 
significant shift in roles occurs between the buyer and the seller: 
With an experience, the employees of the …company are 
actors performing parts, creating roles, and building characters 
to engage guests in entertaining, educational, escapist, and/or 
esthetic ways.  With a transformation, all these experiential 
realms merely set the stage for helping the customer learn to 
act.323  
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Or perhaps even more succinctly: the customer is the product.  The sensory 
and/or emotional experience offered by the company becomes merely the tool 
with which to mould and shape the body, the mind, the beliefs, the attitudes or 
the behaviour of the individual.  At a fundamental level, the kind of consumption 
that Pine and Gilmore describe “affects the very being of the buyer”.324  
Consumption here becomes more than a functional activity, more than a leisure 
activity, it is in essence an ontological pursuit, in which the customer seeks to 
become a better or more enriched person through the purchase of certain 
experiences.  
While the transformational potential of the experience economy might 
more properly be applied to activities like going to the gym, or attending a self-
confidence and self-esteem workshop, the cinema is, nevertheless, a potential 
site of transformation.  However, the possibility of the spectator’s transformation 
is both celebrated and denigrated in equal measure.  On the one hand, as I 
have already suggested in relation to ‘make-over’ movies like Now Voyager and 
Sabrina Fair, to some extent cinema has consistently offered up opportunities 
for transformation.  These films in particular have suggested that women could 
actively transform not only the way they looked but their entire lives through the 
consumption of fashion and cosmetics.  Indeed, Jackie Stacey’s study of 
audiences during the 1940s and 1950s demonstrates that “the forms of pleasure 
taken in Hollywood stars are often centrally concerned with appearance and 
image and involve self-transformation in terms of commodities sold to women to 
improve their appearance and their bodies”.325  However, as Stacey argues, this 
form of consumption, promoted by Hollywood as a way of achieving a proper 
and desirable femininity, is highly normative in its effects.  “In a culture where 
women are denied the status of the subject, modes of subject address within 
discourses of consumption may affirm identities and offer forms of recognition, 
even as they encourage women to produce themselves as commodities.”326   
For Nikolas Rose, this kind of subjectification through the market is not 
only applicable to women, but is a key method of governance in a neo-liberal 
state in which  
Forms of conduct are governed through a personal labour to 
assemble a way of life within the sphere of consumption… 
However constrained by external or internal factors, the 
modern self is institutionally required to construct a life through 
the exercise of choice from among alternatives.  Every aspect 
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of life, like every commodity, is imbued with a self-referential 
meaning; every choice we make is an emblem of our identity, a 
mark of our individuality, each is a message to ourselves and 
others as to the sort of person we are.327 
In terms of cinema then, the choice of what kinds of films to view, to buy, to 
collect and to display on bookshelves or Facebook pages, becomes a means of 
forming and expressing an identity.  And insofar as these choices are selected 
from a wide range of mainstream cinema texts, this process is unproblematic. 
Similarly the potential for cinema to ‘transform’ the viewer may be seen 
as both worthy and desirable.  Watching Hotel Rwanda328 in order to gain an 
understanding of the atrocities committed during Rwanda’s civil war, or 
Rendition329 in order to become more informed and politicised against dubious 
US Government practices in the war on terror, may well be seen as 
commendable and intelligent use of one’s leisure time.  However, the 
transformative potential of cinema is also a source of widespread cultural 
anxiety. 
As Alison Landsberg points out in her article on ‘prosthetic memory’, “the 
mass media fundamentally alter our notion of what counts as experience”.330  
Cinema has the capacity to generate experiences and memories which the 
viewer has never lived, and crucially, she suggests “the memories that cinema 
affords…might be as significant in constructing, or deconstructing, the 
spectator’s identity as any experience that s/he lived through.”331  And perhaps 
more importantly, in the process of consuming these experiences, and creating 
these prosthetic memories, the spectator may be led into forms of behaviour 
they may never have conceived of before viewing.   
As we will see in the next chapter, such fears lie at the heart of the media 
effects debates, and provide the foundation for the UK’s liberal, as opposed to 
neo-liberal, government of film in the contemporary era.  So while in the liberal 
political climate of the UK, consumers may also be encouraged to seek out 
forms of identity through the commodities they consume, the apparent potential 
of cinema, and media more generally, to bring about undesirable social and 
behavioural effects necessitates its legislative regulation.  As Nikolas Rose 
suggests, under the auspices of liberalism the individual’s freedom of choice is 
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guaranteed only insofar as the viewers “come to act upon themselves as both 
free and responsible…The openness and riskiness of liberal modes of 
government…lie in the inescapable quid pro quo that what individuals are 
required to give, they may also refuse.”332  As I will demonstrate in the following 
chapter, the perceived risk of harm, both to the individual and to society, should 
individuals refuse to consume films in a ‘responsible’ way underpins the 
contemporary regulation of film in the UK.  The fear that parents might not act 
responsibly and prevent their children from gaining access to violent films, for 
example, was central to the passing of the Video Recordings Act in 1984, an Act 
in which the viewer, as we shall see, is constructed as the very antithesis of the 
‘free and responsible individual’. 
But for now I want to focus on how the experience of a film is constituted 
in contemporary cinema.  In particular, I want to suggest that the cinematic 
experience does not begin and end with the text.  Rather, our encounter with a 
text is shaped by the discourses that surround cinema at any given time.  I will 
therefore argue that contemporary film marketing promotes its films precisely as 
an experience, and as such, constructs the spectator in a very particular way.  
Moreover, the spectator of contemporary film marketing is constituted as a 
corporeal entity, whose body is subject to the physical address of contemporary 
cinema.  I will argue that this promotional activity develops an expectation within 
the consumer that works to ‘shape’ their relationship with the text, loosening 
dependence on narrative, the traditional mainstay of classical film, and 
refocusing the spectator on the potential ‘sensations’ to be had through their 
engagement with the text.   
As such, I hope to demonstrate that cinema can be fruitfully seen as a 
set of disciplinary practices “that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of 
its elements, its gestures, its behaviour.  The human body…entering a 
machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it.”333  The 
body, in other words, becomes the focal point for the discourses of cinema.  It is 
subject to the power of the institution: a productive power capable of investing 
the viewer’s body with sensational potential, where areas are intensified and 
surfaces are electrified334 in the creation of "sensations, and pleasures”.335  But 
perhaps more importantly, I want to demonstrate that this kind of textual address 
is not merely the over-inflated hype of a marketing executive.  Rather, I will 
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argue that viewers not only pursue this corporeal relation to the film text, but by 
engaging with these discourses they are actively involved in the formation of 
themselves as corporeal subjects, and as such they enhance the capacity of film 
texts to affect them on a physical level. 
 
 
 
Selling the Film Experience 
 
 
 Even during Hollywood’s Classical era, when narrative cinema was at its 
peak, films were routinely marketed to their audience through their capacity to 
‘thrill’, for their ‘sensational’ qualities, for their ability to ‘shock’ or on the grounds 
of sheer ‘spectacle’.  D.W. Griffith’s America336, for example, was billed as “A 
Thrilling Story of Love and Romance” or “Love of Tender Girlhood!  Passionate 
Deeds of Heroes! A Rushing, Leaping Drama of Charm and Excitement!”, while 
Cecil B. DeMille’s Cleopatra337 declares “A Love Affair that Shook the World – 
Set in a Spectacle of Thrilling Magnificence”.  In each case, as we can see, the 
tagline associates the movement of the narrative with physical movement and 
bodily sensation, suggesting that even as the classical narrative was 
establishing itself, films were being marketed for their ability to ‘move’ or affect 
the viewer.  The thrills and excitement are clearly related to the subject matter of 
the films, drama and romance, but what is being sold is the physicality of the 
experience. 
 Similarly, if we look at posters for early horror movies like The Cat 
Creeps,338 they warned the audience that “It will scare you out of your skin”, 
while adverts for the 1942 film The Corpse Vanishes339 suggest it is “Horror to 
make your hair stand on end!”, and that the audience should “Prepare to 
shudder when you see the strange practices of this doctor…”.  Similarly, the 
1935 classic The Bride of Frankenstein340 announces that it is “Universal’s 
Shiveriest Sensation!” which is “Not for the young, the scarey, the nervous, BUT 
if you enjoy thrills, chills and spine-tingling sensation, while your hair stands on 
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end -- SEE ‘The Bride of Frankenstein.’”   In each case, what is being sold to the 
potential viewer through these taglines has very little to do with narrative.  
Rather, these adverts promise the viewer a physical experience.  As Kracauer 
suggests, these films attempt to engage with the material reality of the spectator, 
quite literally, they attempt to address “the human being ‘with skin and hair [mit 
Haut und Haar]’”341 
 What Gunning saw as a peculiarity of address in the cinema of 
attractions is seen by Kracauer as a defining principle of cinema, that is, cinema 
as a whole is a kind of assault on the viewer’s senses.  For Kracauer, film’s 
primary concern was, and perhaps is, to address its viewer as a corporeal entity.  
Or as Kracauer himself puts it, “ the material elements that present themselves 
in film directly stimulate the material layers of the human being: his nerves, his 
senses, his entire physiological substance.”342  What these examples of film 
advertising show is that Kracauer’s concern with the physicality of the film 
experience is no mere academic exercise.  This form of marketing shows little 
concern with plot or narrative, particularly in the case of the early horror films, 
instead these kinds of posters and trailers promise the viewer a sensation, a 
physical pleasure, a corporeal experience. 
Cinema’s promise to deliver a physical experience to its viewer is not 
restricted to early or classical film of course.  If we look through a list of the most 
successful contemporary films worldwide343 for example, we see this pattern 
repeated time and again.  Contemporary film uses physicality to sell its films, 
often focussing primarily on the physical sensations felt in the theatre.  Action 
films like Twister 344 and Vertical Limit345 attempt to convey the intensity of the 
suspense by imploring the audience: “Don’t breathe…” and “Hold your breath.”  
Unlike many classical Hollywood films however, the taglines do not simply 
inform us that it is suspenseful, but refer us to the physical, material, corporeal 
experience of watching a suspenseful sequence.  Even more than adverts that 
promise that the movie “Pins you to the edge of your seat”,346 these examples 
focus on the sheer physicality of the experience of watching a film.   
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Similarly, though perhaps a little more obtusely the marketing tagline for 
Saturday Night Fever347 shows that even musicals are concerned to sell 
themselves through the physical.  The use of the short phrase ‘Catch it!’ is an 
obvious pun on the film’s title, and it also clearly refers to the audience going to 
see the film at the cinema where it will have a finite run.  But most importantly it 
refers to the main attraction of the film, the music and dance routines.  In its 
simplest form it merely implies that the music itself is ‘catchy’, but crucially it also 
refers to the physical experience of watching a well-constructed musical.  In this 
instance, what we ‘catch’ may be as simple as an ‘infectious’ rhythm or beat.  
Maybe we tap our foot.  Maybe we nod our head.  Maybe we sway a little with 
the movement of the characters on-screen.  However it affects us, what we 
participate in, is a kind of ‘contagion’.  In dance circles, the term refers to a 
movement that begins at one end of the chorus and is passed along the rows, 
like a Mexican wave.  The contagion of the musical however, begins on the 
screen and spreads out among the rows in the theatre.  Or in Steven Shaviro’s 
terms, contagion describes the process by which the “viewer is transfixed and 
transmogrified in consequence of the infectious, visceral contact of images.”348  
The poster for Saturday Night Fever obviously does not require an intimate 
knowledge of dance or film theoretical terms to make it readable.  The very fact 
that we describe music as ‘catchy’ or ‘infectious’ will suffice.  And like the fans of 
any other genre, viewers of musicals are well aware of the visceral pleasure to 
be gained from watching. 
Action films are more direct, and often promise the viewer a ‘movie-ride’ 
experience.  Time and again the taglines assure the potential audience that they 
can “Take the ride of your life!”349, “Go for a ride you will never forget.”350, or that 
they should “Get ready for the ride of your life”351, “Buckle up!”352 and “Hang 
on!”353.  While the last two examples obviously operate as puns that refer back 
to the title of the movie, they also clearly relate to the experience of watching to 
the experience of the theme park ride.  Like Katherine Bigelow’s film Point 
Break354 which uses the simple tagline “100% pure adrenaline”, these films 
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promise the viewer that the film will be able to affect them on a basic 
physiological level.  They promise that the images and stories that they present 
will be skilful enough to provoke a rush of excitement that mimics the experience 
of a theme park.  They promise that watching the film can push enough 
psychological and physiological buttons for our bodies to deliver a much sought 
after shot of adrenaline. 
Other films imply something very similar, but do not relate themselves to 
the theme park directly.  Instead they emphasise the pace and the kinetic 
qualities of the film.  Speed355 impels its audience to “Get ready for rush hour” 
while Rush Hour 2356 suggests we “Get ready for a second rush!”.  Again these 
taglines can be read in more than one way, but alongside straplines that inform 
us that “Everybody runs”, or insists we “Get ready to RUN”,357 “Get ready to 
fly”,358 or  that suggest the film will “Cut to the chase”359 or even asks “How fast 
do you want it?”,360 we can see a significant emphasis on the experience of fast-
paced physical movement.  The attraction of these films, and least as far as we 
can judge from the movie posters, is clearly based on their fast action 
sequences, but perhaps more importantly for our discussion here, is that the 
audience is taken along for the ride.   
Similarly, when a film like Die Hard 2361 promises the audience, “Last 
time it blew you through the back wall of the theatre.  This time it will blow you 
sky-high” or Pirates of the Caribbean: Curse of the Black Pearl362 implores the 
audience to “Prepare to be blown out of the water” these taglines are doing 
more than simply suggesting the film might include visually spectacular 
explosions.  It also evokes the reverberations of those sequences as they are 
felt in the movie theatre.  Moreover, like other films under discussion here, these 
taglines also convey a promise to deliver a certain kinetic, as well as physical, 
experience for the audience.  Indeed, the first person address that begs the 
audience to “Get Ready” promises that the speed and action won’t simply take 
place in front of them, but they will be part of it.  It will be happening with them, 
even to them.  It pledges to deliver a ‘direct first-person experience’ that ensures 
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that “it’s not somebody else who’s getting shot at or catapulted out of a rocket.  
It’s you.”363   
 
 
 
The Corporeal Address of the Film Trailer 
 
 
This concern with the physical experience and corporeal address of 
cinema is also apparent in film trailers.  However, while these trailers may 
contain the same, or similar, taglines to print advertising, the scope to express 
the film’s potential to produce visceral, kinetic and affective responses is clearly 
much greater.  In this instance, the cinema trailer need not simply tell us what 
we might experience when we go to see the film.  Instead, it makes use of its 
capacity to demonstrate.  Or in other words, cinema trailers often make use of 
the corporeal address from the very outset.  Print adverts for Spiderman364 for 
example, promised the viewer that s/he would “Go for the ultimate spin”, and 
that the film would “Turn your world upside down”, in much the same way as the 
other action films we have discussed.  While the teaser trailer,365 intended for 
release in September 2001, though subsequently withdrawn in the wake of 
September 11th, not only reiterates this promise but delivers a foreshortened 
‘movie-ride’ experience of its own. 
  The trailer begins slowly, and at first glance appears to be an 
unremarkable exposition of a narrative film, but as a security guard tries to lock 
the doors of the closing bank, the mood changes.  A rock guitar begins to play, 
and the pace of editing picks up.  A man pushes through the door, and as he 
walks toward the camera, he reaches inside his jacket to take out a gun.  The 
scene fades to black and the music disappears, before a series of minor 
explosions burst onto the screen, and a whole succession of hand held semi-
POV shots that swing around wildly as the bank is robbed.  The images are cut 
to a fast pace and work to both express and accentuate the confusion and the 
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anxiety of the people in the bank, as well as the adrenaline-fuelled, heightened 
perception of the robbers.   
The robbers assure both the film audience and the diegetic public that 
“It’ll all be over in about 30 seconds”, and are in and out of the bank in a flurry of 
fast cuts, close-ups and moving shots.  The film’s emphasis on spectacular 
action is hinted at both in the pace and style of editing, as well as in its use of 
foregrounded explosions and dynamic tracking shots of the robber’s helicopter 
in flight.   Until, that is, the audience and the passengers of the helicopter are 
asked to “Sit back and enjoy the ride!”.  At this point the helicopter stops abruptly 
in mid-air.  Alarms sound as panic takes hold within the aircraft and money 
starts to spill out, falling to the street hundreds of metres below.  The helicopter 
is dragged backward through the streets and once again comes to an abrupt 
halt.  The camera pulls back and a snare drum trills militaristically over an 
ominously drawn-out heavy bass, to reveal the helicopter ensnared in a web.  
As the camera pulls back further, we see it is caught between the twin towers of 
the world trade centre.  The dynamism and excitement of the traditional action-
oriented heist movie is thoroughly eclipsed by the hyperbolic spectacle of these 
CGI effects. 
The trailer implicitly acknowledges the audience in this first section, but it 
is not until after we are implored to “Sit back and enjoy the ride!” that the film 
truly reveals itself as a source of awe-inspiring spectacle and the visceral effects 
of the ‘movie-ride’.  Like the print advertising for the film, the trailer uses 
intertitles to demand that, “Next Summer”, “GO”, “FOR”, “THE”, “ULTIMATE”, 
“SPIN”.  This is accompanied in the trailer by a dance/soft-rock sound track that 
announces “I wanna take you on a rollercoaster”.  And the promise of the 
soundtrack is reinforced with scenes of Spiderman whipping through the air 
toward the space of the viewer, and dynamic moving shots which follow behind 
Spiderman in close proximity as he swings through the streets of New York in a 
hyperbola, mimicking the movement of a rollercoaster. 
The trailer, then, emphasises the experiential nature of the film and its 
desire to present a ‘movie-ride’ for the viewer.  It emphasises movement and the 
dizzy excitement of speed.  But where the titles tell us what we might expect, the 
images actually give us a taste of the experience.  But perhaps the key to the 
excitement in this last part of the trailer is its contrast with the earlier scene.  
While the robbery and escape suggested both pace and action, the 
abandonment of realistic storytelling and naturalistic effects successfully ups the 
ante in terms of providing the viewer with a kinetic experience.  The fast paced 
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editing, minor explosions and a stunted sense of vertigo pale into insignificance 
compared to plunging and swinging wildly through the streets of New York.  This 
trailer does not simply offer its visual effects as an experiential attraction, it 
suggests that the experience one might gain from its visual effects are 
qualitatively more intense than those to be found in movies grounded by 
narrative realism. 
By contrast, the trailer366 for the supernatural horror film White Noise367  
works hard to ground its offerings in reality.  The voiceover announces at its very 
outset that “What you are about to hear is real.  It has not been edited or 
enhanced.”  What follows are a series of muffled, whispered or distorted voices 
that utter short phrases, interspersed with ‘educational’ material that introduces 
the audience to E.V.P. or ‘Electronic voice phenomenon”, whereby the dead can 
make use of electronic media in order to talk to the living.  And this claim to the 
‘factual’ nature of E.V.P. is reinforced at the end of the trailer by a link that 
directs the viewer to a website offering a number of articles on the phenomenon. 
But despite its claims to fact, the trailer for White Noise no less than the 
trailer for Spiderman offers the viewer a particular kind of filmic experience, 
which is not dissimilar to the ‘movie-ride’ presented in the Spiderman trailer.  
The imagery at the beginning of the trailer moves jerkily between a green-tinged, 
streaky, over-exposed, double- exposed or negative image of a tape recorder, a 
close-up of a visual display panel of an instrument that registers the volume and 
frequency of the ‘ghostly’ voices we hear, and images of the people we hear 
speaking.  They are often jump cut, and/or flick between the green-tinged, 
simulated ‘white noise’ and ‘negative’ effects.  But in addition, we also see 
flashes of other images: half seen faces appear and disappear in the space of a 
few frames, in negative, hidden by bursts of light, or masked by the green-tinged 
‘white noise’; an eerie flash of an image suggestive of two luminous eyes and a 
jaw, or collar line; or even simply a hand reaching out from analogue 
interference toward the audience.  The trailer then, animates its own tagline 
“The dead are trying to get hold of you” in both a literal and a figurative sense.  
That is, on the one hand they may try to contact us through electronic devices, 
but they may also try to physically grab you! 
The trailer also relies heavily on the use of white noise, as well as a 
series of jarring sounds and single notes, very high pitched and edgy, or low, 
                                               
366
 ‘White Noise Trailer’, Apple.com, http://www.apple.com/trailers/universal/white_noise/large.html 
(accessed 9th June 2010) 
367
 White Noise, directed by Geoffrey Sax, (USA: Universal Pictures, 2005) 
  
 
 112 
resonant and bassy.  These sound effects underscore the movement in the 
images, and crucially, mark the eerie flash frames, heightening their impact.  A 
short musical phrase repeats over and over in the background, like the Twilight 
Zone, before it gives way to the sound of a heart beat at around 100 beats per 
minute, simulating the rate of an anxious and apprehensive spectator.  The 
sound effects work then, not simply to set the viewer on edge, but they actively 
address the body of the spectator. 
This corporeal address is reinforced in the second section of the trailer 
that gives us a taste of the film’s narrative, in which a husband attempts to 
contact his dead wife.  The voice over declares that “our loved ones can reach 
us.  But if they can come through, who else can come through?”, and the 
naturalistic depiction of a grieving man, snaps back to the familiar green-tinged 
imagery of E.V.P.  The camera zooms in on the visual display of voice 
frequency, and the single green line explodes into what appears to be a tunnel.  
Shadows appear in the centre of the tunnel as the camera, apparently, rushes 
towards them, and fingerlike extensions appear to grab from the edge of the 
screen, before the entire image is engulfed in blackness.  The trailer cuts to 
Michael Keaton worriedly watching another screen, before we are sutured into 
his point of view to see a highly pixelated image of a man, mouth wide open with 
teeth filed into points, rushing directly out of the screen.  While this image is 
ostensibly aimed at Michael Keaton, the address of the image is direct.  The 
spectator has no sooner been anxiously ‘drawn into’ the image than something 
both sudden and frightening rushes out.  This attempt to both make the 
audience jump and to literally push the viewer back in their chairs, is mirrored by 
Keaton on screen, as he whizzes backward in his desk chair, and an unearthly 
voice shouts at him indistinctly.   
The trailer sells the film on the strength of its claim that “The subject of 
some movies is so disturbing, that those who experience them will never be the 
same again”, at once highlighting the experiential nature of viewing, as well as 
promising the audience a very particular kind of affect.  The trailer works to 
emphasise the physical/corporeal experience of fear and anxiety.  However, it 
does more than simply tell the viewer what to expect, rather it attempts to deliver 
a small taste of the kind of experience s/he might encounter.  Like so many 
other horror films, the trailer for White Noise is concerned with not only 
promoting but demonstrating its capacity to provoke a physical response within 
the viewer.  And of course, unlike print advertising, the film trailer can make full 
use of its audiovisual capacity and use techniques such as abstract 
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soundscapes, sound effects, single frame flashes and kinetic effects to unsettle 
the viewer and eventually to ‘shock’ them.  But further, insofar as the imagery 
engages in a first person address, simulating a kind of ‘immersion’ in the image, 
as well as displaying objects rushing out of the screen space towards the space 
of the viewer, this trailer, to all intents and purposes is no less of a ‘movie-ride’ 
than the many CGI extravaganzas.   
Of course, the specific kinds of affects and experiences promised by film 
marketing are highly genre specific, and the horror genre obviously trades in its 
ability to scare its viewer.  The Exorcist368, for example, on its re-release in 1998 
touted itself as “The scariest movie of all time”, while the small independent 
movie The Blair Witch Project369 is happy to settle with “As scary as hell”.  In 
terms of marketing itself on its ability to affect its audience, its ability to produce 
a physical sensation for them, both of these films nail their colours to the mast.  
The poster declares the affect it produces as its main attraction, and in the 
process, promises the viewer a certain kind of experience.   But what is 
interesting about the marketing of horror films in general, and is clearly 
demonstrated by the trailer for White Noise, is that it promises not only an 
immediate experience for the viewer watching in the cinema, but a continuing 
one.   
Like action films, horror assures its viewers of its ability to affect them. 
The Ring,370 for example, guarantees that “Everyone will suffer”, one assumes 
both on-screen and in the theatre.  But horror films offer more than a mere ‘thrill-
ride’, like White Noise, they frequently promise “that those who experience them 
will never be the same again.”  Jaws371 for example, not only declares itself “The 
most terrifying motion picture from the terrifying No1 best-seller”, but famously 
declared “You’ll never go in the water again!”.  While in a similar vein, Sleepy 
Hollow372 asks that you “Close your eyes.  Say your prayers.  Sleep if you can.”   
What is key here is that the affect, fear, is not simply something that is enjoyed 
within the safety of the cinema, both Jaws and White Noise promote themselves 
on the strength of their ability to provoke fear so intense that it will permanently 
affect the viewer.  But what is even more remarkable, is that this purported 
ability to affect the viewer in this way is both promoted, and is treated by 
consumers of horror film, as a desirable quality.  Although as we shall see in the 
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next chapter, this potential for the viewer to be transformed, or at least 
permanently affected by what s/he sees in the cinema is both a source of 
pleasure for the audience and a source of concern for society.   
 
   
 
Addressing the Audience 
 
 
The first person, direct address of film trailers like Spiderman and White 
Noise both reinforces the ‘movie-ride’ quality of the film but also hints at the 
importance of the ‘experience’ in selling a film to its audience.  But while the 
centrality of the audience’s cinematic experience is merely implied in both the 
Spiderman and the White Noise trailers, it is made entirely explicit in adverts for 
My Bloody Valentine373 and Paranormal Activity374.  In both these cases, the 
‘experiential’ quality of the film is emphasised by the presence of a diegetic 
audience.   
In the first instance, after introducing the basic narrative set-up of the 
film, the trailer for My Bloody Valentine implores the viewer to “Prepare to 
witness the most frightening 3D motion picture event to tear through the screen.”  
Throughout, the trailer moves between positioning the spectator as an observer 
of the diegetic audience’s reactions, and positioning him/her as a member of 
that fictional audience.  The on-screen audience shrink from a diegetic search 
light, duck to avoid a pick-axe, recoil and cover their heads to avoid being burnt 
by an on-screen explosion.  We can reasonably assume therefore that the 
diegetic audience’s reactions are part of the ‘experiential’ promise of the trailer, 
in which case, the brief images of the on-screen audience clearly attempt to sell, 
not so much the ‘frightening’ quality of the text, but rather the direct experience 
of ‘assault’ at the hands of 3D technology.  This experience is reinforced through 
the use of a first-person direct address as the spectator is placed amongst the 
cinematic audience and these same objects rush out of the screen towards 
him/her.  The trailer clearly attempts to sell the film as a “3D ride to hell”, but 
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perhaps more importantly, it also seeks to legitimise, perhaps even encourage, 
this kind of reaction in the auditorium.  Ducking, recoiling and shrinking in one’s 
seat are all presented as a ‘natural’ and desirable effect of the technological 
encounter rather than a sign of one’s weakness or naïveté. 
By contrast, although I would argue that the trailer for Paranormal 
Activity also legitimises extreme audience reactions in face of the film, the 
diegetic audience are used to demonstrate how effective the film text, rather 
than the film technology, is in delivering an experience to the viewer.  Like all of 
the trailers we have looked at so far, the marketing for Paranormal Activity self-
consciously promotes itself precisely as an experience.  The trailer uses quotes 
from film reviews that tell us that the film is “one of the scariest movies of all 
time” and that it is “…genuinely horrifying…” before exhorting the viewer to 
“experience it for yourself”.  As with My Bloody Valentine, the trailer switches 
between positioning the spectator as an observer of the diegetic audience and a 
participant in the filmic experience.  However, unlike My Bloody Valentine, this 
audience are presented as ordinary members of the public who were “among 
the first to experience the movie”.  Throughout, the film is presented less as a 
narrative unfolding than a series of intensely affective scenes, and the focus 
consistently remains on how the audience react to those scenes: they scream 
and jump; they gape at the screen; they cover their ears, their heads, their 
mouths; they avert their eyes and hide their faces; and grip onto one another in 
trepidation.  In sum, the trailer shows the film to be an intensely affective 
experience, and like the other trailers under discussion here, the film 
demonstrates its capacity to produce the same effects in the spectator in the 
closing image where a body is thrown out toward the screen, once again 
simulating the first person direct address we have come to associate with the 
movie ride experience. 
But what is most interesting about this trailer is that among the quotes 
from film reviews used, is one from Dread Central which reads: “The entire 
auditorium was freaked out of their minds…people were visibly shaken”.  The 
quote is obviously fitting because of the congruence between this review and the 
reactions of the diegetic audience, but it also tells us something of the particular 
nature of this filmic experience.  First and foremost, it is constructed not simply 
as a filmic experience, but more precisely, it is a cinematic one.  It is constituted 
as a collective encounter with the text, and indeed, the focus on the viewing 
audience in both the trailer and in this particular film review suggests that the 
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experience is as much about watching other members of the audience as it is 
about viewing the film.    
 
 
 
Watching the film viewer 
 
 
As Martin Barker and Kate Brooks’ study of viewers of Judge Dredd375 
shows, this concern with the experiential and corporeal address of film is not 
merely a marketing strategy.  Rather, the physicality of the film experience is 
absolutely central to many film-goers.  In their study, Barker and Brooks grouped 
the participants into six ‘patterns of involvement’.  Each of these six patterns 
represented a particular way that a viewer might choose to relate to the film, with 
varying degrees of commitment.  At least two of these ‘patterns’ or spaces, as 
Barker and Brooks call them, emphasised physicality as the primary source of 
involvement and pleasure from the film.  Moreover, the largest group, the action-
adventure ‘space’ which sought the excitement and thrills of the ‘roller-coaster 
ride’ from its films, emphasised characteristics of the film such as pace, rhythm, 
suspense and danger.  For this group films were not about plot, rather “they 
begin, they do something (preferably physical) to you, they end – end of 
experience!”376  This group focussed on the film in the present tense, as it was 
happening; as they experienced it. 
Similarly those who occupied a ‘future-fantastic space’ also adopted a 
profoundly visceral relation to film.  As with the action-adventure group, those 
with this orientation considered that films should ‘do’ something to a viewer, like 
making them jump or gasp.  Further, this group felt that to be ready, the 
audience should prepare to be ‘bowled over’.  Here this group is involved in a 
process of building excitement for oneself, independent of the text.  And indeed 
they also felt that the ‘hype’ that accompanied a film was part of the excitement. 
Stallone-followers also prioritised the physicality of the film experience, 
though in a much more muted way.  Stallone-followers went to the cinema for 
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their viewing “to experience the impact”,377 but thereafter, this experience was 
subsumed within their more general concern with the life and films of Sylvester 
Stallone himself.  Nevertheless, this group went on to purchase the video, not 
simply to add to the collection, but to relive the viewing experience, while the film 
itself represented “a high point in a continuum of preparation and expectation”378 
and was in itself a “new experience to collect”.379 
Among the other groups, the 2000AD space did not prioritise physicality.  
Indeed they appeared to blatantly reject the filmic form for its undermining of the 
authenticity of their comic-book hero.  2000AD-followers did not want to see 
Judge Dredd ‘Hollywood-ised, or ‘blockbuster-ised’.  But even here, members of 
the group suggested that it was “important to see Dredd at the cinema, for the 
experience of him making it to the mainstream, for that shiver of pleasure when 
he appears on the big screen.”380  This audience’s engagement with the film is 
clearly of a very different order to that of the first two groups, but what is 
interesting is that even as they reject the standards and values of the Hollywood 
blockbuster, the appreciation they express is couched in the language of the 
physical.  Their physical response has little to do with the textual operations, and 
yet still their primary motivation for seeing the film at the cinema is to gain a 
physical satisfaction. 
It is perhaps only the ‘culture-belonging’ space that has seemingly little to 
do with the physicality of film, prioritising instead, the social relationship within 
which cinema occurred, and was made use of.  It is pertinent here however, to 
acknowledge that individuals rarely, if ever, complied to just one space, more 
usually they spanned more than one.  This is particularly true of the final space: 
the film-follower.  Here the researchers rarely found someone who complied 
‘only’ with this grouping.  Within this space, the film-follower sees him/herself as 
an expert.  As such “the film-follower can watch a film for audience reaction, 
from which s/he is separate” and while “the audience reaction is part of the filmic 
experience”, as an expert s/he was not party to it.  As Barker and Brooks put it, 
“Lay people react to film, the film-follower studies it.  Part of what is studied is its 
very ability to cause a reaction”.  But even here film-followers admitted that they 
“may react at first, and then watch it again to gain distance”.381  Indeed ideally 
“on first viewing…the film should be absorbing, so that it can be ‘lived’ 
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emotionally first.  Later it can be weighed up more intellectually.”382  So even as 
people who choose to occupy this space denied the physicality of film, their 
corporeality was never entirely left behind.   
Although the focus of Barker and Brooks’ study is very specific, looking 
only at the audience for one movie, what it suggests is that the corporeal 
address that is suggested by film posters is not merely a marketing construct.  
Indeed they show that a physical or corporeal engagement with a film is not only 
actively enjoyed and pursued by many of the audience members, but for some, 
it was the main reason for going to see the film.  And further, this study 
demonstrates that the draw of cinema may be as much about watching other 
members of the audience to see how they react as it is about larger screens and 
digital surround sound.  That is, the cinematic experience is not merely an effect 
of technology, and nor is it simply the result of the spectator succumbing “to 
complete sensory and bodily engulfment”,383 rather, for at least a portion of the 
cinema audience, watching others’ reactions to films is part of the pleasure of 
cinema viewing.  In this sense, cinema is less a mass event, with all the 
connotations of passivity, helplessness and hysteria, and more a social one, 
where the audience itself is part of the attraction; part of the viewing experience. 
The play of gazes within the cinema then, is not restricted to 
spectator/screen relations, but is also a function of the cinematic space.  
Watching and being watched are part of the cinema experience, and as a result, 
the cinematic subject might be characterised less as a passive product of 
representational practice and more as a performative act.  The audiences’ 
performance within the theatre is important in two senses.  Firstly, as Zillman et 
al. have amply demonstrated, the active display of ‘appropriate’ responses to a 
horror film directly contributes to the enjoyment of the movie by others.  In 
particular, in their study of first year undergraduate horror audiences, they found 
that:  
Enjoyment of horror…was strongly influenced by the presence 
of an opposite-gender companion and his or her affective 
behavior in response to the stimulus. Men enjoyed horror more 
than did women. More important, they enjoyed horror most in 
the company of a distressed woman and least in the company 
of a fear-mastering woman. Women, in contrast, enjoyed 
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horror the least in the company of a distressed man and the 
most in the company of a fear-mastering man.384 
Zillman et al. argue that the cinematic encounter with the horror film is a 
contemporary rite of passage akin to tests of bravery in hunter-gatherer 
societies.  Young men, they suggest, are expected to learn to gain mastery over 
their emotions and show calm in the face of fear, while young women are 
expected to learn to display their dependency needs by expressing fear, distress 
and panic.  While the analogy between contemporary horror film and a 
somewhat mythical cultural test of manhood seems incredibly dubious, the 
notion that the individual’s responses to film texts might be both a learned 
behaviour and a deeply social one, seems far more plausible.  Moreover, their 
finding that what counts as an ‘appropriate’ reaction to a horror film is highly 
gender specific, at least for this cohort of undergraduates, points to the highly 
socially and culturally specific nature of what is deemed ‘appropriate’ in face of 
the film text.    
 Secondly, as we shall see in the next chapter, the performative nature of 
cinema viewing not only provides pleasure for others it may also, as Matt Hills 
argues, form part of a ‘project of the self’.  As he puts it: 
Pleasure-as-performance is always a cultural act, an 
articulation of identity: ‘I am the sort of person who takes this 
sort of pleasure in this sort of media product.’  Horror’s 
pleasures – and displeasures – thus work within patterns of 
cultural reproduction, as fans enact their cultural distinctions 
from one another, or from non-fans, and as scholars enact 
their cultural distinctions from one another and from ‘untutored’ 
audiences.385 
Watching the horror film therefore can be seen as an opportunity to define the 
self, both in terms of one’s immediate performance during viewing and in the 
later discussions of the film where one is able to perform one’s identity as, for 
example, a ‘horror fan’ or a ‘concerned citizen’.  
 
 
 
Anticipation and Transformation 
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 Within her study of audiences of violent film Annette Hill argues that 
viewing violent movies may well test the viewer.  In this instance however, she 
does not liken it to a rite of passage.  Rather, she suggests that the possibility 
the viewer might not be able to cope psychologically with the images that they 
will witness on the screen is actually a crucial part of the experience of watching 
a highly anxiety provoking film.  In the case of violent film, it is not that viewers 
pursue images of violence in and of themselves.  On the contrary, the viewers 
are well aware of the extreme nature of the imagery they will witness before 
entering the cinema.  The ‘experience’ therefore does not begin and end with 
viewing the film, rather, the formation of the filmic ‘experience’ begins with the 
viewer’s exposure to the wider discourses surrounding the particular movie they 
were about to see.  Moreover, coupled with an understanding of their own 
personal capacity for tolerance with regard to violent imagery, participants 
treated violent film as a way of testing their ‘boundaries’.  Knowledge of the likely 
content and potential effects of watching such images, in terms of fear, disgust 
or shock, was therefore an intrinsic part of the viewer’s experience.  Indeed, Hill 
suggests that the anticipation of particularly harrowing scenes not only 
contributed to the particular receptive mode adopted toward the film as a whole, 
but also contributed to specific responses toward individual scenes.  As Hill puts 
it, “boundary testing involves participants identifying a threshold of violence and 
choosing whether to self-censor or not.  The way in which participants utilize this 
consumer choice is through anticipating and preparing for violent scenes to 
occur”.386 
What Hill’s study suggests is that this process of boundary testing with 
regard to violent film is at once both thrilling and an extremely self-conscious 
activity.  As one participant puts it, “I love the thrill of daring yourself to watch a 
violent scene – that’s a real kick.  No, I’m not going to watch and then yeah, just 
do it, make yourself watch it.”387  What this suggests of course, is that the viewer 
of violent film truly is a disciplined subject.  Further, in the case of the 
‘controversial’ films studied by Hill, this study shows that the viewer was not only 
well aware of the likely content of the film they were about to view, but were also 
aware of the media reports and social debates that surround these films.  
Indeed, as Hill suggests: 
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Audience awareness is closely linked with physical and 
emotional responses to violent movies…A key factor in the 
range of response available is the role of anticipation when 
viewing violence.  Anticipation heightens response, increases 
excitement and emphasizes the significance of preparation: 
participants anticipate the worst that can happen and prepare 
themselves for just such an imaginary event.388 
Moreover, Hill argues that while watching a violent film the majority of 
participants paid attention to the audience’s reaction as a whole.  In this 
instance, at least part of the pleasure of viewing such films was to monitor the 
reaction of others, and in turn, participants were able to ‘gauge’ their own 
response in relation to the responses of others. 389  The viewing of the film 
therefore takes place within the context of debates about the morality of such 
imagery, as well as discussions of ‘appropriate’ or normal responses to such 
imagery, for example, whether or not it is normal or acceptable to enjoy or to be 
excited by images of rape or torture.  The discourses that surround these 
particular films do not simply create a corporeal subject equipped with a suitable 
mode of reception for a specific form of entertainment.  Rather, these discourses 
differentiate between the normal and the abnormal spectator, and as such 
attempt to exert a kind of cultural control over the viewer.  Or as Butler might put 
it, the viewer’s perfomativity should be understood “as that reiterative power of 
discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains”.390  While 
we will return to this point in the next chapter, what Hill’s study suggests is that 
these media debates are more than simply a call for the censorship of 
‘inappropriate’ or ‘offensive’ imagery.  Instead the focus of these debates is often 
on the spectators themselves, and the controversy that surrounds such films 
prompts a process of continuous monitoring, regulation and control; a process 
that forms an intrinsic part of the constitution of the corporeal spectator.   
However, while the spectator may be monitored by institutions, 
individuals actively and willingly engage in a process of monitoring their own 
reactions in relation to the responses of those around them, effectively 
comparing themselves to the social norm on an everyday basis.  Normalisation 
of audience response to certain images then, may well begin in the media, but 
on a social level, it would appear that many members of the audience willingly 
engage in a process of creating themselves as ‘normal’ and ‘appropriate’ 
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cinematic subjects, engaging in the processes of anticipation, preparation, 
audience monitoring, self-monitoring and self-censorship where necessary. 
But while this kind of viewing activity may well produce a ‘socially 
acceptable’ viewing subject, as Foucault suggests, censorship, even self-
censorship, is a productive process, and in this instance I would suggest that 
this continuous self-monitoring, self-regulation and self-control exhibited by the 
viewers of violent film actively contribute to the intensity of the experience.  The 
media hype that surrounds such movies, for example, means that the viewer’s 
physical and emotional response to such a film is actually a subject for 
discussion.  In effect there is an ‘incitement to discourse’ with regard to the film’s 
affective capacity and the individual’s experience of the film.  This incitement 
requires a process of self-monitoring, which prompts the viewer to look inward 
and pay attention to the physical signals of their own heightened anxiety – or the 
lack thereof.  Engaging in such a process means that the viewer is likely to 
become acutely aware of even small fluctuations in their own internal state, and 
a raised heartbeat or increased tension is unlikely to pass unnoticed.  In a very 
real sense then, the affective experience of watching such a film is potentially 
intensified by virtue of its controversial status, but its success depends on the 
efforts of the viewer in the creation of this very particular form of cinematic 
subjectivity.  
While Hill focuses solely on violent films, I would suggest that horror 
movies demand a similar form of engagement from the viewer, and that the 
process of boundary testing is also central to this genre.  Moreover, the 
marketing of horror films also suggests an awareness of the need to both 
anticipate and prepare for the cinematic event. The Silence of the Lambs391 for 
example, demands: “Prepare yourself for the most exciting, mesmerising and 
terrifying two hours of your life.”   As I have already suggested, taglines for 
popular action films also entreat the viewer to “Get ready!”.  Here the first person 
address of these imperative statements promises that the viewer will experience 
the kinetic thrill of these films, but it also suggests, in keeping with Annette Hill’s 
findings, that the viewer of the action film is more than a passive recipient of a 
physical experience.  On the contrary, the viewer is being asked to prepare 
themselves for it, and this, I think, is actually quite remarkable.   
Despite the lack of media or critical interest in these kinds of films, it 
appears that the process of anticipation and preparation identified by Hill may 
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still have validity within these genres.  These marketing campaigns clearly 
attempt to induce a state of anticipation and excitement about the film’s release, 
but the particular mode of address employed by the campaign specifically asks 
the viewer to prepare themselves for the physical sensations they will 
experience during the film.  On one level, the viewer is asked to adopt an 
appropriate mode of reception that will allow them to enjoy such a corporeal 
address within the cinema, in effect to create themselves as a corporeal subject.  
However, these marketing campaigns take place outside of the cinema, they 
may even be seen by a potential audience months before the film goes on 
release.  Preparing oneself is, therefore, not simply a matter of engaging with a 
film text in a particular way.  The viewer, in this instance, is asked to actively 
participate in the creation of a heightened state of arousal before entering the 
cinema.  
The purpose of the campaign may be to induce a viewer to go and see 
the film, but further, it suggests that the film text depends on the viewer to 
participate in the creation of the experience.  That is, the excitement and 
anticipation that the marketing attempts to provoke might actually play a crucial 
part in the physicality of the textual encounter, particularly in the case of horror 
film.  As I have already suggested, the process of continuous self-monitoring 
may well work to intensify the experience, but more than this, exposure to the 
marketing and/or media that surrounds a film may also influence the quality of 
the experience.  For example, if we assume for one moment that the purpose of 
a horror film is to provoke, fear, anxiety and/or shock within the viewer, then it 
stands to reason that if the viewer enters the cinema already in a heightened 
state of anxiety, then the likelihood of the film text producing the desired 
response is increased.  The incitement to prepare oneself then, suggests that 
engagement with a film, and particularly horror films, does not begin and end 
with the text itself, rather film marketing incites a form of engagement with the 
film, or at the very least the kind of experience it has to offer, before the viewer 
ever enters the cinema.    
This kind of film marketing then, does not simply address the viewer as a 
corporeal subject and promise to deliver physical sensations and thrills in line 
with that mode of address, but actively encourages the viewer to participate, and 
enter into a state of heightened arousal before entering the cinema.  Viewers are 
encouraged to enter into a particular mode of reception; to actively create 
themselves as corporeal subjects in order to fully appreciate the particular form 
of experiential address offered by particular movie genres.  
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Moreover, if we return to Annette Hill’s work, she suggests that the 
discourses surrounding a film may even change the viewer’s perception of the 
film while they are actually viewing it.  That is:  
It is the build-up of anticipation and a desire to test boundaries 
which is significant to participants’ response to the visual effect 
of the ear-slicing sequence.  Participants anticipate and 
prepare for extreme violence…It is this build-up to the ear-
slicing sequence which creates a sense of anticipation so 
great many group members believe they see the ear being 
sliced.392 
As Hill suggests, the anticipation of violence is a process that leads viewers to 
imagine scenes that do not appear on the screen.  A combination of the hype 
surrounding the ear-slicing scene in Reservoir Dogs and the diegetic 
‘signposting’ that something terrible is about to happen, colluded in leading 
these viewers to anticipate and prepare to the extent that they actively 
intensified their experience through imagining graphic scenes that were not 
present on the screen. 
 
 
 
Anticipation and fear in Horror 
 
 
As Hill’s study suggests with regard to violent film, anticipatory fear and 
excitement are also reinforced by press that surrounds such films.  Urban myths 
about the physical and psychological effects of horror films abound, but far from 
putting fans off visiting the theatre, they simply stimulate their anticipation more.  
And reading through user comments on the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) for 
films like The Exorcist it is clear just how often these urban myths are repeated:   
In late 1973 and early 1974, women and men were lined up for 
blocks. People were known to become ill watching it. Some 
fainted. Some ran out of the theater in tears. There were 
reports of people having to be institutionalized, and at least 
one miscarriage was attributed to viewing it. No, it wasn't a 
Rolling Stones Concert. It was a film called The Exorcist.393 
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Many suggest that these reports are ridiculous, since they themselves thought 
the film was not scary by contemporary standards, or worse still, laughable, 
while others suggest that it was just this over-hyping that ruined their experience 
of the film.  But what shows in their reviews is their disappointment in the film’s 
inability to provide the kind of intensity of experience they had expected and, 
presumably, hoped for: 
I first watched The Exorcist around 3 years ago: like everyone 
else nowadays, I watched it expecting an earth-shattering 
experience in horror. I was sorely disappointed when instead I 
saw a careful character study. I didn't hate it, but I did feel 
cheated.394 
I too waited 30 years to see this film. I remember there being 
lots of talk about it when it came out even though I was quite 
young. A mythology has built up around it over the years and I 
was expecting to jump at least once during the film. 
 
Not remotely scary.395 
But still others draw on these urban myths to support their own view of 
how good the film is, and to suggest to others the reasons why they should see 
the film.   Far from putting people off, these urban myths and/or the associated 
controversy about the content of horror films seems simply to fuel their desire to 
see the film more: 
I saw this movie during its initial run… I worked in a book store 
and had seen the book but had never read it and then all the 
controversy about this movie hit the airwaves. People were 
being carted away in ambulances and running screaming from 
the theaters. Either TIME or NEWSWEEK ran a cover story on 
people being possessed… I was going to see it when it finally 
came to town (it was delayed for several months and was 
almost banned in my city)… My brother who was in college 
begged me not to see (he had found the Lord and thought it 
was blasphemous), he said I was going to hell. Oh well, I saw 
it anyway.396 
And further, this kind of hype actively promotes an emotional engagement with 
the experience before one ever enters the cinema, as one user reports: 
I'll confess that I was frightened just to rent the film. The things 
I had heard about it were terrifying - a girl possessed by the 
devil saying inverted words, masturbating with a crucifice, 
etc…Even with all that, I decided to rent "The Exorcist". So I 
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watched it and I'll just say one word. No, two- scary and 
perfect. 397 
And it seems, anecdotally at least, that movie theatres are not immune from 
fuelling this hype and adding to the fear and anticipation involved in going to see 
a scary film.  The midnight showing of classic horror movies is an obvious 
example, but as one user reports, some theatres are prepared to take it a step 
further: “I watched this film in 1973 at the age of 17 at a local theater with a 
friend when it was first released (they were handing out sickness bags at the 
door)”,398  Phill-13 concludes “Watch this film. But don't do it alone.”   
Judging from these unsolicited user comments, media reports of intense 
and apparently overwhelming physical responses work to lure viewers to the 
theatre rather than put them off.  And so one might reasonably assume that, at 
least a proportion of the cinema-goers are actively pursuing this intense 
experience, that the very possibility of being ‘overcome’ was exciting enough 
that one would actively seek out that experience.  Furthermore, users report that 
being warned of the lasting effects of exposure to the film does little to dissuade 
them either, on the contrary, the possibility of being so disturbed that one had 
nightmares actively encouraged them to see the film.  As one viewer put it,  
“When I announced my desire to watch "The Exorcist," many people warned me 
that I would have nightmares upon watching the film. This intrigued me all the 
more, of course, so I eagerly watched the film.”399  Indeed many contributors to 
the IMDB cite how disturbed they were by the film as a particular reason why 
one should go to see it.  Brian Harris, for example, suggests “No movie has ever 
disturbed me quite like this one. When I say disturbed I don't mean upsetting, 
but more like, once you see it you will be haunted by it for years to come… You 
will not [be]disappointed.”  While videocaptain maintains that 
...it will certainly move you in ways you have never thought 
possible. It is THE perfect horror film. After watching the 
Exorcist for the first time (10 years old), I had nightmares for 
months! I actually thought that demons and the devil existed 
and can enter your body at any time...boy was I frightened to 
death. Even 'till this day, I still get shivers up my spine when I 
watch this film...it still makes my hair stand on end.  
And BeccaLeo suggests, “Do not watch this film by yourself. Have one or more 
people with you and be prepared for the after affects of the film on your 
subconscious mind…you will more than likely have bad dreams over this 
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movie.”  As I have already suggested, the idea that watching this film might 
provoke an immediate and extreme response is a selling point, and further, the 
notion that this may have a lasting effect on the consciousness or perception of 
the viewer is actively promoted by this particular film-watching community as a 
particular reason to watch the film.   
 Moreover, as BeccaLeo points out, it is important to be prepared.  An 
idea repeated by several contributors to the site: 
If you are going to watch this film, BE PREPARED!!!400 
I just watched it again, and it was still the scariest movie I'd 
ever seen… Even when I watched again I felt giddy 
afterwards. It will mainly work for horror fans, like me, because 
most people don't believe in that devil shit. Be prepared if you 
rent this one out.401 
My gosh, THE EXORCIST scared the crap out of me! I usually 
sit down and watch a horror movie and just move on. This is 
different…This is just terrifying. This is a must-see for horror 
fans, but be prepared. 9/10402  
This incitement to prepare, of course, appears to be less about hyping oneself 
up in order to increase the intensity of the experience than it is about steeling 
oneself against the intensity, or preparing oneself mentally for the filmic assault, 
and viewers take pains to suggest the dangers of not preparing adequately: 
When The Exorcist was first released in December 1973, the 
audience wasn't prepared for what it was about to see. Patrons 
fainted, entire towns banned the film, and some couldn't 
believe it was only given an R rating, instead of an X.403 
I first saw The Exorcist on my own, underage and unprepared 
back in 1974. It terrified me. My walk home from the cinema 
meant that I had to cut across dark, isolated farmland. Every 
noise of every hidden creature became a demon in the 
shadows.404 
I saw the original version of The Exorcist yonks ago, and just 
saw the Directors Cut today on the big screen…I thought it 
was the scariest freakin movie I'd ever seen in my life. I know 
I'm not gonna sleep tonight and I hate myself for reminding 
myself about the film. As the movie developed I recalled 
certain scenes, but still wasn't prepared by the full impact of it. 
The infamous "Spiderwalk" scene almost left me running from 
the cinema screaming like a little girl. Even though it is a 
brilliant movie; great to see that style of horror is still 
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aprecciated today - I still hated it. For the mark it left on my 
psyche, which is totally shredded by the way.405 
Preparation here then is seen as a way of forestalling the ‘full impact’ of the film, 
a way of developing the requisite ability to deal with the events and images one 
will witness when watching the movie, and avoiding embarrassing public 
displays of ‘inappropriate’ responses like “running from the cinema screaming 
like a little girl.” 
However, while people were aware of the media hype that surrounded 
the film’s original release, the intensity of the debate and the enormity of the 
fears that surrounded the film were not repeated when the film was re-released 
in 1998.  The discourses then, that I have argued, work to stimulate fear and 
excitement before going to experience a film of this kind were notably absent at 
the time when many of these first-time viewers saw the film.  This may in part 
explain why many people reported that the film was not scary ‘by today’s 
standards’, and attributed the reports to the naïveté of the previous generation of 
filmgoers.  Nevertheless, those who did talk about how much they enjoyed the 
movie often stressed the importance of preparation and highlighted their own 
sense of anticipation before going to see the film.  These reports are often 
couched in terms of the media hype that has surrounded the film in the past, 
suggesting that these press reports have a continuing impact on the reception of 
the film: both positively and negatively affecting the viewer’s enjoyment. 
More importantly, although viewers themselves construct the idea of 
‘preparation’ as a way of avoiding extremes of affect, the anticipation of and 
preparation for their own potentially extreme response to the film acts as a 
cornerstone of contemporary viewing practices, forming an intrinsic part of the 
constitution of contemporary corporeal spectatorship.  In this instance of course, 
the corporeal spectator is not simply an effect of discourse, rather viewers 
themselves become active agents in the formation of their own cinematic 
subjectivity.  This subjectivity may be highly individual, multiple, even resistive, 
but as I have suggested it is always formed with respect to the prevailing 
discourses that surround both the film one is going to view, as well as cultural 
attitudes toward the ‘appropriate’ content of film more generally. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 As one cinema trailer, warning against the low quality of illegal copies of 
films, so succinctly declared: “Cinema.  It’s the experience that counts!”406  And 
as I have tried to show in this chapter, the ‘experience’ is indeed absolutely 
central to contemporary cinema spectatorship.  Drawing on some of the most 
successful contemporary films worldwide, I have sought to show that 
contemporary film not only seeks to deliver an experience for its viewer, but that 
experience takes a very specific form.  Contemporary film seeks to address the 
viewer as a corporeal subject.  Pleasure in popular film therefore, is rooted in the 
physicality of the experience: whether that is the thrill-ride of an action film, or 
having your skin crawl in a horror film. 
 Contemporary, popular Hollywood film then, has been shown to use its 
marketing to sell its films to its viewers as a source of physical excitement, 
kinetic effects and visceral experience, but this is no mere marketing promise.  
As we have seen very many viewers actively seek out the physical address that 
this kind of film offers, and treat it as the primary reason to see a film.  These 
contemporary film viewers are therefore clearly entering into some form of 
corporeal spectatorship.  However, what I have sought to demonstrate is that 
this form of spectatorship does not begin and end with the film text, as 
metapsychological theories would have us believe.  Rather, the discourses that 
surround cinema, from the film posters and trailers to controversy in the press, 
form a very specific context within which the viewing of a film occurs.  This, I 
have argued, does not only affect the way in which viewers think about a film, it 
is absolutely central to the constitution of the filmic experience.  That is, these 
discourses build a sense of anticipation for the viewer and, either implicitly or 
explicitly, demand that the viewer prepare themselves for the intensity of the 
experience, particularly in the case of violent and horrific films.  The anticipation 
of what a viewer is about to see not only raises levels of arousal, making certain 
film affects more likely to be effective, but as Hill points out, can actively work to 
change a viewer’s perception of what they see on the screen to the extent that 
they ‘imaginatively insert’ images that do not appear on the screen.   
The discourses surrounding the film can therefore build anticipation to 
the extent that the film text is perceptually modified by the viewer.  But further, 
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the incitement to prepare oneself, either for viewing the film as a whole, or 
watching particular scenes within the film, demands that the viewer enters into a 
process of constructing a specific form of cinematic subjectivity, suitable to the 
specific address employed by these films.  The incitement to prepare oneself, 
extolled by both film marketing and film viewers alike, suggests that engagement 
with a film does not begin and end with the text itself.  Rather, that film 
marketing, as well as any further media attention, attempts to provoke a form of 
engagement with the film, or at the very least, the kind of experience it has to 
offer, before the viewer ever enters the cinema.    
The marketing that surrounds the release of this kind of film then, may 
well be central to the success of the film’s affects.  But further, the type of 
campaign that insists that its viewer ‘Get ready!’ or ‘Prepare yourself!’ does not 
simply address the viewer as a corporeal subject and promise to deliver physical 
sensations and thrills in line with that mode of address.  Rather, they actively 
encourage the viewer to enter into a particular mode of reception; to actively 
create themselves as corporeal subjects in order to fully appreciate the 
particular form of experiential address offered by the film.  
The idea that the viewer might be transformed or permanently affected 
by the images s/he will see within the film is a case in point.  That is, the 
suggestion that the film might have a lasting effect on the viewer, actively works 
to heighten the fear and anxiety of the viewer before they enter the cinema.  The 
anticipation of a profound or extreme affect in this case means that the viewer 
may already be experiencing a degree of anxiety or tension with regard to what 
they are about to see, making scenes of peril, suspense or shock more likely to 
be effective within the cinema.  Moreover, as Hill has demonstrated, viewers of 
these kinds of films take a significant degree of pleasure from being able to test 
their own boundaries with regard to the kinds of images and affects they can 
tolerate.  In this instance, anticipation and preparation are absolutely crucial to 
this process, and therefore knowledge of the likely content and potential effects 
of watching such images, in terms of fear, disgust or shock, is therefore, an 
intrinsic part of the experience.   
Films like The Exorcist and Reservoir Dogs407 are clearly very different 
from films like Twister or Die Hard, and the particular form of spectatorship 
entered into within these films is clearly very specific to the content of the film 
and the intensity of the media debate surrounding their release.  Nevertheless, 
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what I am suggesting is that while these films mark the limits of acceptable 
cinema, their mode of address in unrelentingly visceral.  As such, the processes 
and strategies adopted by viewers in response to these kinds of films shed light 
on the formation of corporeal spectatorship more generally, though it is 
important to acknowledge their specificity too. 
In a very real sense films like The Exorcist and Reservoir Dogs not only 
tested the boundaries of those who watched them, but deliberately tested the 
limits of culturally acceptability within cinema at the time of their release.  The 
value of these films however, is not simply in highlighting how a particular viewer 
might respond, or what strategies he or she might adopt when watching a film 
with an intense corporeal address.  Rather, in situating itself at the limits of 
acceptability, it also helps us to delineate the limits of ‘acceptable’ cinematic 
subjectivity.  That is, a film that is central to debates about the morality of violent 
or horrific imagery also entails significant debates about what is considered to 
be an ‘appropriate’ or normal response to such imagery, for example, whether or 
not it is normal or acceptable to enjoy or to be excited by images of rape or 
torture.     
As I have already suggested, these discourses do more than help to 
create a corporeal subject equipped with a suitable mode of reception for a 
specific form of entertainment.  Rather, these debates will delineate the limits of 
acceptable responses to images, as well as differentiate between the ‘normal’ 
and the ‘abnormal’ spectator.  Corporeal spectatorship, therefore, is not an 
entirely ‘free’ activity, it is already shot through with power that attempts to both 
define and control it. 
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Fear of the Dark: 
 
‘Media Effects’ and the Subjectification of Film Regulation 
 
 
 
 
As Annette Kuhn points out in her book Cinema, Censorship and 
Sexuality,1909-1925, debates over film censorship are dominated by those who 
see it as a repressive act; an act of cutting out, of excision, of rejection, of 
exclusion, of freedom of expression undermined and of subjects forbidden.  
Within these debates, censorship is conceived as a problem, and questions 
revolve around “the extent to which prohibitions on the content of films constitute 
a justifiable exercise of power”.408  The problem with this ‘prohibition model’, 
Kuhn suggests, is twofold: firstly, it implies that censorship is an act carried out 
by a singular empowered person or institution; and secondly, it assumes that the 
process of censorship can only be conceived as a ‘repressive’ power.  As such, 
the censor can never hold anything other than a negative relation to the rights 
and freedoms of others.   
What Kuhn sets out to demonstrate is that the power to censor texts 
does not lie in the hands of a single public body, but rather the regulation of 
cinema takes place within the context of a network of relations between a 
number of interrelated, though frequently competing, institutions, practices and 
discourses.  Or as Foucault might put it, the regulatory apparatus extends 
beyond any single institution to a “thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble 
consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, 
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laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions”.409  As a result, Kuhn suggests the regulation of 
cinema should be understood “not so much as an imposition of rules upon some 
preconstituted entity, but as an ongoing and always provisional process of 
constituting objects from and for its own practices”.410  Censorship then is 
always a matter for debate, and what is considered appropriate or necessary 
censorship is always in tension.  Though perhaps more importantly, the work of 
these regulatory discourses is never simply ‘prohibitive’ or ‘repressive’.  Rather, 
as Foucault suggests, power is always productive in its effects.  
Indeed as both Annette Kuhn and Lee Grieveson argue in relation to 
early cinema, early debates on censorship were not only directed towards the 
“cultural control of cinema, on what could be shown”, but frequently engaged 
with the question of “how cinema should function in the social body”.411  As a 
result these regulatory discourses not only worked to produce ‘censorable texts’ 
but in their treatment and handling of ‘controversial’ films during this period, 
regulatory bodies like the British Board of Film Censors (BBFC) in the UK, and 
the National Board of Censorship (NBC) in the US, worked to shape cinema in 
very specific ways.  
For example, after a series of highly controversial films were released in 
the UK in the early 1910s, the BBFC chose to refuse all health education films a 
certificate, not because “such films might be ‘indecorous’, but because the 
cinema was…not a suitable place to air matters of potential 
controversy…Cinemas, in other words, were seen as exclusively for 
‘entertainment’ films, and entertainment films were to be neither educational not 
controversial.”412  Similarly in the US, the NBC was forced to seriously 
reconsider its policy of promoting cinema as a site of public education after the 
release of two highly controversial ‘white slave’ films in 1913, to admit that the 
“lack of dialogue and emphasis on the dramatic” made film a “difficult medium” 
to achieve educative goals, and to conclude that cinemas were “primarily places 
of amusement and not of serious discussion and education”.413  This prompted 
the nascent American film industry to move away from the production of 
potentially controversial ‘educational’ films and focus instead on “the self-
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enclosed space of the fictive and the harmlessly ‘entertaining’”.414   As 
Grieveson suggests, far from ‘repressing’ the film industry the regulatory 
debates that unfolded in the early years of the twentieth century significantly 
contributed to the American film industry’s self-definition as a producer of 
entertainment, and significantly shaped the development of the fictional, 
narrative and ideological norms central to classical Hollywood cinema.  
  However, while the practices of these censorship bodies may well have 
been ‘productive’ they were not exactly ‘libertarian’.  And although institutions 
like the BBFC, the NBC and later, the Hays Office were set up in order to guard 
against the threat of a heavy handed state censorship, the set of practices 
adopted by these institutions “effected much more stringent controls over the 
contents of films than any legislation directed specifically at indecent or obscene 
publications could possibly have done”.415  
What I want to suggest in this thesis however, is that since the 
breakdown of the Production Code in the US in the late 1960s, and coupled with 
the development of ‘new’ technologies of distribution like video and the internet, 
the regulation of contemporary cinema has undergone a kind of crisis.  In the UK 
this crisis can be clearly demonstrated in the unprecedented slew of legislation 
passed by Parliament since the 1970s to regulate film works.  But within an 
Anglo-American context more generally, depictions of sex and violence formerly 
prohibited under the Production Code have roused significant debate within the 
public arena over how film ought to be regulated.  As I will seek to show, the 
agenda for this public debate has been more or less led by the findings of 
‘media effects’ research, wherein concern over adult viewing has crystallized 
around the potential harm caused by depictions of sexual, and sexualised 
violence, particularly on young male viewers.  
As a result the terms of the contemporary regulatory debate have 
become ever more insistently focused on the film spectator as opposed to the 
text.  Though more importantly, within this discourse, the ‘subject-spectator’ has 
been constructed in very particular ways.  That is, the ‘subject-spectator’ 
conceived within the ‘media effects’ tradition is not only thoroughly gendered, 
but is constructed in profoundly physical and bodily terms.  The regulatory 
discourses of cinema, which include not only research on media effects, but 
public debate about controversial films, therefore increasingly concern 
themselves less with defining appropriate levels of explicitness within the text, 
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and more with the definition of ‘appropriate’ spectatorial responses.  The 
struggle for freedom of expression within contemporary cinema can therefore be 
seen to have shifted its locus from a conflict over the meaning or the 
acceptability of the text to a battle being fought over the body of the film 
spectator.  
As such concern over ‘media effects’ has not only thoroughly 
problematised adult spectatorship, but as I hope to show, has led to an 
increasing subjectification of film regulation.  Or as Foucault might put it, in the 
wake of increasing liberalisation, the regulatory discourses of contemporary 
cinema increasingly employ “new methods of power whose operation is ensured 
not by right but by technique, not by law but by normalisation, not by punishment 
but by control”.416  That is, in the discourses of contemporary cinema, relations 
of power concern themselves less with the justified excision of the image, and 
more with ‘normalising’ the responses and behaviour of the audience.  As I will 
seek to show these ‘normalising practices’ take place not within the context of 
statutory regulation of cinema, but within public discussion of films by both critics 
and members of the public alike. 
In order to explore the terms of this public discussion I have chosen to 
focus on the recent Australian independent film Wolf Creek  The decision to 
study the reception of this film however, was prompted less by methodological 
concerns than by personal experience. The horrific nature of the film revolves 
around the torture and killing of two young women, and includes a protracted 
scene in which one of the women is threatened with sexual violence.  In the UK 
the BBFC maintains a “hard line” on depictions of sexual violence on the 
grounds that: 
research into the effects of depictions of sexual 
violence…undertaken in the USA in the 1980s…[although] 
hotly disputed…is an area in which the evidence supporting 
the case for possible harm is unusually strong, and the BBFC 
continues to work on the assumption that particular violent 
scenes with the potential to trigger sexual arousal may 
encourage a harmful association between sexual violence and 
sexual gratification.417 
Nevertheless, the film was passed by the Board without incident on both film 
and video, and was recently shown on late night UK domestic television in its 
entirety.  While watching television as part of a mixed sex peer group, the 
showing of Wolf Creek on FilmFour was preceded by an announcement that 
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viewers should be warned that the film contained scenes of sexual violence; the 
result was a look of horror that passed around the room before the host rose 
from his seat and switched the television off.  Already in the process of writing 
about BBFC policies within the UK, what struck me about this event was that it 
represented a mundane, but very real act of censorship by an everyday group of 
people, who had evidently met with the limits of acceptability, at least within that 
particular context of reception.  
Further investigation revealed that although the film was critically well 
received in many quarters and had been nominated for a host of awards 
internationally, including the Grand Jury Prize at the Sundance Film Festival, an 
award for best horror film by one of Britain’s largest movie magazines, and no 
less than seven nominations from the Australian Film Institute, the theme of 
sexual violence that had motivated such a strong reaction within that small 
group had also generated significant debate amongst a wider film audience.  
And given the fact that the film had passed unproblematically through the 
classification and censorship process, the film proved to be a useful case study 
in which public debates about the ‘acceptability’ of such themes and depictions 
could be studied in a context that was distinct from ‘official’ regulatory debates 
over censorship.  Moreover, although the threat of sexual violence is never 
actually carried out within the film, the threat itself is central to one of the key 
scenes within the film.  As such, the film mobilises popular understandings of 
‘media effects’, and allows us to explore the way in which the ‘subject’ of this 
kind of contemporary film is constructed by the public at large.  In this sense, the 
film is particularly relevant within a British cultural context where debate about 
the potential ‘harm’ done to adult viewers by cinema crystallises around this 
issue. 
What I will seek to demonstrate is that debate about the film within 
Anglo-American websites and forums circulates less around the content of the 
film per se and more around the reactions and responses of the film’s audience.  
Calls for regulation within this context are highly unlikely to suggest the cutting 
or banning of the film, and instead focus on stigmatising viewers.  The regulation 
of film in this sense becomes less about the excision or repression of texts, and 
more about the construction of normative categories of spectatorship.  As a 
result the ‘problem of cinema’ within these debates becomes focussed on 
particular groups of spectators; it is a question of which subjects are viewing this 
kind of film.  But moreover, these debates not only attempt to define the act of 
consumption of this problematic film text as a social and moral problem, but also 
  
 
 137 
attempt to specify precisely how spectators should and should not respond.  And 
while some contributors focus exclusively on defining appropriate standards of 
behaviour in face of the film, others concern themselves less with defining how 
one should ‘act’ and more with how one ought to ‘feel’.  As such we can clearly 
discern a public struggle to define a normative standard that seeks to prescribe 
‘appropriate’ affective relations to such films.  And further, as we shall see, there 
is clear evidence that individual viewers not only construct themselves as 
subjects of this discourse, but that they can and do internalise these normative 
standards.  Film regulation in this sense has become subjectified, whereby 
subjects produce their own pleasures and affective relations to a text in the 
context of these normalising discourses, and understand them as socially 
problematic.  
 
 
 
Contemporary British Law 
 
 
As writers like Graham Murdock418 and Geoffrey Pearson419 have shown, 
the fear that watching certain kinds of film will lead young men into violence and 
crime, or otherwise cause them ‘harm’ is nothing new.  Indeed, what they set out 
to demonstrate is that the journalists caught up in a succession of ‘moral panics’ 
about film in recent British history have done little more that reiterate the fears 
and anxieties that have circulated widely throughout the course of the twentieth 
century.  The ‘video nasties’ debacle in the early 1980s is a case in point.  In this 
instance, a group of very loosely defined ‘video nasties’, consisting mostly of 
low-budget American and Italian horror films, including I Spit on Your Grave,420 
The Texas Chainsaw Massacre421 and The Toolbox Murders422 which relied 
heavily on the presentation of horror and graphic violence, provoked outrage 
within the British tabloid press.  Concern circulated around the potential of these 
(as yet) unregulated videos to fall into the hands of children and young people 
leading inexorably, it was asserted, to an increase in violent crime.  
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The ‘moral panic’ initiated with the aid of the British press over the effects 
of these videos on the nation’s youth led directly to the introduction of the Video 
Recordings Act in 1984.  The Act granted the BBFC statutory powers for the first 
time in its history and required the Board to make classification and censorship 
decisions with “special regard to the likelihood of video works being viewed in 
the home”423 as well as to consider whether the particular film was “suitable for 
viewing by persons who have not attained a particular age”.424   For while the 
cinema box office had functioned as a statutory age bar since the passing of the 
Cinematograph Act in 1952,425 the same could not be guaranteed within the 
unregulated space of the home; especially, it was argued, within working-class 
homes.426  
The Video Recordings Act therefore placed the possibility of children 
viewing works intended for an adult audience right at the heart of the BBFC’s 
regulatory agenda and as a result the BBFC was legally required to make much 
stricter regulatory decisions with regard to video works than it did for films shown 
within the cinema.  For although the effects of films on children’s “health, 
intelligence and morals”427 had been an explicit cause for concern from the 
earliest days of cinema, since the introduction of the category X in 1951 which 
excluded those under 16 the BBFC had sought to judge works aimed at an adult 
audience on the grounds of whether it was “likely to impair the moral standards 
of the public”, and more importantly, whether it was “likely to give offence to 
reasonably minded cinema audiences”.428  Moreover, the remarkably illiberal 
redefinition of the audience contained in the Video Recordings Act, flew in the 
face of the far more progressive definition contained in the Obscene 
Publications Act,429 which had been extended to cover film just seven years 
previously.  
 The Obscene Publications Act itself overturned the 1868 legal precedent 
set by Regina v Hicklin in which the test of obscenity was “whether the tendency 
of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds 
are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this 
sort may fall.”430  Such a test rested on the perceived effects of any given work 
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on the most vulnerable members of society, regardless of whether they were 
ever likely to encounter it.  By contrast, the 1959 Act rejected “the ‘most 
vulnerable person’ standard of Hicklin, with its preoccupation with those 
members of society of the lowest level of intellectual or moral discernment.”431  
Instead, a work was only to be considered obscene if “its effect…is, if taken as a 
whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely…to read, 
see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it”.432  This crucial rewording of 
the obscenity test demanded that any jury must take account of the effect on the 
“‘likely’ rather than ‘conceivably possible’ readership”.433  As such, the Obscene 
Publications Act pushed the definition of the audience beyond that of the 
‘reasonably minded’ general public, and inscribed instead the very specific 
target audience for the work.  Thereafter, as Robertson and Nicol put it, a work 
of literature was “to be judged by its effect on serious-minded purchasers, a 
comic book by its effect on children, a sexually explicit magazine sold in an 
‘adults only’ bookstore by its effect on the adult patrons of that particular 
shop.”434 
Far from the media literate, genre-specific consumer of the Obscene 
Publications Act, or even the ‘reasonably minded’ audience at the centre of the 
BBFC’s policies during Arthur Watkins tenure as Secretary, the ‘potential’ 
audience for video works inscribed in the Video Recordings Act was discursively 
constructed as a child who was ‘vulnerable’ in face of the image, ‘deficient’ in 
their ability to understand or to cope with what they see, and to otherwise lack 
critical or rational faculties.435  Moreover, while it had been common practice for 
the BBFC to classify films prior to their release, until the passing of the Video 
Recordings Act the arrangement had been voluntary one.  Unlike the Obscene 
Publications Act which was used to prosecute publications which were in 
circulation, the Video Recordings Act passed a system of prior restraint into law, 
effectively “saving police the trouble of submitting films to juries who may take a 
different view of what adults are entitles to watch in the privacy of their own 
homes.”436 
Indeed, although the extension of the Obscene Publications Act 
ostensibly broadened British legislative control over film content, the inclusion of 
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film within the Act was not intended to stem the flow, or even to provide 
legislative validation for the censorship of provocative films.  On the contrary, the 
Act specifically protected works that may otherwise be considered to be 
obscene, provided that they could be proven to be “for the public good”.437  The 
decision to include film works within the Act was therefore taken in order to 
defend ‘serious’ or ‘artistic’ films against the threat of private prosecutions, and 
ironically, allowed the BBFC to relax its policies.  Furthermore, the extension of 
the Act, coupled with a more general shift in the application of indecency laws to 
take account of the ‘work as a whole’,438 compelled the BBFC to change the way 
in which it handled controversial material.  While the Board had previously 
considered particular scenes within films on the basis of whether they could be 
deemed indecent, this legislative framework allowed the BBFC far more latitude 
when deciding whether films featuring graphic nudity, for example, could be 
passed uncut.   
The Board’s regulatory practices also began to mirror the legislative 
definition of obscenity insofar as material was no longer considered to be 
‘inherently obscene’, rather its obscenity could only be judged by its tendency to 
corrupt its audience.  As a result, the BBFC’s classificatory decisions shifted in 
emphasis, from a consideration of the explicitness of the image to a judgement 
about the potential effects of the work, as a whole, on the spectator.  However, 
while this shift may well be interpreted as a remarkable liberalisation of the 
BBFC’s regulatory practices in 1977, under the auspices of the Video 
Recordings Act the question of the effect upon the potential viewer, who is 
defined in terms of their vulnerability, ceases to be a liberating one. 
 While the passing of the Video Recordings Act temporarily assuaged the 
pro-censorship campaigners, the ‘video nasties’ debate re-emerged a decade 
later in the wake of the murder of the toddler James Bulger in Feb 1993 by two 
ten year old boys.  Summing up the case at the end of the boys’ trial, the 
presiding judge suggested that the boys’ crime could be at least partly explained 
by their exposure to violent videos.  Although video violence had never been 
discussed at the trial, and despite a dearth of evidence, the UK press claimed 
that the crime was almost exclusively attributable to the fact that the two boys 
had watched Child’s Play 3.439  The case reinvigorated public concern over 
‘media effects’ and led directly to the strengthening of the Video Recordings Act.  
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The amendment required the BBFC to take particular account of the “harm that 
may be caused to potential viewers or through their behaviour, to society”.440  A 
test of ‘harm’ which for the first time enshrined in law the idea promoted by 
‘media effects’ research, that watching certain kinds of films can directly damage 
a viewer and/or be causally linked to anti-social behaviour.  
Moreover, since this time the findings of the ‘media effects’ canon have 
become central to the BBFC’s definition of ‘harm’.  In Feb 2008 for example, the 
Board rejected the US ‘torture porn’ film Murder Set Pieces441 for video release.  
And in their notice of rejection the BBFC specifically cite the findings of the 
‘media effects’ researchers as the basis of that decision “current Classification 
Guidelines, published in 2005…reflect the balance of media effects 
research…that scenes of violence with the potential to trigger sexual arousal 
may encourage a harmful association between violence and sexual 
gratification.”442  As this example clearly demonstrates, the decision to effectively 
ban this film from the UK video market is not founded on the explicitness, the 
offensiveness or even the morality of the text, but around received models of 
spectatorship, formulated within the ‘media effects’ tradition, in which  the 
spectator is frequently constructed as ‘vulnerable’ and in need of protection. In 
relation to specific research on the effects of viewing sexual violence, on the 
other hand the spectator is more regularly constructed as potentially ‘deviant’ 
and/or ‘criminal’, and in need of regulation and control.  
 This idea that the consumption of certain kinds of images may lead to 
‘deviancy’ and crime, a notion that has by no means been proven by ‘media 
effects’ research, not only lies at the root of the statutory definition of ‘harm’, but 
recently formed the basis of a law designed to criminalise the consumption of 
‘extreme’ pornography.  The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act which came 
into effect in May 2008, made it “an offence for a person to be in possession of 
an extreme pornographic image”.443  The law was prompted by the trial of 
Graham Coutts for the murder of Jane Longhurst in 2003, where the prosecution 
placed a great deal of emphasis on the discovery of a large number of violent 
pornographic images on Coutts’ computer.  Although no evidence was 
presented to prove a causal link between his consumption of these images and 
the murder of Jane Longhurst, the prosecution contended that this material had 
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“‘fostered’ his bizarre and macabre fantasies”, prompting Jane’s mother to lead 
a campaign “to close down or filter out these pornographic sites, so that people 
like Jane’s killer may no longer feed their sick imaginations and do harm to 
others”.444  
Like the Video Recordings Act before it, this legislation is clearly born out 
of public anxiety about the unregulated circulation of images, facilitated by the 
development of ‘new’ technologies, despite the fact that distribution of ‘hard-
core’ and ‘illegal’ pornography predates the development of both the internet 
and video tape.  Indeed as Julian Petley points out, in the early 1970’s a large 
number of 8mm films were sold via mail order and under the counter in Soho 
and East End sex shops.  Moreover, such films were not restricted to the UK’s 
flourishing black market.  Until 1982 a loophole in British law allowed a limited 
range of pornography to be screened in private cinema clubs, always assuming 
that such films did not contravene laws of obscenity or indecency.445  
Nevertheless, despite the fact that it was already illegal to publish such material 
under the Obscene Publications Act, “the global nature of the Internet means 
that it is very difficult to prosecute those responsible who are mostly operating 
from abroad” making it necessary to “take a different approach”,446 in which it is 
the consumer rather than the producer or distributor of ‘extreme’ pornography 
who is criminalised. 
Debates about how we might define ‘extreme’ pornography, and growing 
concern about the impact of such this law on minority sexual practices 
notwithstanding, the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act is symbolic of a more 
general shift within UK regulatory policy.  On the one hand, it is indicative of an 
institutional acceptance of ‘media effects’ based models of ‘harm’.  But more 
important for our discussion here, it also represents a significant refocusing of 
the regulatory agenda in which there is an increasing intensification and 
insistence on the regulation and control of the spectator as opposed to the text.    
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The question of ‘harm’ 
 
 
 These concerns of course, are not unique to Britain. In the US many 
reporters attempted to explain the Columbine High School Massacre by pointing 
to films like The Matrix and The Basketball Diaries447, as well as the music of 
artists like Marilyn Manson, and violent video games like the first-person shooter 
DOOM.448  Like the Bulger case, it was never clear whether the boys who 
carried out the shootings had even seen the films singled out for speculation.  
But even if they had, as Karen Boyle argues, “there is no inherent reason for 
these particular aspects of the boys’ lives to have come under such intense 
scrutiny”.449  For Graham Murdock, this practice of generalising from single 
cases has a long history.  However, as he suggests the moral panics sparked by 
such tragic and newsworthy events tell us less about the motives or chain of 
events that might have led to such a tragedy, than it does about the latent social 
fears and concerns of the culture in which they occur.450 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the American public struggled with the issues of 
the ‘harm’ that may be caused by the rising wave of sex and violence found on 
the screen.  US ‘media effects’ research boomed, and public concern over the 
effects of such films on the viewer proliferated, strengthening the demands of 
feminists like Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon for the right of women 
to sue producers and distributors of pornography on the grounds that they had 
been harmed by it.  The Ordinance proposed by Dworkin and MacKinnon in 
Minneapolis in 1983451 was tabled in a number of cities around the US, and 
briefly became law in Indianapolis, before it was declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court.  However, in 1992 the Pornography Victims’ Compensation 
Act452 reiterated many of the concerns of the Minneapolis Ordinance.  The Act 
proposed that those involved in the business of making and selling pornography 
ought to be held responsible for “any sexual offense determined by a court to 
have been a major cause (or motivating factor) for a sex offender’s actions”.453  
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Although the Act was quashed before ever reaching the statute books, it 
nevertheless demonstrated a continuing public concern for the harm that may be 
caused by pornography within the US.  
Indeed the question of ‘harm’ has been central to US obscenity law since 
the ruling of Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton in 1973.  Here the US Supreme 
Court upheld the State of Georgia’s right to prevent the showing of obscene 
material within an adult theatre on the grounds that such material was not 
protected under the First Amendment on the grounds that there was a ‘possible’ 
connection between the circulation of obscene material and “antisocial 
behaviour”.  Although the Supreme Court admitted that evidence of a link 
between the two was inconclusive, it ruled that the State itself should be able to 
decide on the question of whether “commerce in obscene books, or public 
exhibitions focused on obscene conduct, have a tendency to exert a corrupting 
and debasing impact leading to antisocial behaviour”.454  It also cited evidence 
that “While erotic stimulation caused by pornography may be legally insignificant 
in itself, there are medical experts who believe that such stimulation frequently 
manifests itself in criminal sexual behavior or other antisocial conduct.”455  In a 
similar way to the regulation of works within the UK, despite the fact that this 
case considered obscenity in the context of a cinema aimed exclusively at an 
adult audience and effectively policed by a box office, it did not construct the 
spectator as a reasonable and rational adult.  Instead, with its insistent focus on 
the ‘stimulation’ of the subject by pornography and/or obscenity, and the 
possibility of ‘adverse effects’ it posited a spectator who is acted upon by a text; 
‘subjected’ to it in a way that is quite outside of his/her control intellectually, 
critically or morally.  And further, it formulated a model of the spectator who is 
deemed on the one hand to be ‘vulnerable’ to the ‘adverse effects’ of 
pornography, and on the other, potentially ‘deviant’ or ‘criminal’ and in need of 
regulation and control.  
  By the time of the Meese Commission in 1986, which argued for the 
strengthening of the obscenity laws in the US, the concern about ‘harm’ had 
become increasingly focussed on the issue of sexual violence.  The Report 
suggested that although there was still some debate about the potential harm 
that may be caused by sexually explicit materials, they could not be considered 
to be harmful on the grounds of their explicitness.  Indeed the Commission 
unanimously agreed that ‘non-violent’ and ‘non-degrading’ materials were “little 
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cause for concern if not made available to children [or]…foisted on unwilling 
viewers.”456  Materials containing depictions of sexual violence on the other 
hand, were treated very differently.  The Commission concluded that “the 
available evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that substantial exposure to 
sexually violent materials as described here bears a causal relationship to 
antisocial acts of sexual violence and, for some subgroups, possibly to unlawful 
acts of sexual violence”.457   These findings were scarcely supported by 
research.  Indeed the Commission conceded that the research evidence could 
only demonstrate a link between exposure to sexually violent material and 
aggressive behaviour, whereas “finding a link between aggressive behavior 
towards women and sexual violence…requires assumptions not found 
exclusively in the experimental evidence.  We see no reason, however, not to 
make these assumptions”458   Moreover, the Commission’s condemnation did not 
stop at obscene works, or even films depicting graphic scenes of sexual 
violence.  Rather it was suggested that “the so-called "slasher" films…are likely 
to produce the consequences discussed here to a greater extent than most of 
the materials available in "adults only" pornographic outlets.”459   
Although ‘media effects’ researchers themselves might dispute whether 
watching a ‘slasher’ film might lead directly to sexual assault, the Commission’s 
findings that these films might prove harmful, was not without precedent.  Dr 
Edward Donnerstein, a central figure within ‘media effects’ research, had 
previously given evidence in support of the Minneapolis Ordinance in 1983 
where he raised concern over a number of R-rated films, including I Spit on Your 
Grave, The Texas Chainsaw Massacre and The Toolbox Murders all of which 
had been central to the ‘video nasties’ debate in the UK.  For Donnerstein the 
central problem with these movies was that: 
Every time a woman is killed it has a sexual overtone. It is to 
get the audience sexually aroused…there is nothing wrong 
with sexual explicitness. What is wrong is…it is in juxtaposition 
with some of the graphic violence…And yes, young males will 
become sexually aroused with the images. If you remove the 
sexual context, unfortunately they will become aroused by the 
violence.460 
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For Donnerstein the problem with such films is not the level of explicitness within 
the text, but the association between sex and violence.  More specifically, that 
young men will become sexually aroused whilst watching violent images, 
leading to a situation in which these young men are ‘conditioned’ to become 
sexually aroused by violence.  The young male viewers referred to here are 
constructed as being passively and unwittingly subjected to a text that conditions 
them to respond to violence, despite the fact that Donnerstein provides no 
evidence that this actually occurs, and nor, to my knowledge has ‘media effects’ 
research more generally shown this to be the case.  Nevertheless, Donnerstein 
puts aside any notion that the viewers of these films might be able to respond 
critically or rationally to these films, let alone actively resist the ideological 
messages contained within them.  While this approach is not uncommon within 
‘media effects’ research, these formulations of spectator-text relations take place 
within the context of a significant power relationship in which the research 
subject has little control over  or even input into the interpretation of the findings. 
 
 
 
The problem of ‘media effects’ 
 
 
As the preceding discussion of ‘harm’ suggests, the question of media 
effects is inextricably bound up with politics on both sides of the Atlantic.  And as 
cases like that of James Bulger and the Columbine High School massacre 
demonstrate, the question of media violence is often central to the debate over 
these high profile crimes.  However plausible these links might seem, 
investigations within the UK have consistently failed to find any evidence of a 
link,461 leading critics like David Buckingham and Karen Boyle to suggest that 
politician’s complicity in perpetuating this kind of moral panic represents a way 
of avoiding having to deal with the very real social problems that may lie at the 
heart of such crimes.   
Moreover, Buckingham argues that it is important to remember that it is 
not simply that politicians make dubious use of highly questionable evidence, 
but that the research itself is inevitably influenced by the political climate in 
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which it is produced.  The “kinds of research that are funded, the kinds of 
questions that are addressed, and hence the kinds of evidence that are 
available”462 are all shaped by the social and historical context and the prevailing 
public anxieties in circulation at the time.  In broad terms, moral panics of the 
kind outlined above lead researchers to question ‘what does media do to 
people?’, or at the very least it leads moral entrepreneurs to seek out studies 
that ask this kind of question.  From a Cultural Studies perspective however, 
these studies take the wrong approach.  Our understanding of media influence 
would be better served by a focus on ‘what do people do with media?’ 
While a thorough review of all ‘media effects’ studies is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, it is pertinent here to highlight some of the more profound 
weaknesses in the evidence presented by this body of research.  For as the 
somewhat unfounded conclusions of the Meese Commission suggest, “so often 
is the possibility – or rather, supposed likelihood – of television”, and media 
more generally, “having direct effects pushed into the public eye that it can seem 
naïve, even perverse, to argue against the contention.”463  Despite the long 
history of effects research however, the evidence remains at best 
inconclusive.464   As David Buckingham suggests, far-reaching claims are often 
made on the basis of limited evidence and studies often contradict one 
another.465  Though after a comprehensive review of the literature authors like 
Jonathan Freedman have concluded unequivocally that “the scientific evidence 
does not support” the hypothesis that “media violence causes aggression”.466   
Nevertheless, effects studies have focussed predominantly on trying to 
establish a direct causal link between media exposure and the particular 
behavioural or attitudinal effects they are testing for.  Crudely framed, research 
studies often rely on a classic behaviourist model which conceives of spectator-
text relations as a simple question of stimulus and response.  As a result, effects 
research has consistently neglected the social factors that might underpin the 
commissioning of a crime.  And further, Boyle argues that by framing 
interpersonal violence in terms of cause and effect in this way, research not only 
ignores the fact that individuals make active choices about how they behave, but 
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it also suggests individuals are not entirely accountable for their actions.467  For 
Boyle, this forms part of a wider problem in which the mobilisation of debates 
over media effects provides a way of excusing male violence against women.  
Although the cause and effect logic of much effects research may simply be 
indicative of behaviourism’s overly simplistic and reductionist approach to the 
social world, and as such, it is imperative that we challenge the basic theoretical 
assumptions that underpin this research.  That is, we must question how both 
‘stimulus’ and ‘response’ are conceived within such studies. 
In the first instance, researchers often present the stimulus material, 
‘violence’ or ‘pornography’, as though these were self-evident and objective 
categories, free from the value judgement of the researchers.  Many studies 
simply do not explain what is meant by violence, or what kind of media violence 
was used in the process of the research, and it is simply assumed that the 
participants, not to mention the reader, share their perception and definition of 
the material under scrutiny.  However, work by Morrison and Millwood suggests 
that definitions of what counts as ‘violence’ on the screen will vary, at least in 
part, depending on the life experience of the individual.468  As a result, we have 
reasonable grounds to question what interpretations and assumptions 
researchers bring to bear on ill-defined categories such as ‘pornography’.  As 
Boyle suggests “in the studies most often cited in the pornography debates…the 
terms ‘pornographic’, ‘erotic’, ‘obscene’, ‘sexually arousing’, and ‘sexually’ 
explicit’ are used interchangeably to refer to a diverse set of representations, 
from nudity to sexual activity between consenting adults and scenes of 
sexualised mutilation”.469   
In studies of screen violence, this kind of gross over-simplifications can 
lead to a total elision of the question of context.  Within those studies that 
conduct content analyses for example, there is an assumption that violence is a 
simple category with a singular fixed meaning that can ultimately be quantified.  
As Barker argues, such approaches neglect issues how such violence is 
represented, who commits it, what their motivations are, who it is perpetrated 
against and why.470  Indeed some studies neglect even the most basic issues of 
genre, leading to definitions of violence that are so broad that they make 
programmes like Tom and Jerry appear to be one of the most violent shows on 
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television.471  As a result, Barker and Petley suggest that “claims about the 
possible ‘effects of violent media’ are not just false, they range from the daft to 
the mischievous…different kinds of media use different kinds of ‘violence’ for 
different purposes… without asking where, when and in what context are they 
used…it is stupid simply to ask ‘what are the effects of violence?”472   
But while on the one hand definitions of what counts as violence appear 
so broad that it seems to encompass depictions that are of little or no concern to 
the public at large, on the other hand this same set of studies appear remarkably 
specific in their focus on fictional violence.  As Gauntlett points out, the range of 
violent acts that are featured in news programmes is almost always exempt from 
criticism.  Condemnation of screen violence, it would seem, is reserved for those 
genres whose purpose is to entertain rather than edify, despite the obvious 
fallacy of assuming that depictions fictional violence and depictions of violence 
on the news will differ in their effects. 
In the second instance, it is also important to question how such studies 
conceive of the issue of ‘response’.  As I have already suggested, effects 
research very often assumes its subjects to be passive and uncritical.  This often 
leads researchers to assume that while children are inherently ‘vulnerable’, other 
groups of viewers are potentially dangerous, and might be led to commit violent 
and/or sexual offences simply by virtue of witnessing them on the screen.  
Research suggests however, that this is simply not the case.  Buckingham for 
example has shown that children are in fact remarkably sophisticated in their 
handling of media texts.473  Similarly, work by Barker et al, which will be 
addressed more fully later in this chapter, suggests that viewers of sexual 
violence bring a range of interpretations to bear on what they see, and in the 
process create a variety of ways in which these texts might be understood.474  
Indeed as Gauntlett so succinctly puts it: 
Since the effects model rides roughshod over both the 
meanings that actions have for characters in dramas and the 
meanings which those depicted acts may have for the 
audience members, it can retain little credibility with those who 
consider popular entertainment to be more than just a set of 
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very basic propaganda messages flashed at the audience in 
the simplest possible terms.475 
In the case of adults, this characterisation of the act of viewing leading 
directly to the commissioning of violent or sexually abusive crimes suggests that 
the only barrier to the perpetration of these crimes is either knowledge, (in the 
case of theories of imitation), or the lack of suitably stimulating material, (in the 
theories of arousal).  Theories of arousal in particular, are significantly at odds 
with research into actual cases of rape, where the crime is found to be 
“motivated more by retaliatory and compensatory motives than sexual ones; it is 
a pseudosexual act…addressing issues of hostility (anger) and control (power) 
more than desire (sexuality).”476  As such, these theories not only neglect the 
issue of providing the viewer with an actual motive for such a crime, but they 
also ignore the many other social barriers to committing an act of interpersonal 
violence.  Indeed, effects research has itself shown that post-exposure 
debriefing sessions can not only significantly ameliorate desensitisation and/or 
attitudinal effects produced by the research, but can lead to greater sensitivity to 
issues of rape.477  Taken at face value this undermines the premise that 
watching sexual or sexualised violence on screen causes harmful effects in any 
simple way, and suggests instead that interpretations of these depictions are 
profoundly influenced by the social and ideological climate in which they are 
viewed.  In which case, the question becomes less about the regulation of film 
works, and more about the information and attitudes that circulate within our 
culture more generally. 
However, these results might also suggest a more general problem with 
effects research insofar as laboratory based experiments contain ‘demand 
characteristics’ which present the participant with a defined role to play.  In this 
respect, Cumberbatch recounts the tale of “one shrewd four year old who, 
arriving at the laboratory for a modelling experiment, was heard to whisper to 
her mother “Look Mummy! There’s the doll we have to hit!”478  As Cumberbatch 
suggests, “if four year olds can guess what an experimenter wants them to do” 
then one needs to ask serious questions about whether adult participant may 
also “behave as ‘good’ participants, providing the experimenter only with the 
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results they think s/he wants”, a result which is “arguably more likely with 
controversial and well publicised issues such as video violence.”479  Similarly, 
Howitt suggests that questionnaires designed to test the effects of pornography 
and/or sexual violence on an individual’s attitudes may also be subject to this 
kind of ‘research demand’.  That is, the simple act of showing a pornographic 
film fundamentally changes the context in which subjects are being asked to 
respond.  It may not be that the pornography itself changed attitudes, but rather 
showing this kind of film may change subject’s perceptions of what the 
researcher wants.  However, we might also consider the possibility that viewing 
pornography in this kind of setting may simply suspend the rules of everyday 
‘polite’ society and allow participants to reflect of their experiences differently, or 
to present themselves more honestly.480   
What these issues suggest is that while laboratory based studies may be 
among the most influential in policy debates over the regulation of pornography 
and violence,481 the artificial character of these studies means that they lack 
‘ecological validity’.  The kinds of texts encountered, as well as the manner of 
presentation is unlikely to be representative of what subjects would choose to 
view outside the lab, or the way media texts may be used in more natural 
settings.  As Boyle notes, “being wired up to a machine measuring physiological 
aspects of arousal is hardly equivalent to an orgasm in the privacy of your 
home…Effects research cannot account for how participants make sense of 
what they see…and why they choose to engage – or not – with specific media 
texts.”482  Similarly, the artificial nature of the most common test for aggression, 
namely giving another party an electric shock within a laboratory setting, leads 
one to seriously question whether those studies that report increases in 
aggression in response to viewing violence can be applied to behaviour in the 
outside world.  As Howitt observes, choosing to administer an electric shock to a 
woman who has usually deliberately annoyed you in the context of a laboratory, 
is rather different to an act of sexual assault.  Indeed as Boyle notes, in the real 
world acts of violence not only have myriad consequences for both the victim 
and the perpetrator, but individuals also have a range of more or less legitimate 
ways of dealing with their aggression, like phoning a friend or hitting a pillow, 
which are simply not available to them in the laboratory.  
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A further weakness in the behaviourist model is that it fails to account for 
the psychological processes that lie behind particular behaviours.483  This 
presents a particular problem in instances where the researcher’s concern to 
demonstrate desensitisation or attitudinal effects means that their conclusions 
may completely cut across alternative explanations for the subjects’ responses.  
For example, Howitt discusses research conducted by Zillman and Bryant on the 
effects of watching pornography on ‘sexual callousness’.484  Howitt suggests that 
while these researchers claim that the lowering of a subject’s support for the 
Women’s Liberation Movement after viewing pornography is indicative of a more 
general increase in ‘sexual callousness’, they wholly neglect the possibility that 
subject’s lower support might be because the films were not as extreme as 
feminist campaigners had led them to believe.   
Similarly a study by Linz, Donnerstein and Penrod485 claimed to show 
that viewing sexualised violence in R-rated films led to a desensitisation toward 
rape and violence.  The researchers suggested that after watching 10 hours of 
feature films subjects reported feeling less anxious, seeing less ‘offensive 
scenes’ within the films, perceived the films to be ‘less graphic and gory’, and by 
the last day “men were rating the material as significantly less debasing and 
degrading to women, more humorous, more enjoyable, and claimed a greater 
willingness to see this type of film again”.486  These findings were construed as 
evidence that the subjects had become desensitised, however what the 
researchers claim to be evidence of harm may just as easily be interpreted as 
the men’s growing familiarity with the specific narrative conventions that define 
the genre of the films they saw.  But by wholly ignoring the subjects’ own 
interpretations of the films, and refusing any account of their own responses, 
these researchers simply treat these viewers as passive and ignorant victims.   
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Despite the inconclusive character of the evidence presented by media 
effects research, and the somewhat dubious nature of at least some of their 
findings, the media effects canon still holds sway over the regulatory decisions 
of the BBFC in the UK.  The BBFC formally recognises that “adults should as far 
as possible be free to choose what they see, providing that it remains within the 
law and is not potentially harmful to society”.487  However, the definition of ‘harm’ 
that is enshrined in UK law under the Video Recordings Act makes clearly draws 
on media effects research.  As the BBFC regularly point out in their rejection 
notices “harm is not to be interpreted narrowly as behavioural harm, but may 
also include more insidious risks, and the Board follows this approach in having 
regard to, for instance, moral harm and possible desensitisation.”488  As a result, 
the Board maintain a ‘hard line’ on depictions of sexual violence specifically 
because the findings of “researchers such as Donnerstein, Linz, Malamuth, 
Check, Zillman, Bryant, Berkowitz and Burt”,489 which although they are “hotly 
disputed” nevertheless present an “unusually strong” “case for possible harm”.490  
Or as Robin Duvall (the former Director of the BBFC) put it in a lecture given in 
Feb 2001, “we reject material which endorses the old male ‘women like it really’ 
rape myth. One of the reasons we do this is because of the research evidence 
that that is what turns some men on.”491  Chief amongst the ‘more carefully 
designed studies’ in Duvall’s view is the “evidence from American social 
scientists - Donnerstein, Linz, Penrod, Malamuth - that violent pornography and 
“‘X’ rated videos in which the woman is shown enjoying the assault or rape” 
excite aggressive responses from some male viewers.”492  While Duvall 
expressed misgivings about the possibility of ever finding a definitive answer to 
the media effects debates within his lecture, he nevertheless suggested that 
there may well be a significant link between viewing sexually violent material 
and the aggressive responses and/or sexual arousal of some of those watching. 
This ‘strict policy’ on the treatment of sexual violence goes hand in hand 
with the BBFC’s increasingly liberal treatment of sex within narrative film.  An 
increasing tolerance for sexually explicit works is, of course, part of a more 
general trend that began in the 1970s, where in the wake of the extension of the 
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Obscene Publications Act, public debate moved away from arguments “about 
the explicitness of screen representations towards a consideration of any 
corrupting influence”.493   However, the definition of harm inserted into the Video 
Recordings Act in 1994 explicitly requires the BBFC to take particular account of 
the “the manner in which the work deals with… human sexual activity”494.  So 
while the BBFC may be noticeably more tolerant of sexually explicit material 
than it has been past, the Board’s treatment of ‘sex works’ is likely to be more 
punitive than its handling of narrative film more generally.  In comparison to the 
Board’s handling of depictions of unsimulated sex in films like Intimacy495 and 9 
Songs,496 for example, which were passed without incident, the Board’s 
Guidelines explicitly state that “sex works containing clear images of real sex, 
strong fetish material, sexually explicit animated images, or other very strong 
sexual images will be confined to the ‘R18’category.”497  Indeed, sex works are 
only permitted an ‘18’ certificate where they contain only simulated scenes. 
Within the BBFC Guidelines sex works are explicitly defined as “ works 
whose primary purpose is sexual arousal or stimulation”.498  Setting aside the 
issue of an entire category of films that is defined with specific reference to its 
effect on the viewer, it nevertheless remains clear that it is a sex work’s 
exclusive intent to arouse or stimulate that is problematic, and justifies more 
stringent regulation than any other type of film.  All but the most innocuous 
erotica is likely to be relegated to the R18 category, which is subject to a further 
level of regulation insofar as it can only be sold through licensed sex shops, or 
shown in specially licensed cinemas to those over 18.  The demand that the 
consumer must visit one of these establishments to buy or view such material, 
rather than buying it via mail order or in mainstream DVD outlets, acts as a 
significant barrier to its distribution insofar as these establishments are 
themselves subject to strict licensing laws that severely limit their availability in 
many areas of the country.    
 The stricter handling of R18 is not merely a question of limiting its 
distribution.  The texts themselves are also subject to a great deal more cuts 
than narrative film.  The BBFC may well highlight that the number of feature 
length cinema releases that required cuts has dropped from an all-time high of 
                                               
493
 ‘History of the BBFC – The 1970’s’, SBBFC: Students’ British Board of Film Classification. 
http://www.sbbfc.co.uk/student_guide_history1970s.asp, (accessed 10th Feb 2008) 
494
 Video Recordings Act, sec. 4A(1) 
495
 Intimacy,  directed by Patrice Chereau, (France/UK/Germany/Spain: Studio Canal, 2001) 
496
 9 Songs, directed by Michael Winterbottom, (UK: Optimum Releasing, 2004) 
497
 Guidelines,(2009), 14 
498
 Guidelines,(2009), 14 
  
 
 155 
33.9% in 1974, to an all-time low of 0.9% in 2004 and 2007, indeed in both 
these years no cuts at all were required of cinema films intended for those over 
18.  However, what this surface statistic masks is the very large number of cuts 
required by the Video Recordings Act for videos and DVDs.  In 2007, for 
example more than 95% of feature-length works submitted to the Board for 
classification  were in fact intended for the video/DVD market.  So while in 1974 
the Board required cuts to just 240 films, in 2007 it required 547 video works to 
be similarly cut, including 22.8% of category 18 and 27.1% of R18 videos.  Such 
figures obviously exclude the mundane acts of self-censorship freely entered 
into by film producers in order to meet the category restriction before 
submission, and yet nevertheless they considerably undermine the BBFC’s 
claim to ever-increasing liberalisation.   
However, it should be noted that despite the large number of cuts 
required of R18 material, the very presence of ‘real sex’ within these texts marks 
a significant liberalisation of the BBFC’s policies since the 1990s.499  And 
notably, content deemed unacceptable within the Guidelines for the R18 
category, is predominantly that connected with non-consensual sex, the conduct 
of violence and/or physical harm.  As a result, the BBFC can be seen to 
maintain its concern with sexual violence, even as it might also be wrongly 
applied to sado-masochistic works.  As such, the Board’s treatment of sex works 
appears to be more stringent that its handling of narrative film.  That is, where 
images of non-consensual sex are strictly prohibited within works that are 
designed to ‘arouse’ the viewer, narrative film is given slightly more latitude in 
depicting rape and sexual violence, provided that the viewer is, under no 
circumstances, “encouraged to enjoy the pain of the victims of violence”.500 
The question of whether any given representation rape or violence is 
acceptable to the Board therefore circulates around the presumed pleasure of 
the spectator.  Acceptability rests not on the text’s explicitness, the duration, or 
even the brutality of the depiction, but rather on the matter of the quality of the 
experience available to the spectator within the text.  Whether a particular scene 
of violence, and particularly sexual violence, should be cut, has therefore shifted 
from a consideration of whether the depiction itself is intrinsically indecent or 
obscene to a question of how the spectator is likely to engage with the text.  So 
while Irréversible was passed without cuts on both film and video in the UK, 
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despite its inclusion of a 9 minute brutally violent rape scene, when the film I Spit 
On Your Grave was resubmitted to the Board for video release in 2001, the 
BBFC required over 7 minutes of cuts on the grounds that the “manner of 
presentation or visual details, may sexually arouse rather than horrify”.  More 
specifically, “The Board felt that in parading and emphasising Jennifer's youthful 
nakedness during the rape scenes, the film presented the sexual excitement of 
rape from a male perspective in a manner which could excite aggressive males 
with a predisposition for enjoying non-consensual sex.”501  As we can clearly see 
here, it is neither Jennifer’s nakedness nor the subject of rape that is cause for 
concern here.  It is the possibility of arousal, excitement or enjoyment.  As such 
we can clearly see that within this regulatory decision the ‘problem’ of cinema is 
clearly defined not as the text per se but as the inappropriate physiological and 
affective responses of the potential spectator, who is defined here, not as a 
rational or ‘reasonably minded’ adult but rather as “aggressive males with a 
predisposition for enjoying non-consensual sex”.  Censorship in this instance 
has been founded on the basis of the possible responses of those who are, by 
their very definition ‘abnormal’, in that they are not only aggressive, but possibly 
sexually ‘deviant’, and potentially ‘criminal’. 
The BBFC’s Guidelines also express a significant concern over the 
inappropriate use of film works, by similarly ‘deviant’ individuals.  In particular, 
the Guidelines suggest that classification decisions with regard to video works 
will be stricter because they may be “viewed out of context”.502  This too is 
prompted by the provisions the Video Recordings Act which stipulate that 
classificatory decisions must be made with “special regard to the likelihood of 
video works being viewed in the home”.503  In this instance legislation is 
specifically targeted toward an apparently “greater potential for harm” afforded 
by “the technological capacity to freeze-frame and replay scenes of sex or 
violence.”504  As a result, classificatory decisions must attempt to compensate 
for the increased control the viewer may gain on DVD or video.  The more 
flexible reception practices, and increased potential for a viewer to ‘read against 
the grain’ of the ideological tone of the film ‘as a whole’ seemingly demand the 
BBFC’s intervention.  What is being regulated therefore are the available 
readings of a film.  Outside of the cinema, narrative does not necessarily 
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dominate, and therefore the decision to regulate on the grounds that a scene 
may be taken out of context, in some sense represents an attempt to enforce 
appropriate (i.e. institutionally sanctioned) interpretation of a film. 
This point is emphasised with regard to the BBFC’s policy on depictions 
of rape or sexual violence, where it is stated that “the Board may require cuts at 
any classification level.  This is more likely with DVD or video than film because 
scenes can be replayed repeatedly.”505  The concern that underpins this section 
of the Guidelines represents more than an attempt to ensure that particular 
scenes are ideologically recovered by the text ‘as a whole’.  There is an implicit 
suggestion that these images might arouse in the viewer, and cuts would 
therefore be specifically required in order to prevent their use as a masturbatory 
aide.  The implications of this Guideline are twofold: firstly that there may be a 
possibility that repeated viewing might prove harmful to the spectator; but 
perhaps more importantly, that at least some of the censorship decisions made 
by the BBFC are made explicitly on the grounds of the potential that images may 
be used inappropriately by sexually deviant individuals.  The film A Ma Soeur!506 
is a case in point, where concern is explicitly expressed about the potential for 
the video or DVD to be used as a grooming tool on the one hand, and as a 
masturbatory aide on the other. As the BBFC put it:  
Two clinical psychologists advised that, on video, a rape scene 
involving a young girl could be used as a ‘grooming tool’ by 
paedophiles.  In the context of an ‘18’ rated cinema release, 
which effectively prohibits access by a child, this was not a 
concern.  But the much more private and domestic context of a 
video viewing was another and rather more problematic 
matter507  
Similarly in the BBFC’s press release about the decision the Board suggest, 
“Videos of A Ma Soeur! may be more widely available and so more accessible 
for personal use to any individuals with abusive and paedophilic inclinations… 
the rape scene may arouse potential child abusers and be used as stimulus 
material.”508  A debate about the merits of the research evidence behind such a 
decision is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Rather, my point here is to highlight 
the fact that censorship and classification decisions are being made under the 
rubric of potential ‘harm’, as required by the Video Recordings Act, and what the 
case of A Ma Soeur! neatly demonstrates is the way in which the potential 
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viewer is constructed within this regulatory discourse as being either a 
vulnerable child at risk of harm or an actually or potentially deviant individual.  
 Within the BBFC Guidelines then, appropriate levels of censorship for 
film and video works aimed at an adult audience are being defined, not on the 
basis of its being viewed by a ‘normal’, ‘reasonable’ adult but with specific 
reference to those who are constructed as ‘vulnerable’, passive and lacking in 
critical faculties, or potentially criminal and/or sexually ‘deviant’. The question of 
the appropriateness or suitability of any particular theme or depiction within a 
film then, circulates not so much around whether the text itself might be 
considered indecent or obscene, so much as whether the potential spectator, 
(as s/he is variously constructed and defined) will display appropriate relations 
with the text.  And indeed, as we have seen, in some cases the question of 
regulation has completely shifted from what might be appropriately articulated 
within our society, to a regulation of how cinematic depictions might be 
appropriately used and understood by the spectator.  Indeed, in these cases it is 
the spectator’s capacity to use or respond to the film inappropriately that is being 
regulated. 
 
 
 
Public Opinion 
 
 
As I have already suggested, despite a dearth of conclusive evidence 
showing a causal link between viewing violence, sexual violence in particular, 
and either psychological damage and/or the commissioning of violent offences, 
the BBFC are keen to stress the support of the British public for their 
activities.509  Indeed, the BBFC’s public consultation on the Guidelines in both 
2000 and 2005 showed that the majority of the British public saw the BBFC’s 
handling of matters of sex and violence as being ‘about right’ in both studies.510  
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However this consent was evidently based on the belief that a causal link exists.  
During the 2005 study for example, respondents were asked whether “people 
are liable to copy activities they see portrayed on the screen, including activities 
which are criminal or dangerous. The survey showed that a majority (69%) 
agreed with the statement, which was a smaller number than that found in 2000 
(74%).”511  And similarly when asked if ‘Watching violence in films generally 
makes people more likely to be violent in real life’, 45% of the respondents 
agreed.512  The question of whether regulation ought to be based on the public’s 
beliefs about the nature of media effects rather than solid evidence 
notwithstanding, perhaps the most interesting finding of the 2000 report was that 
while 
46% of the national sample agreed with the statement that 
“watching violence in films generally makes people more likely 
to be violent in real life”. When members of the citizens’ juries 
were asked their views on that statement at the outset of the 
jury process, half of them agreed with it. However, nearly 
three-quarters of them disagreed with it once they had heard 
the evidence of the ‘expert witnesses’.513 
What this suggests is that while the British public as a whole have a clear and 
apparently consistent view of the media’s capacity to provoke anti-social effects, 
these might be liable to change in the wake of an explicit public debate about 
the issue. 
 We cannot assume however that this change will lead to a relaxation of 
regulatory policy.  Indeed, research carried out by Dr Guy Cumberbatch on 
behalf of the BBFC in 2002 suggested that despite a “surprising tolerance of 
sexual violence in film…so long as it was justified in the storyline and it was ‘in 
context’”, for the British public “sexual violence in films remains far more 
controversial and less acceptable to viewers than either sex or violence.”514   
Moreover in contrast to the two other consultation studies, “when first surveyed, 
26% of the viewing panel had agreed that: ‘Watching violence makes people 
more likely to be violent in real life.’ After seeing [a selection of sexually violent] 
films, the proportion agreeing rose to 44%.”515  Cumberbatch argues that the 
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viewers “simply had not appreciated just how ‘graphic’ some of the films might 
be.  Indeed, a number admitted to being ‘quite shocked’ at the level of gritty 
sexual violence.”516  His argument implies that the panel’s former ‘liberal’ attitude 
toward sexual violence on screen is, to some degree, born out of naïveté.  
However, in the context of a debate about media effects, what this suggests is 
that for the general public, exposure to depictions of sexual violence is less likely 
to ‘desensitise’ the viewer, or to lead to aggressive or violent behaviour, than it is 
to promote more conservative attitudes towards the regulation of such films! 
While I appreciate that I am taking this evidence out of its intended 
context, my intention is to underscore the difficulty in these discussions.  That is, 
as Richard Perloff contends, that people involved in discussions about media 
effects see themselves as being immune from their influence, whilst seeing 
others as being those who are vulnerable to any effects.517  A point that 
Cumberbatch himself acknowledges.  So while this statistic clearly shows that 
participating in a research study on sexual violence in film can change one’s 
attitudes, the change that occurs is very different to that which the participant 
might attribute to those ‘others’.   
 Cumberbatch’s research suggests that “concern about what types of 
people would actually want to watch such - or at least some of the - films was 
common”, 518 with concern being expressed that “advertising the film’s content 
(such as ‘contains graphic sexual violence’) might attract ‘the wrong 
audience’”.519  Concern was specifically expressed that watching a film featuring 
sexual violence might ‘incite’ those who were already “mentally or emotionally 
unstable” before viewing “to go out and do comparable things”.520  One particular 
comment by a focus group member sheds significant light on who exactly this 
‘wrong audience’ might be: 
Susan (conservative): It still worries me, who would choose to 
hire it. It really still bothers me, who would actually choose 
to…to hire it and how, what they would feel about it.  I mean, 
everybody in this room says we watched them, yeah they were 
discovered no lasting effects and we’re not gonna go out and 
jump on somebody in the street, but it’s the people who 
choose to.  Y’know, that bothers me.  How do they feel about 
people around them…are they, I mean, but are they gonna 
effect their attitudes towards women they live with, or women 
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they come into contact with?  And that bothers me.  I think if 
one rape came out of it, it’d be one too many.521 
For this particular respondent the question of ‘media effects’ circulates around 
the possibility of a ‘deviant spectator’, and while Cumberbatch himself might 
argue against Susan’s stimulus-response model of ‘direct’ effects, the research 
paper itself maintains the ever-present possibility of the abnormal viewer.  
By which I mean, when participants within the study were explicitly asked 
‘Do you think that scenes of sexual violence might encourage copycat 
behaviour?’: 34% of the viewing panel agreed; a further 34% suggested that it 
might if the person was already predisposed to do so; 12% admitted it was a 
possibility; while the remaining 20% clearly disagreed and said ‘no’.  However, 
although this latter 20% may well represent a minority view, in entirely rejecting 
the idea that scenes of sexual violence might lead to copycat crime, the report 
concludes, “These answers are somewhat difficult to evaluate, since, however 
unlikely, the theoretical possibility of some deviant mind being influenced by a 
film can never be completely rejected.”522  This conclusion not only undermines 
these viewers’ opinions, but may in turn raise questions about to what extent 
participants framed their views in relation to the ‘demand characteristics’ of the 
research design.   
That is not to say that Cumberbatch was personally invested in seeking 
support for film regulation on the basis of the public’s belief in media effects.  
Indeed as we have already seen, Cumberbatch himself is renowned for being 
profoundly critical of the media effects canon as a whole.523  However, this kind 
of speculation about other, deviant viewers may well have been provoked by the 
terms in which issues were addressed within the focus groups.  That is, the 
BBFC’s concern to uncover the extent of the public’s belief in the risk of imitative 
effects may have solicited such responses.  Indeed Cumberbatch himself is 
keen to point out that spontaneous comments about the possibility of copycat 
behaviour by ‘other’ viewers was actually quite rare within the discussions.524 
But while public concern about ‘media effects’ is clearly focussed on the 
possibility of the ‘deviant spectator’, within Cumberbatch’s study, one of the 
three primary reasons participants gave as to why a film or scene was 
problematic was the fact that it was ‘disturbing’.  Alongside aesthetic and moral 
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judgements that the films were ‘too graphic’ and respondents’ beliefs that 
scenes were ‘out of context’, 23% of participants suggested that they had found 
elements of the film ‘disturbing’.  While worries about the disturbing nature of a 
film may well still be grounded in fears about others, this perspective also opens 
up the possibility that individuals felt that they themselves were affected, by what 
they had seen.  As one respondent put it: 
The one thing I found really bad, erm, was that guy who’s 
playing a retarded guy.  It seemed like it was being played a bit 
for laughs, in the scene in the house.  I think it was just his bad 
acting to be honest with you, but he was like a typical slow…he 
just seemed to be a humour character.  And it just seemed 
really weird that he was stuck in the middle of this scene.  I 
found myself laughing at him, which is really disturbing when 
you’re watching a rape scene.525 
As we will see in the next section, the question of laughter while viewing such 
horrific films and/or scenes reoccurs again and again in public discussions of 
this kind of film.  And while some might suggest that laughing through certain 
kinds of horror movies is perfectly acceptable, and perhaps even part of the 
experience, the idea that one might laugh whilst viewing a scene of actual or 
implied sexual violence is almost universally acknowledged to be wholly 
unacceptable, likely evidence of a sick and twisted mind and repugnant to the 
point that it invites social censure.  However, while these discussions tend to 
revolve around the possibility of ‘inappropriate’ and ‘unsolicited’ laughter from an 
ideologically divergent, and possibly socially deviant individual, what is 
interesting about this comment is that his or her own laughter is taken as a sign, 
not of personal psychological problems, as it may be interpreted in the context of 
behaviourist research or when witnessed by an outside observer, but an issue 
with the film itself, and a specific justification for regulation. 
 What this solicited discussion of ‘media effects’ within Cumberbatch’s 
study suggests then, is that the British public, at least insofar as they are 
represented in Cumberbatch’s study, are engaging in a debate over depictions 
of sexual violence in a way that suggests that concerns over the ‘harm’ that 
might be done by such depictions circulate around the motives and pleasures of 
a ‘deviant’ viewer.  As such, the problem of potential harm inflicted by such 
depictions is not discussed in social, cultural, moral or even ideological terms 
per se.  Rather, the issue has become thoroughly subjectified in the figure of this 
deviant ‘other’.   
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However, as Barker et al point out in their study of the Audiences and 
Receptions of Sexual Violence in Contemporary Cinema, Cumberbatch’s 
research 
focussed on the views of a demographically balanced sample 
in relation to what adults in general should and should not be 
allowed to view.  Respondents were asked to view films which, 
in normal circumstances, they might never have chosen to 
view.  As such, it revealed the extent of public concern over 
what impact certain films might have on other people, and 
relied on assumptions about how the ‘other people’ might 
experience and respond to such films.526 
By contrast, Barker et al sought to study ‘naturally occurring’ audiences for films 
featuring depictions of sexual violence, and chose to recruit individuals who had 
positive responses to these films to their focus groups.  As such, Barker et al 
attempted to counter the “moral fears and preconceptions” that lie at the heart of 
“claims about what ‘audiences’ must be doing if they watch and enjoy screened 
sexual violence”.527  Instead, they sought to discover how these audiences made 
sense of scenes of sexual violence and explore “the nature of their pleasures 
and valuations.”528   
Somewhat unsurprisingly, the research found that the natural audience 
for these films often characterised their experiences of viewing in physical or 
visceral terms, and in keeping with Annette Hill’s work, some of the more 
‘extreme’ visitations of rape or torture were discussed in terms of endurance, 
coping and/or testing oneself.  Within discussions of Irréversible for example, 
“writers often construct endurance narratives around the rape scene”,529 while 
for Ichi The Killer530 “narratives of preparation, anticipation, viewing, and 
comparing one’s own reactions to others, abound.”531  More interesting though is 
the researchers’ discovery of the extent to which the judgements and policies of 
the BBFC had an impact on the formation of the viewer’s sense of identity: 
It is not merely that some audiences would like to ‘push’ 
against what they would regard as the ‘nanny-ism’ of the 
BBFC.  It is just as much that they feel watched, measured and 
judged.  This can lead in several directions: to angry 
denunciation, or to ‘bad behaviour’, or to a certain self-
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watching, for fear that you might appear to be as you fear 
others see you.532  
In some instances this was a matter of the audience arguing against received 
models of harm, particularly those that circulate around the question of sexual 
arousal.533  In other instances however, the fears and preconceptions that 
circulate around the presumed pleasures of these audiences can be seen to 
pose a very real threat to the individual’s sense of self.   
As part of a focus group discussing The Last House on the Left534 for 
example, Keith from Glasgow suggested that: 
I’m just interested in this type of cinema and this is an example 
of it and, you know, I appreciate fully that it is a problematic 
film and I don’t mind if you are, if you object to it or whatever, 
you know, just as long as you don’t sort-of confuse me 
showing this film with, you know, thinking anything about me 
as a person,’ as it were.535 
Keith’s response highlights his awareness of how other people might perceive 
and construe his appreciation of The Last House on the Left and exploitation 
cinema more generally.  The ‘risk’ Keith perceives in relation to this film is not 
the possibility of psychological, emotional or behavioural harm, but a direct 
threat to his social identity.  This awareness of being judged particularly 
characterised the reception of Irréversible where “the negative reaction (actual 
or assumed) of a partner/friends to either the viewing of the film or even the 
possibility of viewing the film”536 was often presented as a reason for seeking out 
the opportunity to discuss the film online. 
Although there were some key exceptions, to which I will return in a 
moment, in the main those who embraced these films were well aware that they 
were, potentially, the ‘deviant others’ referred to by anxious mainstream 
audiences in studies like that conducted by Cumberbatch.  As a result, 
respondents were often concerned to defend themselves against being 
categorised in this way.  Viewers of Irréversible for example frequently reported 
very visceral responses to the rape scene.  “Disgust, revulsion, anger and 
feeling physically sick are commonly reported, and these experiences although 
unpleasant in themselves, are strangely comforting because they are 
understood to be the right responses to a horrific act”.537  As this might suggest, 
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viewers had a very clear sense of what are considered ‘appropriate’ and what 
are considered ‘inappropriate’ responses to sexual violence, and on the whole 
Barker et al found that viewers were concerned to distance themselves from 
such impropriety.  As such, the kind of revulsion reported by viewers of 
Irréversible was held up as evidence that one is “not ‘sick’ for taking eventual 
pleasure from such a disturbing film.”538  But further, individuals could also be 
seen to regulate their own reception practices in order to guard against the 
inappropriate ‘misreading’ of a film.  Keith from Glasgow elaborates: 
I think it’s a film that I would sort-of hesitate to show to 
somebody unless you know, kind of, I was confident that they 
were sort-of ‘get it’… it’s a film could very easily be taken the 
wrong way and, you know, I would not want in any case to 
show this film to, um, you know, sort of, uh, kind of, in a 
laddish context, I think that would be a completely 
inappropriate, and you know, I would not feel comfortable sort 
of if people were sort of drinking lager or, you know, really 
‘getting off on it’, as it were539 
For Keith, the enjoyment of exploitation cinema is clearly founded on a specialist 
knowledge of the codes and conventions of the genre.  But perhaps more 
importantly, his response suggests that not only is there a right way and a wrong 
way to read and consume such films, but also that he might police his own 
distribution practices based on his assessment of the potential viewer.  And 
despite Keith’s awareness of the possibility that people might judge him for his 
taste in films, like members of the anxious mainstream before him, he 
nevertheless engages in the process of constructing his own version of the 
‘dangerous other’.  The question of whether the ‘laddish’ viewer ‘who gets off on 
it’ is representative of Keith’s own fears, or whether it is merely a reiteration of 
what he perceives to be the figure that underpins the mainstream audience’s 
hostility to such films is not entirely clear.   
However, Keith is not atypical.  Although it was more common for those 
who disliked and ‘refused’ the films to define and describe this ‘other audience’, 
those who embraced these films also raised the possibility that depictions of 
sexual violence might arouse or titillate others.  In their analysis of responses to 
a questionnaire about Irréversible for example, Barker et al found that  
there is almost always an implied ‘other’, the person who is 
‘titillated’, the one who is aroused by the scene.  This is of 
course partly the result of thinking about the BBFC’s position 
on this (provoked by the form of our question).  But we don’t 
                                               
538
 Barker et al, (2007), 149 
539
 Barker et al, (2007), 106 
  
 
 166 
think it is entirely so.  It is also that this is a possibility that must 
be acknowledged and held away.540   
The question of arousal therefore becomes central to the definition of the 
‘deviant’ response, and not surprisingly it was relatively rare for any of the 
participants in the study to talk about arousal in the first person.  Indeed for most 
heterosexual males watching Irréversible “it is both a relief not to be turned on 
(or to rapidly cease to be turned on) – proof that they are ‘normal’ and not 
sexually deviant”.541  What is notable here is that these viewers were not simply 
reporting their responses, but were actively engaged in a process of reflection 
over the subjective meaning of those responses.  In this respect, these viewers 
not only show an awareness of how they might be viewed by the BBFC, and by 
the public at large, but in some sense are producing themselves a ‘normal 
subjects’ through the process of interrogating their own relations to the screen. 
Indeed, as Barker et al point out, in some discussions there was a good 
deal of attention paid to how disturbed the poster was “by their own response to 
the rape scene (as opposed to how directly disturbed they were by the rape 
scene).”542  For example, one contributor suggests that  
“The most disturbing thing about this movie to me was my 
reaction to the rape scene.  It didn’t do as much to me as I 
knew it should.  I knew I was supposed to be horrified and 
hurting, but I wasn’t”543 
What this suggests is that viewers are aware of how they ought to respond to 
such scenes, and are actively monitoring and interrogating their own responses 
in relation to these ‘normative’ standards.  One might suggest that there is an 
implicit fear within this comment that the viewer has become ‘desensitised’, and 
as a result, this poster devotes a lengthy tract to recovering or justifying this 
worrying response in order to assure the reader, and perhaps himself that this 
response was ‘normal’.  That is, a response born out of relief that the incessant, 
nauseating movement of the camera had finally come to an end. 
That is not to say however that all members of the audience were 
concerned to defend themselves against their categorisation as a ‘problem’ 
viewer.  Indeed many of the ‘fans’ of The Last House on the Left consciously 
embraced their own vilification by the public at large.  For this group “engaging 
positively with this film means enjoying embracing something which you know to 
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be socially unacceptable to the majority of the audience.  As a result there are 
many self-conscious self-categorisations as ‘sick’.”544  These viewers not only 
recognised that they were the ‘deviant others’ referred to by the anxious 
mainstream, but their assured assertion of their own difference also made them 
more likely to admit to having ‘inappropriate responses’ to the film.545  
 Similarly those involved in the BDSM community were acutely aware of 
how their relations to images of sexual violence were perceived to be a 
significant problem.  In particular, their sexual orientation was seen by the 
researchers to be especially problematic insofar as it challenges “the notion that 
representations of rape can only be acceptable if they resist being arousing.”546   
And finally, Barker et al found a significant number of what they term a 
defiant ‘gross’ response, which defended the right to enjoy the rape for the 
purposes of sexual stimulation.  The researchers assert that these latter posts 
are produced on public forums by those who are already well aware of the kind 
of reactions this kind of post will garner, and as such might be seen as a form of 
‘trolling’.  However: 
For those who have made an analysis whereby they are 
normal because they were horrified not aroused, and that the 
film is inherently not arousing in structure, these claims are 
highly problematic. The film is responsibly made, as proven by 
the fact that it has not corrupted the writer, thus evidence of 
others’ arousal is often claimed as evidence of prior 
deviance.547 
In this instance calling the poster ‘sick’ or ‘some kind of sex offender’ becomes a 
means of making sense of and managing their (bad) behaviour.  That is, 
labelling these posters as ‘deviant’ is not only an attempt to dissuade the other 
party to desist in their assertions of arousal within the forum, but in a more 
general sense, can also be seen as a way of ‘pathologising’ certain forms of 
responses.  Nevertheless, for those who reject films like Irréversible, 
contributors who assert their arousal at scenes of sexual violence, provide 
evidence of the potential danger posed by the film.   
While this research was carried out on behalf of the BBFC, the team 
avoided making any policy recommendations on the strength of their findings.  
And indeed, to date the BBFC have also avoided any change in their regulations 
as a result of the report.  What this study suggests of course is that, in the main, 
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audiences for films featuring sexual violence are not as ‘dangerous’, and nor are 
their readings and responses as worrying as the general public might fear.  
However, this study fails to adequately dispense with those fears for two primary 
reasons.  Firstly, although this excellent piece of research might give us an 
extremely nuanced insight into how real audiences handle culturally sensitive 
material like this, the methodology and interpretive framework it adopts can 
never challenge the media effects canon on its own terms.  This is somewhat 
indicative of the difficulty cultural studies faces in disputing the findings of media 
effects more generally.  That is, behavioural psychology as a whole might 
suggest that individuals are wholly unaware of the effect of these films on their 
behaviour, or on their perception of the world.  The second problem with the 
findings however, is that rather than allaying moral fears and preconceptions 
about the ‘deviant viewer’, the results of this research actually confirms their 
existence.  On the one hand, the research points to a small minority of viewers 
who, whether defiantly or mischievously, declare their enjoyment of and sexual 
arousal in the consumption of images of sexual violence.  And on the other 
hand, the research also confirms that this very small minority remain a worry for 
the ‘natural’ audiences for these films, as well as for the public at large.  As 
such, to paraphrase Cumberbatch, the research stops short of the impossible 
task of precluding the theoretical possibility of some deviant mind being 
influenced by these films.  
However, the value of this work is in the researchers’ deliberate attempt 
to problematise the self-evident association between sexual arousal and harm.  
Within the report they have sought the opportunity to highlight the ways in which 
viewers themselves either explicitly or implicitly challenge the assumption that 
arousal will lead to harm, perhaps even that arousal is evidence of harm in and 
of itself.  Indeed the Barker et al claim that while  
there is strong evidence within our study (a) that many – both 
men and women – do find some such scenes arousing, but (b) 
that this can associated with greater condemnation of the 
violence because the arousal heightens awareness and 
involvement, and thus imaginative participation in the 
implications of the scene.548 
In addition, in their summary of the possible implications of their work Barker et 
al highlight the fact that certain “figures of the audience”549 haunt the criteria by 
which films featuring sexual violence are judged.  That is, the researchers assert 
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that within the reports on the BBFC’s judgements on each of the five films under 
scrutiny, the BBFC implicitly relied on models of spectator/text relations that 
were “unavailable for critical scrutiny”.550  With regard to media effects studies 
which explicitly problematise ‘sexual arousal’ in the face of depictions of sexual 
and sexualised violence, Barker et al suggested it was especially imperative that 
the BBFC allow the studies on which their regulations are based to be put to the 
test.   
As I have already suggested, rather that prove a harmful link between 
sexual arousal and viewing sexual violence, many of these studies simply 
assume this association.  Indeed, in most cases sexual arousal is the deviant or 
‘harmful’ response that researchers are testing for.  These studies therefore are 
not only normatively defining ‘appropriate’ physical and affective responses to 
such films, but in its emphasis on comparisons between ‘normal’ men and 
convicted rapists, or occasionally ‘force oriented’ men, the ‘media effects’ canon 
forges a clear discursive link between arousal, sexually violent imagery and 
individual sexual deviance.  In associating sexual arousal with a group of 
individuals who have either previously committed a sexual offence, or with those 
identified as being more likely to in the future, media effects succeeds in 
stigmatising this kind of response in such a way as to imply that there is a 
necessary connection between arousal and the commissioning of a sex crime. 
Moreover, as William L. Marshall551 suggests, studies that test for 
physiological arousal are inherently flawed.  For example, studies that test for 
arousal responses to non-consenting sex, most often rely on a test of penile 
tumescence.  What they depend on, Marshall argues, is that being a rapist, or 
being a ‘force-oriented male’ is in itself a conditioned response.  The assumption 
is that when tested, rapists and ‘force-oriented males’ would inevitably display 
their conditioned arousal to the ‘deviant’ acts depicted; an assumption that is not 
necessarily borne out by large scale studies comparing the responses of rapists 
to non-rapists, where little difference was found between the two groups.552  
Indeed two large scale studies suggest that arousal responses to images of non-
consenting sex might actually be lower for the majority of offenders than for 
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consenting sexual material.553  Furthermore, Marshall suggests, both offenders 
and non-offenders have demonstrated an ability to fake response patterns and 
fool phallometric testing devices, either by inhibiting arousal by using mental 
activities to distract themselves, or by generating arousal to non-preferred 
stimuli.554 
As such even those studies which show that ‘normal’ young men might 
be caused harm as a result of become aroused in response to depictions of non-
consenting sex where the woman is portrayed as being aroused are at best 
unreliable.  But further, as Lynne Segal suggests they present sexual arousal as 
though it were the necessary corollary of sexually violent behaviour rather than 
actually proving this is the case.  In doing so these studies fail to address “the 
complex question of the relationship between fantasy and reality…when we 
know…from the studies of Nancy Friday, Shere Hite and Thelma 
McCormack…that [sado-masochistic] fantasy is commonly used by both men 
and women to enhance sexual arousal”.555  Arousal by images would therefore 
seem to be a very poor predictor of actual behaviour. 
However the historical roots of the BBFC as a voluntary rather than 
statutory body, mean that they are arguably driven as much by public opinion as 
by research evidence.  In this respect the public’s ‘common sense’ association 
between sexual arousal, images of sexual violence and harm, and the 
theoretical possibility of the ‘deviant viewer’, provide a significant impetus toward 
the regulation of films of this kind, despite the dearth of credible evidence.  
Moreover, the BBFC’s duties under the Video Recordings Act require that even 
after the possibility of children viewing material intended for an adult audience is 
precluded, the Board must assess “the danger of adult viewers being morally 
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corrupted or being persuaded to emulate anti-social acts.”556  The Board are 
therefore asked to pass judgement on the potential ‘risk’ of harm, not on solid 
evidence that it can and does occur, and have chosen in many cases to take a 
cautious approach when dealing with apparent evidence of media effects.  In 
this respect, it would seem that cultural studies is charged with an impossible 
task if the Board depends on studies ‘precluding the possibility of the deviant 
viewer’, or providing sufficient proof that there is absolutely no risk of harm in 
watching depictions of sexual violence, in effect countering decades of ingrained 
cultural assumptions.     
 
 
 
The Gender of ‘Media Effects’ 
 
 
Also of note within these assumptions is the construction of the figure of 
the actual or potentially deviant viewer as a thoroughly gendered subject.  Within 
the discourse of media effects it is male viewing that is problematised and 
constituted as being in need of regulation and control.  Indeed as Karen Boyle 
argues in her book Media and Violence,557 discussions of media effects often fail 
to acknowledge the implicit sexual stereotyping that underpins their 
assumptions.  Indeed, as Boyle points out, in an early review of the literature on 
the effects of violence on television, of 67 studies examined there was only one 
study that looked exclusively at effects on women.558  While a more recent 
analysis of 217 effects studies revealed that while 40% of research was 
focussed solely on effects upon the male population, only 2% of studies looked 
exclusively at female viewers.559   And I suspect that this trend might be even 
more exaggerated if we were to look exclusively at studies of sexual violence.  
Boyle argues that one of the central problems with media effects 
research is that it actually works to mask significant biases represented in the 
populations of study.  Boyle suggests that this research has focused 
predominantly on a very specific audience group, which has then been used to 
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make generalisations about the viewing public at large.  The vast majority of 
effects research has been carried out in the US for example, placing the findings 
and the viewers in a very particular social, cultural and political context which is 
rarely, if ever, acknowledged within the discussion.  Moreover college students 
are disproportionately represented as a subject group within these studies, 
presumably because of ease of access within the academy.  However, as Boyle 
suggests, college students cannot be considered to be representative of even 
the US population in terms of age, class, race or educational background.  
Indeed Paik and Comstock found that within media effects research 85% of the 
total sample was drawn from a group with ages in the range 6-21, with boys and 
male college students predominating.560  Furthermore, Boyle argues studies 
often cast a veil over gender difference, meaning that even within those media 
effects studies that include both men and women within the sample, the results 
are only broken down by gender in 40% of cases.561 
Boyle’s aim within her research is to highlight the gendered nature of 
violence within contemporary society which, she argues is masked within both 
popular representations of violence on screen and within the effects research 
more generally.  As Boyle herself puts it: 
It should worry feminist anti-violence campaigners that effects 
research has been predominantly concerned with acts of male-
on-male physical violence as both on-screen cause and off-
screen effect although the gender of perpetrator and victim is 
often considered to be insignificant…In this way, researchers 
have perpetuated the ‘normality’ of male violence – it’s not 
male violence, its just violence – while making violence against 
women invisible.562  
Moreover, Boyle suggests that the debate over media effects is itself a symptom 
of a society in which male violence is thoroughly normalised.  A society in which 
“blaming individual media representations becomes a way of not asking more 
pressing questions about the construction of masculinity in our culture”.563 
 What Boyle’s argument suggests is that debates over media effects are 
a tacit way of excusing male violence within our culture; that masculinity itself is 
the problem that we as a culture are failing to deal with.  Of course, Boyle’s 
research focuses on a wide selection of media coverage of copycat killings, 
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representations of violence, and effects debates in general.  Within specific 
debates about sexual violence on screen, gender is not ignored in the same 
way.  Indeed it is predominantly male on female violence that is under scrutiny.  
As a result, gender is absolutely central to these debates.  And far from ignoring 
male violence, the threat posed by young men is the central issue under 
examination.  In this respect I concur with Boyle that pressing questions need to 
be asked about the contemporary construction of masculinity within our culture.   
More particularly, I would argue, we need to ask questions about how 
‘masculinity’ comes to be constructed as ‘violent’, ‘aggressive’ and a ‘sexual 
threat’.  That is, how within popular representations and debates, male violence 
is taken to be the norm, and similarly, how media effects research normatively 
constructs masculinity as violent, potentially violent, aggressive or simply 
callous.  This issue is thrown into sharp relief in the BBFC’s judgment on the film 
Baise Moi! where just one cut was required in order to prevent the film from 
appearing ‘explicitly pornographic’ in the BBFC’s view.  The justification for the 
cut to a brutal male on female rape scene early in the film was “in part informed 
by the evidence of media effects research that violent pornography may excite 
aggressive responses from some male viewers.” 564  However similar acts of 
violence visited on men by the two female protagonists remain untouched.  As 
the BBFC explain, “it is also relevant that the two female protagonists remain in 
control of events: the most serious concern identified by effects research, which 
is male sexual aggression, is not an issue in the rest of the film.”565  So while the 
BBFC do admit to the possibility that pornography might excite female, as well 
as male viewers, this is nowhere constructed within the press release as a 
problem.  Indeed, the central issue that necessitated the cut to the film is 
emphatically ‘male sexual aggression’, and the fact that the protagonists are 
female, and remain in control throughout the film, negates any need for further 
cuts within the film.  Far from being hidden, or masked, within the regulatory 
discourse, gender and concomitant assumptions about gendered subjectivity, 
are absolutely central to the process of classification. 
I would also suggest that within debates about pornography, sexualised 
violence and sexual violence it is masculinity that is constructed as a problem in 
need of regulation.  So while laboratory experiments tend to focus implicitly or 
explicitly on male viewing, in areas in which women’s viewing becomes an issue 
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in its own right, the problem of women’s viewing is framed in very different terms 
indeed.  Detailed discussion of these studies, which focus predominantly on 
television viewing, is somewhat outside the scope of my study here, but it is 
nevertheless important to highlight the significant differences in the way in which 
both masculinity and femininity are constructed with effects discourse. 
 Briefly then, one area which has highlighted women’s viewing is 
cultivation theory, most closely associated with George Gerbner,566 a US based 
researcher whose central focus is on television viewing.  His work suggests that 
those who consume the most television are most susceptible to what he dubs 
the ‘mean world syndrome’.  That is, the most frequent consumers of television 
are far more likely than others to overestimate the prevalence of violence and 
crime within their neighbourhood, as well as the likelihood that they themselves 
might become victims of violent crime.  Within this research, women have been 
consistently identified as ‘heavier’ viewers than men, and as such are more 
prone to cultivating a ‘mean world view’.  As Boyle suggests there are significant 
problems with Gerbner’s approach, for example, while these studies identify 
those it labels ‘heavy viewers’, it asks very few questions about whether they are 
actually heavy viewers of programmes containing crime and violence, and nor 
does it adequately investigate the individual respondent’s lived experience of 
crime in their neighbourhoods and in their homes.567  More important for our 
discussion here however, is Boyle’s observation that ‘taken alongside the 
behavioural studies…there seems to be an assumption that male viewers act 
and female viewers are acted on.”568 
 Similarly studies by Schlesinger et al, Women Viewing Violence and Men 
Viewing Violence,569 self-consciously sought to challenge the media effects 
debates by conducting audience research that aimed to explore the way in 
which real viewers understood and responded to screen violence.  But while in 
the study Women Viewing Violence the researchers sought to recruit women 
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from two specific groups “those who had experienced violent attacks from men 
and those who had not”,570 men on the other hand, were not chosen on these 
grounds as it was deemed unlikely that men “would readily identify themselves 
as either victims or perpetrators of violence.”571  Nevertheless, the report 
suggests that the questionnaire maintained some central elements of the 
previous study “that relate to experiences of being physically attacked and about 
men’s use of the criminal justice system.  However, we also introduced a section 
to investigate men’s perpetration of violence in order to assess the levels of 
violence for individuals or groups.”572  Schlesinger et al stress however, that data 
was gathered on both men’s experience and perpetration of crime on the 
grounds that crime statistics show that young men are both the most likely 
perpetrators and victims of violence.  But while there is no escaping the fact that 
the vast majority of recorded violent crime within our society is apparently 
committed by men, I think it is important to ask to what extent these studies 
‘reflect’ the gendered nature of such crime, and to what extent they are merely 
reiterating gender stereotypes, and, by extension ‘producing’ these gendered 
subjectivities. 
 In both Women Viewing Violence and Men Viewing Violence there is a 
clear gender bias that disproportionately positions women as victims and men 
as perpetrators of violence.  The idea that men might be fruitfully divided into 
focus groups centred around their experience of violence at the hands of men, 
as the women were, is dismissed as an inappropriate method within the study, 
and focus is instead given to the likelihood that they have at some point been 
perpetrators of violence, a position not even considered for the women in the 
first study.  In this sense many of the women in the Women Viewing Violence 
study were specifically invited to take up a position, to produce themselves, and 
to speak as a victim of violence.  More specifically, they were invited to speak as 
a subject who had endured violence at the hands of men, about their 
understandings of and responses to depictions of male violence against women.  
It is little wonder then that discussion in this first study expressed considerable 
concerns about ‘men’ as viewers, and what might be done to control their 
reception of such material.  And while the male participants in the Men Viewing 
Violence study were not ‘invited’ to take up a position as either victim or 
perpetrator per se, the focus of the study opens up the possibility that many of 
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these men might be categorised as ‘perpetrators’; a position entirely absent in 
the construction of women’s viewing. 
 Within behavioural studies that form the basis of the case for harm in the 
consumption of depictions of sexual violence, two distinct strands of research 
prevail.  The first compares a group of males already categorised as ‘abnormal’, 
‘deviant’ or ‘criminal’, drawing from groups of ‘offenders’ and comparing their 
responses to those deemed otherwise ‘normal’ men.573  And a second strand, 
that seeks to show that ‘normal’ men have the capacity to hold or to develop 
objectionable or otherwise deviant views and behaviours in relation to violent, 
and sexually violent, imagery.574  Stepping back from the issue of whether or not 
the findings of these researchers actually prove to be an accurate reflection of 
the potential impact of media on the viewer, what appears to be happening 
within this field of study is the production and specification of a contemporary 
model of ‘deviant spectatorship’.  More specifically, this model is built on a 
foundation of ‘deviant masculinity’.  As such, the research itself is deeply 
normative; bracketing off a range of attitudes, beliefs, responses and perhaps 
even sexual practices as not simply socially or culturally undesirable, but as 
harmful and damaging.  As such, these discourses represent a set of texts that 
are implicitly, and occasionally explicitly, aimed at the contemporary reformation 
of masculinity, or at the very least, masculine spectatorship. 
That is not to say that women, or female spectators are wholly 
unaffected by this shift.  Indeed, as we saw in the previous studies by 
Schlesinger et al, women’s viewing is no less constructed than male viewing.  
What it does suggest however is that the transformation and increased 
regulation of spectatorship that has occurred in recent times is being played out 
predominantly in masculine terms.  As we have already seen, it is male viewing 
that is constructed as ‘suspect’ and in need of investigation and control, in the 
popular consciousness, in the regulatory discourses, and within behavioural 
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studies of media effects.  Women are constructed time and again within the 
discourse as the potential victims of aggressive and violent male responses, 
while female spectatorship is often, though not always, seen to be the repository 
of ‘appropriate’ fear, disgust and revulsion at images of violence.   
So on the one hand women are warned by popular magazines to avoid 
any man looking to rent a horror film on the grounds that he may well hold 
“questionable feelings about women.  Whether buried deep within him or overtly 
expressed in his words and actions, his misogynistic tendencies make him a 
man to avoid.”575  While on the other hand, women, like Annette Hill, who claim 
to enjoy watching violence on screen are treated with incomprehension.  As she 
puts it:  
My taste in violent cinema is often interpreted by other people 
as ‘odd’, particularly by other women who shake their heads, in 
confusion and ask me ‘why would you want to watch 
something like that?’, ‘something like that’ meaning violent 
films are unspeakable, repulsive and often involve violence 
towards women.576 
As both Cherry577 and Hill argue, horror and violence in film are constructed both 
in the popular consciousness and within the film industry as a masculine domain 
and a source of dubious masculine pleasure.  All of which, Barker578, 
Cumberbatch & Howitt579 and Gauntlett580 argue, leads to a stigmatisation of 
fans of media violence that actively hinders both open debate and objective 
research within the field. 
 
 
 
The Subjectification of Film Regulation 
 
 
As we have already seen, the model of harm propounded by both 
American media effects researchers, and the corollary British legislative 
framework frequently construct the viewers of such films as either ‘vulnerable’ or 
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potentially ‘deviant’ viewers.  These constructions serve to legitimate institutional 
interventions, but they also serve to shape the cultural context in which the 
viewing of these films occurs.  What I want to demonstrate in the final part of this 
chapter is that the viewers of torture porn generally, and Wolf Creek specifically, 
are indeed thoroughly stigmatised by both the press and public alike.  Both 
reviewers and commentators regularly discuss these ‘deviant’ viewers in order 
to justify their rejection of the film.  And in the course of these discussions 
commentators can be surprisingly specific in the way in which they differentiate 
between ‘normal’, ‘acceptable’ readings and responses, and ‘abnormal’ or 
‘deviant’ ones.  The process of classifying readings and responses in terms of 
their ‘normalcy’ and ‘deviancy’ however, does not simply describe observable 
behaviour.  Rather, these arguments actively attempt to delineate appropriate, 
socially sanctioned readings and responses to this ‘problematic’ film.  As such, 
reviews and commentaries act as more than simple recommendations or 
remonstrations of particular films, they can also be highly prescriptive with 
regard to ‘acceptable’ readings and responses of those who go to see the film.  
As we will see, what is at stake within these reviews and commentaries about 
Wolf Creek, is not so much the behaviour of the individual within the audience 
per se, but the cultural constitution of normative standards for the spectator’s 
affective relations to a film containing sexual violence and/or sexualised 
violence.  
Indeed what I want to suggest is that, while the BBFC still maintain an 
important position in the regulation of cinema, the increasing availability and 
circulation of these socially problematic texts leads to the regulation of these 
films through social networks, rather than necessarily through censorship.  That 
is, calls for the regulation of problematic films are often less likely to be couched 
as public demands for censorship, and more likely to be a demand for the 
viewer to reject and revile such images.  In this respect, the processes of 
subjectification lie at the very heart of contemporary film regulation, which 
directs itself towards ‘the conduct of conduct’.581  Wherein the individual is free 
to choose the kind of entertainment s/he desires, at least insofar as the law will 
allow, at the same time s/he becomes ethically responsible both for the choices 
s/he makes, and for her or his responses to them.  In an era of relatively liberal 
institutional regulation of film then, responsibility for viewing is passed to an 
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ostensibly autonomous and ‘free’ subject, who is nevertheless implored to 
govern him or herself.582 
As with the ‘media effects’ canon more generally, the ‘problem’ of cinema 
within popular press and public discussion can not only be seen to revolve 
around the construction of discrete groups of ‘deviant’ and/or ‘vulnerable’ 
subject-spectators, but in addition, in prescribing a limited set of acceptable 
affective relations and responses to these problematic texts, these 
commentaries beseech the viewer to engage with the text in a limited set of 
ways.  As such, one watches these films in a cultural climate that entreats the 
viewer not only to behave appropriately within the cinema, but also to monitor 
and control his or her emotional connection to the film.  
That is not to say that each and every individual viewer will choose to 
comply with such prescriptive modes of viewings.  Indeed empirical studies of 
audiences have consistently noted the wide variety of readings and relations 
that audiences bring to bear upon their chosen texts.583  In her study of the 
audience for ‘new brutalism’ for example, Annette Hill argued that individuals 
approached these films with a number of “contextual and individual factors” 
which together helped to “form the viewing experience”.584  These “portfolios of 
interpretation” she argued, were sufficiently varied that even amongst an 
identifiable group of individuals who sought out this kind of film, viewers’ 
responses were highly differentiated, and as a result no one singular reaction 
could be seen to define watching this kind of violence.585  As such, Hill’s work, 
and the work of audience studies more generally, undermines any notion of a 
singular spectatorial subject position, by demonstrating the heterogeneity of 
understandings, interpretations and social uses that different audience members 
have of and for any given media text. 
However, studies that have focussed specifically on fans or genre 
specific audiences have shown these groups not only to be acutely aware of the 
kinds of judgements made of their viewing practices by the majority audience, 
but in some instances the active rejection of such prescriptive modes of 
reception can be seen to be an important part of the formation of their 
subcultural identity.  Within Annette Hill’s study for example, the viewing of these 
films took place within the context of a “heightened awareness of…the 
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controversy surrounding the target film and their representations of violence”.586  
Participants within the study were therefore not only aware that such films were 
perceived negatively by certain sections of society, but that this form of 
entertainment was seen to be a ‘social problem’.587  Viewers therefore, not only 
appear to go to watch a film like Wolf Creek in the context of debates about 
harm and depictions of sexualised violence against women, but Hill’s study 
suggests that the audience of such films, especially ‘fans’ of these controversial 
genres, understand themselves as subjects of the discourse; precisely as these 
potentially deviant viewers.  Although Hill’s study demonstrates that participants 
were keen to reject their categorisation as “strange, disturbed or emotionally 
deficient”,588 and instead chose to recast themselves as an “intelligent and 
sophisticated” audience.   
By contrast, other studies of explicit or implicit fan communities have 
shown these audiences to have a more ambiguous relationship to their 
categorisation as ‘problematic viewers’.  Indeed as we have already seen within 
Barker et al’s study of the audiences of sexual violence, certain groups of 
viewers are well aware that their pleasures and their viewing habits are a 
significant cause for concern amongst mainstream audiences.  So while many 
were keen to dissociate themselves from ‘deviant readings’ and ‘other’, 
pathological viewers of sexual violence, those who embraced The Last House 
on the Left, and exploitation cinema more generally, were more likely to 
understand themselves as a specific interpretive community who shared a 
specialised knowledge of the codes and conventions of this ‘niche’ genre.  
Moreover, rather than defend themselves against such categorisation, these 
viewers were far more likely to embrace their own pathologisation by admitting 
to ‘inappropriate responses’,589 or by proclaiming themselves to be ‘sick’.590 
Such self-categorisations, I would suggest, are indicative of a fan’s very 
particular relation with this kind of text.  As many researchers have pointed out, 
fandom itself is a thoroughly pathologised subject position.591  For Jenkins, the 
fan “constitutes a scandalous category in contemporary culture, one alternately 
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the target of ridicule and anxiety, of dread and desire.”592  Fans transgress 
boundaries of taste and violate dominant cultural hierarchies, and as a result 
they are often seen as “abnormal and threatening”, “represented as ‘other’” and 
“held at a distance”593 by both mainstream audiences and by sections of the fan 
community who are keen to “reassure themselves that their own media 
consumption is on the normal side of ‘the thinly drawn yet sharply policed 
boundaries between normal and abnormal audience behaviour’.”594  In addition, 
as Brigid Cherry points out, “viewers of horror films are often equated with 
dangerous or insane criminals” since successive moral panics have “led to the 
perception of horror films (and their viewers) as being a danger to society.”595  
Being a fan of horror or of exploitation cinema therefore means being aware that 
one is doubly positioned as a troubling or problematic viewer. 
It is not surprising then that in her study of female fans Cherry found that 
many of the participants refused the label ‘fan’ or talked about hiding their 
consumption of these films to the extent they described themselves as being “in 
the closet”.596  However, embracing one’s socially imposed identity as ‘sick’ or 
‘inappropriate’ may well be a way of asserting a specific form of subcultural 
identity for those who are well aware that the very act of viewing these films is a 
resistive act in and of itself.  Especially in the case of The Last House on the Left 
which was refused a certificate for cinema release by the BBFC up until 2002, 
and was not available on video in an uncut form until 2008.  Acquiring or gaining 
access to the film under these circumstances therefore meant breaking the law 
in many instances.  Or at the very least, for those who attended uncut 
screenings of the film that toured around the UK in the wake of the BBFC’s 
decision to refuse a certificate as recently as 2000,597 participating in such an 
event was a deliberate and knowing act of defiance against the regulatory 
institution.  As such, the fan community for such films can arguably be defined 
through their willingness to resist dominant culture mores, or as Matt Hills puts it 
in his book The Pleasures of Horror: 
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The act of ‘enjoying’ films that have been censored, denied a 
classification, or had their general release delayed, therefore 
needs to be viewed symbolically and performatively… 
’Watching and enjoying’ [film violence] affords fans a route to 
communicate their subcultural difference and their valued, 
subcultural transgression of mainstream values.598 
In Hills’ view, pleasure and consumption are performative acts, taking 
pleasure therefore “is always a cultural act, an articulation of identity: ‘I am the 
sort of person who takes this sort of pleasure in this sort of media product.’”599  
In other words, the viewing of a film is at least a partial enactment of one’s 
identity, and choosing to identify oneself as a fan, or simply as a person who 
takes pleasure in this kind of controversial film, within public discussions means 
opening up one’s motives and pleasures to public scrutiny.  Fans are well aware 
of the low esteem in which both they and their chosen cultural objects are held, 
and as such one can read engaging in this kind of a cultural debate as an 
assertion of identity and cultural authority.  As Hills suggests: 
The pleasures of horror…can be analysed as claims to 
agency.  They are performative by virture of arguing for, and 
constructing, their bearers as agents who display expertise 
and authority in relation to horror’s texts – whether this is the 
authoritative dismissal of horror (as ’perverse’, ‘weird’, 
‘immoral’ and ‘unpleasant’) enacted by ‘anti-fans’…or its 
equally authoritative championing (as ‘art’) by fans600 
In each case then, both the fan and the anti-fan are in engaged in a struggle 
over the meaning of the text.  In the process, they can be seen to construct their 
identity through their reading of and relation to the text and by drawing on more 
or less established discourses to assert their distinction from one another.   
 As Mark Jancovich points out, these discourses are not intended merely 
to mark out the fan from the non-fan, but rather the display of one’s cultural 
capital can serve to mark the distinction between the long-term ‘connoisseurs’ of 
cult horror and the inauthentic teen fans of ‘mainstream’, commercial horror.601   
`Real’ and `authentic’ fans, Jancovich suggests, are those who enjoy 
films of violent `excess’ whose circulation is usually restricted 
(and often secret and/or illegal)…They adopt the stance of a 
radicalized subculture or underground to distance themselves 
from, and define themselves as superior to, others who they 
construct as inferior and threatening, a mindless and 
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conformist horde associated with mass, middlebrow and 
legitimate culture.602 
As such, the readings and receptions of the fan audience vary not only in terms 
of their willingness to identify as a fan, the longevity of their commitment to the 
genre, and their acquired knowledge both of the genre and of the formal mores 
for the display of cultural capital within the fan community, but also by social 
differences such as gender.603  Such findings shed light on the absolute fallacy 
of attempting to define a universal spectator, or delimit a singular subject-
position created by the text, as even within specific fan communities individuals 
are keen to differentiate themselves from one another through their display of 
knowledge and taste.  However it is also worth noting the extent to which these 
‘authentic’ fans of the horror genre depend on the discourses of censorship and 
media effects in order to create a ‘rebellious’ and ‘transgressive’ subcultural 
identity.  Or as Matt Hills puts it, “Horror fans may well oppose censorship, but 
they are also semiotically and subculturally indebted to it.”604 
What I want to propose here however, is that these discussions 
represent more than the assertion of a social identity.  Rather as Steve Bailey 
argues, they are instances in which the individual can be seen to “produce 
modes of self-relation, ways of understanding one’s position as a social subject 
and one’s relation to the set of institutions, codes, norms and practices”, a 
capacity which depends on “self-reflection and socially enabled self-
understanding...in regard to a plurality of codes, institutions and discourses.”605  
In this regard, posts that are found on online review sites and forums should be 
seen not only as a specific textual production of a fan, or more broadly a viewer, 
identity,606 but may also be considered to be a place in which the individual 
cultivates a sense of self in relation to both the film text, and the specific culture 
which defines the online space.  It is important to note therefore, that most of the 
reviews which follow were sourced from ‘mainstream’ film sites such as the 
IMDb.com and EasyCinema.com, where the readership is assumed to be a 
‘mainstream’, commercial audience rather than a fan community.  As such, one 
would expect that the prevailing culture of such sites to be more closely aligned 
with the views and opinions of the ‘majority audience’, than with the very specific 
interpretive communities outlined by Jancovich and Hills.   
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This study of the debates that surround Wolf Creek then is by no means 
to be considered an attempt to explore the very specific relations that fans have 
to the horror genre.  Rather, what I want to tease out of these reviews is a sense 
of precisely how the ‘majority audience’ understand films of this kind.  More 
specifically, I am concerned with the way in which these mainstream audiences 
draw on the discourses of media effects in order to develop a model of the 
pathologised ‘other’ who takes pleasure in these films.  As a result, where fans 
do air their views, they do so in a context where their pleasure and consumption 
is defined by those around them as problem.  It is my contention that these web-
based reviews and discussions can be seen as an attempt to define and delimit 
the range of ‘appropriate’ responses to viewing sexualised violence on the 
screen.  As such, these discourses produce a particular, socially sanctioned 
subject position in relation to the text that operates quite independently of the 
textual strategies at work within the film itself.  
As we shall see, this spectatorial position is created through the 
construction of what Matt Hills might term an ‘imagined subjectivity’.  “By 
regulating what counts as a ‘good’ subject…imagined subjectivity acts as an 
extremely powerful cultural device.  It can be used to restrict and pathologise 
specific cultural groups, while promoting the achieved ‘normality’ and ‘legitimate’ 
authority of others.”607  What I want to suggest is that within these ‘mainstream’ 
discourses that surround images of sexual and sexualised violence the majority 
audience consistently draws on their understandings of the media effects canon 
in order to make a clear distinction between the normal and the pathological.  
On the one hand, they point to pathological responses, and on the other, they 
specify particular groups of viewers who are deemed to be troubling.  Of course, 
any given individual is free to resist and refuse such categorisation and/or 
subject positioning, and as we have already seen research suggests that fan 
communities tend to define themselves in quite different terms to those 
proposed by the mainstream.  Where fan communities do draw on these 
discourses, the work of Jancovich and Hills suggests that it is order to mark 
themselves out as a deliberately transgressive community.   
Nevertheless, as Blackman and Walkerdine point out, “the 
normal/pathological distinction underpinning the construction of Otherness plays 
a specific role in the ways we relate to, understand and act upon ourselves as 
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subjects of particular kinds”.608  In this respect, these mainstream discourses 
can be seen to urge the viewer to reflect on his or her relations to images of 
sexual and sexualised violence and assess the extent to which those relations 
might be considered ‘normal’.  As Hills notes however, the very act of 
contributing to an online forum is in itself a performative act through which the 
individual produces their identity, and as such we must be aware of the extent to 
which individuals produce themselves as ‘normal’ subjects through their 
definition of both pathological responses and the pathological ‘other’.  Or 
conversely, the extent to which they might, subversively or otherwise, self-
categorise as ‘sick’ or ‘deviant’ in face of these mainstream audience 
constructions.  In either case, my contention is that the proliferation of 
‘pathological’ categories within mainstream discourses can be understood both 
as an attempt to regulate viewers’ behaviour within the cinema, and as an 
incitement for viewers to monitor and regulate their relations with the screen. 
In my own small scale study of just 4,297 user reviews of some key 
contemporary ‘torture porn’ films, Captivity,609 Chaos,610 Hostel,611 Hostel II,612 
the recent remake of Last House on the Left,613 Murder Set Pieces,614 The 
Devil’s Rejects615 and The Hills Have Eyes,616 posted on two key sites, 
IMDb.com and EasyCinema.com, showed that lay understandings of media 
effects are regularly deployed.  For example, as one reviewer of The Hills Have 
Eyes argues:   
The bottom line is films CAN influence people who are already 
unhinged into desiring to commit unspeakably horrible acts of 
harm on others. This film is definitely one of them. It crosses 
the line and makes sane mentally healthy people shudder to 
think of what ideas it may be giving some unstable, emotionally 
disturbed people out there. A film like this is adding gasoline to 
the fire.617 
And within the user comments for these films more generally, a number of 
viewers raised the possibility that films like Hostel I and Hostel II, The Hills Have 
Eyes and the Devil’s Rejects might inspire others to commit similar acts 
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themselves, and a large proportion of these expressed particular concern about 
those who were already ‘unstable’ or ‘disturbed’.  As in the case of the BBFC, 
and the ‘media effects’ canon, the possibility that a certain group of viewers 
might become aroused by the depiction was also a key concern, which for one 
reviewer at least, seemed intrinsically linked to society’s descent into violence. 
Firstly let me just say I’m a BIG fan of horror films, but this film 
and recent films like it, have stepped over the line, they seem 
to be more about watching people begging for their lives and 
then dying slowly and painfully, i personally worry MORE about 
the 'sickos' watching this that are getting off on it...we are 
becoming more and more numb to the most horrific 'SICKO' 
style movies, and therefore making our ALREADY violent 
world even MORE violent618 
However fear is not simply restricted to a ‘deviant’ few who may be 
lurking in the audience, the very question of taking pleasure in viewing these 
types of films is an enormously problematic one.  Indeed the ‘imagined’ viewer’s 
affective relations are also a cause for considerable concern amongst reviewers.  
In particular, many of those who reject these films express both horror and 
dismay in others’ perceived enjoyment of viewing violence, rape and torture.  As 
one viewer put it, “Let me start by saying that I think anyone who enjoys this 
movie should be taken out of society, or heavily medicated...no healthy 
individual can benefit from viewing these scenes.”619  However, what is most 
interesting about reading the user reviews of these films is not so much that they 
reiterate concepts gleaned from ‘media effects’ debates.  Rather it is that these 
lay understandings of ‘media effects’ form the foundation of a normative 
regulation of ‘appropriate’ spectator-text relations, that is, they seek to define 
and delimit ‘acceptable’ forms of consumption by pathologising certain kinds of 
pleasure and spectatorial response.  As such these should be considered as an 
extension of the regulatory discourses of contemporary cinema, regulation 
“whose operation is ensured not by right but by technique, not by law but by 
normalisation.”620   As one comment on Christopher Goodwin’s Sunday Times 
article621 on the “horrifying trend” of “ultraviolent sadism” within Hollywood 
succinctly put it: 
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defenders of these films are in complete denial as to their 
effect on the viewers…No one is arguing crudely that these 
films have a direct, causal link to crime but to pretend that we 
are not abusing ourselves emotionally and spiritually, 
desensitising ourselves to what should be shocking acts, is to 
be in complete denial of the truth. None of which is a 
justification for government censorship, but a plea for self-
control, introspection, and regard for moral behaviour622 
The regulation of film within a liberal political climate is then to be achieved not  
through the censorship of texts but through techniques of the self – specifically, 
a moral requirement to interrogate one’s self in face of these films and to 
demonstrate both ‘self-control’ and ‘moral behaviour’ in our consumption of 
them.  In particular, Mr Rowley suggests that one should ask oneself: 
When you watch a film like Hostel, what do you feel?  
Revulsion, outrage, nausea, anger, or do you revel in the 
victims' suffering and secretly wish you were doing the 
torturing? And when it’s all over do you feel uplifted, filled with 
joy, renewed or do you feel complicit in something dirty, sordid 
and shameful?623 
This of course is not merely a question of the viewer’s identification.  Rather, it is 
part of what Nikolas Rose might term the ‘government of freedom’ in which film 
viewers are scrutinised by one another” and hence, persons are governed “by 
throwing a web of visibilities, of public codes and private embarrassments over 
personal conduct: we might term this government through the calculated 
administration of shame.”624  In reading web reviews of these films it is clear that 
viewers do scrutinise both the behaviours and responses of others viewing 
these films.  Indeed reviewers frequently recount how the audience responded 
to the film, sometimes in exacting detail. 
The regulation of film therefore, can fruitfully be seen as a form of 
governmentality in which ‘media effects’ research has produced a body of 
knowledge about a certain set of ideologically, psychologically and socially 
suspect spectator-subjects.  And however suspect their findings might be, these 
discourses are then not only reproduced within legislation, and circulated within 
public debate, but as Hill’s study suggests, these discursive standards of 
‘normalcy’ and ‘deviancy’, are internalised by individuals, who can be seen to 
measure their own behaviour and responses against it.  As such the discourses 
of ‘media effects’ are not limited to institutional debates, but form part of a 
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contemporary ‘technology of the self’, through which the viewer produces him or 
herself as a subject-spectator. 
 
 
 
The Reception of Wolf Creek 
 
 
Released in 2005, this low budget Australian slasher film tells the story of 
three young backpackers, two British women and one young Australian man, as 
they head into the Australian outback to visit Wolf Creek National Park in a run-
down car.  True to the genre, the car breaks down far from the nearest town and 
they are forced to accept help from a passing motorist who offers to tow them to 
his camp and fix the car.  However, after passing the time drinking and chatting 
around a campfire one of the girls awakes to find herself bound and gagged in a 
shed, and soon discovers the other girl beaten and bloody, tied to a stake while 
the ‘helpful’ stranger torments her; threatening to both rape and mutilate her.  
The girls escape briefly before one is recaptured and the other is killed outright.  
The film ends bleakly, without resolving the fate of the recaptured girl, as the 
young man finally wakes up and runs for help, and after a spending a protracted 
period lost in the bush this ‘final boy’ is eventually rescued by two tourists.  
 Funded in part by the True Crime Channel the film claims to be based on 
true events.  The story drew loosely on the cases of Ivan Milat who was 
convicted of killing seven backpackers during the 1980s and 1990s, and the 
Snowtown murders largely perpetrated by John Bunting in the 1990s.  Despite 
drawing on these high profile murder cases for inspiration the film was 
nevertheless fictional.  However, at the time of its release the film was refused 
distribution in the Northern Territory of Australia until after the conclusion of the 
trial of Bradley John Murdoch for the murder of British backpacker Peter 
Falconio on the grounds that its subject matter would potentially prejudice the 
trial.  This brief period of censorship clearly lent weight to the film’s claims to a 
realistic portrayal of events.  
 Within reviews however, these claims that the film was based on true 
events were a considerable cause for debate. On FilmFocus.co.uk for example, 
Jennifer Kent suggested that she had “found the claim of a 'true story' repellent 
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and disingenuous”.625  Similarly, one reviewer on EasyCinema.com suggested 
that the director’s attempt to raise the film’s profile “on the basis that its 'based 
on a true story' is just daft, exploitative bunkum”.626  Although others tried to 
defend the film by pointing to the cases of Milat, Bunting and Murdoch 
suggesting that such things can and do happen, as well as defending the film on 
the grounds of its ”realistic approach” rather than its claims to truth.627  As one 
contributor put it, “this film is a truly frightening experience and although many of 
the scenes are fictitious, McLean offers a more realistic approach to the horror 
genre then many other horrific films that are churned out in the entertainment 
industry.”628  Indeed, the realist aesthetic of the film was central to many 
commentators’ appreciation of it.  As one reviewer put it “at times it feels almost 
documentary-like”629 while another suggested that the film was “so realistic and 
so unflinching in portraying what happens, that you'll feel as if someone was 
always peeking around a corner with a camera, filming an actual event”.630 
But it was not just the aesthetics of this movie that made it so successful, 
its status as an independent Australian film was also seen as contributing to its 
success.  As drunkenmaster put it on EasyCinema.com, “this is no Hollywood 
film”,631 and for many it was precisely the fact that it was not a run-of-the-mill, 
mainstream Hollywood movie that made it so enjoyable.  “The format of this film 
has been seen many times before, but this time it's the lack of the Hollywood 
prettiness and production values that works to its benefit”.632  Indeed, one 
reviewer wondered whether the very fact it had not been made in America had 
prevented it from slipping into a predictable pastiche, as well as whether “the 
non-American influence kept this from becoming predictable or familiar in any 
way”.633 
Nevertheless, the film was not without precedent in US cinema.  On the 
British site EasyCinema.com the film was predominantly likened to The Texas 
Chainsaw Massacre,634 perhaps partly because it too claimed to be based on a 
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true story, but more explicitly because of its gritty depiction of “graphic, sadistic 
violence” which, for some placed the film squarely “in the same seedy category 
as such 'classics' as The Texas Chainsaw Massacre and I Spit On Your 
Grave”,635 with one reviewer unambiguously suggesting that the film was “Not so 
much a horror as a video nasty”.636  On IMDB.com on the other hand, the film 
was not only likened to controversial 1970s films like "Texas Chainsaw 
Massacre and Last House on the Left",637 but was situated by numerous 
contributors within the context of the recent rash of ‘torture porn’ films, and 
slasher movies more generally.  
 The controversy that surrounds Wolf Creek has no doubt been 
heightened by its association with these films.  In the press, its inclusion in “a 
new subgenre of horror films which are so dehumanising, nasty and misogynist 
that they are collectively known…as ’torture porn’”638 has marked it out as a 
particular cause for concern.  For David Edelstein, reputedly the man who 
coined the term ‘torture porn’, the genre as a whole begs the question of 
whether there are any “moral uses for this sort of violence?”, since they appear 
to be  “so viciously nihilistic that the only point seems to be to force you to 
suspend moral judgments altogether”.639  While Kira Cochrane’s attack on the 
genre in The Guardian is explicitly intended to question whether such depictions 
ought to have any place within ‘entertainment’ cinema.  But even the term 
‘torture porn’ represents an attempt to stigmatize these films through its 
juxtaposition of extreme violence and graphic sexuality.  From the very outset, 
the term invites questions about how such films are consumed by the audience, 
and problematises the kinds of ‘pleasures’ that might be found within the genre.  
For Cochrane the central problem with the ‘torture porn’ genre is that “these 
films flag up the prospect of watching a nubile young woman being tortured as a 
genuinely pleasurable experience”.  More precisely, it is the consumption of 
such images of violence against women by young male audiences that is the 
problem.  Cochrane therefore not only questions “who would seek out this 
experience as entertainment?”, but answers her own rhetorical question by 
mobilising the ‘media effects’ debates:  
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Of course, watching one of these films won't turn a sane, 
decent individual into a killer or a torturer, but you have to 
wonder what effect this widespread meshing of sexuality and 
graphic violence will have on the young men at whom they are 
primarily aimed.640 
Other reviewers like Nigel Floyd of TimeOut London, defended the film 
by suggesting that conflating “Greg McLean’s fiercely intelligent Wolf Creek”641 
with other examples of the genre such as The Devil's Rejects642 or Turistas643 
was “at best sloppy, at worst misleading and prejudicial”.  Nevertheless, the 
likening of Wolf Creek to films and genres specifically implicated in ‘media 
effects’ research clearly provides a discursive framework within which popular 
debate about the film takes place.  Indeed, discussion about the film is 
dominated both by the sadism and violence of the film as well as its capacity to 
provoke deeply visceral and affective responses within the viewer.  And whether 
viewers liked or loathed the film, in the main they agreed with Rich Cline from 
shadowsonthewall.co.uk that the film was “gut-wrenchingly awful to watch – 
horrifyingly violent, stomach-churningly gruesome and soaked in inevitable 
tragedy”.644  
Among professional reviews of the film listed on RottenTomatoes.com, 
opinion appears to be fairly evenly divided among those who embraced and 
those who rejected the film.645 However, within the wider context of web based 
reception, it is Roger Ebert that has become the figurehead of those who 
denounced the film outright.  In his review, he famously gave a zero star rating 
to the film and condemned it as a “sadistic celebration of pain and cruelty”.646  
And this indictment of the film is raised numerous times by both professional 
reviewers and web forum participants.647  Ebert’s review of the film is instructive 
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here, partly because it is central to many web reviewers’ discussions of the film, 
but also because his review reactivates many of the same points he raised 
against films like I Spit On Your Grave,648 and the more general category of what 
he termed the ‘woman in danger’ film in his famous article in American Film 
‘Why Movie Audiences Aren't Safe Anymore’.649  The point of view that Ebert 
specifically lays out in these articles is clearly informed by the ‘media’ effects’ 
tradition, as he claims that viewing such films fostered in the audience rape and 
violence against women.650  Moreover, after watching the audience laugh and 
shout encouragement at the screen during the course of the rape scenes in I 
Spit On Your Grave, Ebert concluded that the audience of the film were nothing 
more nor less than “vicarious sex criminals”.651  The value of Ebert’s contribution 
to the debate over Wolf Creek therefore extends beyond the fact that these two 
articles have become central to academic discussions of both the slasher and 
the rape-revenge genre.652  Rather Ebert’s condemnation of the film Wolf Creek 
is implicitly informed by the ‘media effects’ debates, and as such represents a 
key instance in which the model of spectatorship formulated within these 
debates is mobilised within contemporary discussions of cinema. 
 For Ebert, Wolf Creek was a film was so repugnant in its display of 
misogynistic torture and violence that he “wanted to walk out of the theatre and 
keep on walking”.653  Though evidently he stayed to the end, visiting the movie 
review site RottenTomatoes.com after the screening “not for tips for my own 
review but hoping that someone somewhere simply said, “Made me want to 
vomit and cry at the same time.”654  For Ebert there was only one ideological 
perspective to take on this film, and that is to see it as he does: as “brutal”, 
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“misogynistic” and “sadistic”; recoverable neither in terms of its genre nor in 
terms of a discussion about the role of violence in film.  
What is most interesting about his review however, is the way in which 
he attempts to sway the opinion of the reader.  More specifically, he reinforces 
his own ideological perspective with a clear attempt to stigmatise those viewers 
who may not reject the film outright as he did.  “To laugh through the movie, as 
midnight audiences are sometimes invited to do, is to suggest you are 
dehumanised, unevolved, or a slackwit…If anyone you know says this is the one 
they want to see, my advice is: Don’t know that person no more.”655  Laughter 
for Ebert, is not only an ‘inappropriate’ response to this film, it is a serious cause 
for concern.  One should note of course, that unlike his previous encounter while 
watching I Spit On Your Grave, Ebert didn’t actually see any audience members 
laughing.  Instead his condemnation is targeted at those who might laugh under 
other circumstances. Moreover, Ebert attempts to reinforce his judgement of this 
sort of behaviour by denouncing those who might respond in this way as 
“dehumanised, unevolved or a slackwit”.  Here Ebert not only disparages the 
audience and their potential responses but goes on to suggest that readers 
impose social sanctions on their friends and acquaintances for simply 
expressing a desire to see the movie.  As such, we can clearly see that Ebert 
attempts to employ the language of inadequacy and deviancy as a normative 
strategy designed on the one hand to stigmatize and sanction those who want to 
see the film, and on the other hand to designate profoundly ‘inappropriate’ 
reactions and responses to the film for the audience. 
 For Ebert then, this is not exactly a debate about ‘violence against 
women’ and nor is it a call for censorship.  Ebert’s review represents something 
else.  It is an attempt to achieve the suppression of this film through the exertion 
of normative social, and possibly interpersonal, pressure.  As the reviewer for 
popcornpictures.co.uk points out however, Ebert’s condemnation of the film 
ultimately backfired by raising the profile of the film, and getting fans of the 
genre “chomping at the bit to see [it]”.656  Nevertheless, Ebert’s review 
represents an important contribution to the cultural context in which the film was 
viewed. A context in which choosing to see this film invites questions about 
one’s motives and desires as well as one’s mental health.  
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 Looking at the wider debates about Wolf Creek, the issue of how one 
ought to respond, indeed how one ought to feel, resurfaces time and time again.  
The issue of laughter arises quite regularly, with both defenders and detractors 
agreeing that laughter would be completely inappropriate, while feeling 
physically ill and emotionally disturbed are, on the whole, defined as the way 
you ‘should’ or ‘ought’ to feel.  But further, within user reviews of ‘torture porn’ 
films more generally there is at least anecdotal evidence that audience 
responses are not simply being defined in the public domain, they are actively 
being monitored and policed.  That is laughing in the wrong places can not only 
garner the disapproval of the rest of the audience, but can get you evicted from 
the cinema: 
I was disturbed (in certain ways) by the film, but not because of 
the film itself, but because 2 people in the theater I saw it in 
repeatedly laughed at several scenes which were not funny at 
all. It took laughing at a helpless woman wearing her 
husband's face and running for her life to get these guys 
kicked out.657 
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that viewers are not only aware that they 
are expected to respond appropriately to these films, but that they may well 
modify their behaviour accordingly.  “Who cares if no one else is seeing this? If 
you're watching this alone you can laugh and cheer out loud all you want. So 
check your sense of morals and compassion at the door and rock and roll with 
the Firefly family one more time.”658  So while Mike from Jersey suggests that an 
empty theatre might be a good thing since it will allow him to shrug off this social 
pressure and enjoy the film in his own way, there is also a suggestion here that 
he does actually feel the need to reign in those responses in the company of 
others. 
To return to the specific case of Wolf Creek however, within both 
professional and amateur reviews there is a clear struggle to define ‘appropriate’ 
models of behaviour.  One critic who explicitly challenged Ebert’s summation of 
the film for example, suggested that Ebert had misunderstood the audience.  In 
contrast to Ebert, James Berardinelli suggested that the audience for this film 
was more appropriately characterised as a “horror fan - or a parent desperate to 
drive home the advice not to speak to strangers” rather than the ‘dehumanised’, 
‘unevolved’ ‘slackwits’ in Ebert’s review.  Moreover, Berardinelli argued that “if 
the film evokes squeamishness, it has done its job. You're not supposed to sit 
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through a film like this placidly munching popcorn. The reaction is intended to be 
visceral.”659  While Berardinelli clearly disagrees with Ebert, he nevertheless 
takes pains to define ‘inappropriate’ behaviour in the audience.  That is, ‘placidly 
munching popcorn’ while watching this kind of film, is simply something you are 
not “supposed to” do.  As such, Berardinelli’s contribution to the debate over 
Wolf Creek does not represent a struggle over the ‘meaning’ or the ‘appropriate’ 
interpretation of the film as such, but a debate over the constitution of 
appropriate forms of spectatorship.  So where Ebert constructs an ‘imagined 
other’ as mentally, intellectually or emotionally deficient, and/or ‘mysogynistic’, 
Berardinelli attempts to ‘recover’ the film by providing ‘legitimate’ reasons for 
watching and ‘liking’ the film.   
 However, Ebert was not the only critic to express concern about both the 
film and its ‘imagined audience’.  Tyler Hanley a critic from Palo Alto online also 
suggests that the film is “pointless, nauseating cinema” and that “Viewers eager 
to embrace 90 minutes of footage featuring women being brutalized, beaten, 
stalked and slaughtered may want to consider some serious introspection”.660  
Like Ebert, Hanley clearly attempts to stigmatize those who want to see the film.  
The implication being that there is clearly something wrong with an individual 
who is eager to see the film, to the extent that such an individual should 
consider “some serious introspection”.661  The movie in fact, does not actually 
feature 90 minutes of brutal violence against women.  Indeed, the first half of the 
film is devoted to character development.  Nevertheless, Hanley’s comments 
clearly draw on the discourse of media effects in suggesting a connection 
between a desire to see the film and ‘deviancy’ or abnormality within the 
individual.  Hanley therefore, clearly problematises the viewer’s relation to the 
text, suggesting that “embracing” this movie is, in itself, a problem.  She stops 
short of suggesting therapy in this instance, but clearly advocates a personal 
interrogation of one’s motives for seeing the film.  The implication, of course, is 
that not only should the reader reconsider their eagerness to see the film, but 
that they should examine the roots of that eagerness in an effort to bring their 
desires, perhaps even their subjectivity, into line with a more balanced, more 
normal, more socially appropriate view of the world. 
Similarly, viewers like jeffrsun, posting on IMDb.com writes: 
                                               
659
 James Berardinelli, ‘Wolf Creek’, Reelviews.net, 
http://www.reelviews.net/movies/w/wolf_creek.html, (accessed 8th Jul 2008) 
660
 Tyler Hanley, ‘Wolf Creek’, Palo Alto Online, 30th Dec 2005, 
http://paloaltoonline.com/movies/moviescreener.php?id=002299&type=long, (accessed 1st Mar 
2007) 
661
 Hanley, ‘Wolf Creek’ 
  
 
 196 
This film is disturbing…It made me sick to my stomach. It 
made me ask my friend to walk out…[It is] simply sophisticated 
sick violence…that is not good for your brain to be exposed to. 
If you played a part in the making of this movie, you are a truly 
sick individual… I'm embarrassed to tell people I saw this 
movie, and if you know someone who thought this was cool, I 
would stay away from them.662 
Jeffrsun clearly reiterates Ebert’s perspective on both the content and the 
acceptability of the film, by labelling both the violence and the members of the 
production crew as “sick”.  Jeffrsun then, like Ebert, attempts to reinforce his 
ideological perspective on the film by both stigmatising, members of the crew, as 
well as suggesting the use of social sanctions against those who may have 
thought the film was “cool”.  Once again, jeffrsun’s understanding of the problem 
with this kind of film is rooted in the media effects tradition as he suggests the 
viewing this kind of material “is not good for your brain to be exposed to”; 
implying, of course, that those people who though it was “cool” have, somehow, 
been irreparably damaged.  The metaphorical ‘sickness’ with which he 
condemns the violence and the crew, is therefore equated with a real 
physiological and/or psychological illness, and yet discrete from the ‘sickness’ 
he himself endured while viewing the film, which represents a ‘normal’ 
physiological rejection of the film. 
What is clear when looking at these debates about Wolf Creek the issue 
of how one ought to respond, indeed, how one ought to feel, resurfaces time 
and time again.  The issue of laughter arises quite regularly; with both defenders 
and detractors agreeing that laughter would be completely inappropriate, while 
feeling physically ill and emotionally disturbed are, on the whole, defined as the 
way you ‘should’ or ‘ought’ to feel.  But where for some this reaction is read as 
an indication that the viewer is appropriately aligned with the ideological thrust of 
the film (that is, that one is ‘appropriately’ disgusted by scenes of sexual 
violence), for others, like Ebert and jeffrsun, this feeling of revulsion is more 
appropriately directed towards a rejection of the film as a whole. 
Within these web-based forums that are targeted at a mainstream, 
commercial audience, rather than a niche group of horror fans, the question of 
“how people can ‘enjoy’ this”663 is raised repeatedly, especially by those who 
rated the film poorly.  However, it was not just those who rejected the film that 
                                               
662
 jeffrsun, ‘IMDb user reviews for Wolf Creek (2005)’ 
663
 meh, user Comment on Dan Jolin, ‘Wolf Creek’ 1st Jun 2007, EmpireOnline, 
http://www.empireonline.com/reviews/reviewcomplete.asp?DVDID=116928, (accessed 10th Jul 
2008) 
  
 
 197 
questioned the motives of others, MDL, posting on the site of the British movie 
magazine site Empire, gave the film four out of five stars, but nevertheless 
began her comment; “I saw this film with three friends.  Afterward, two of them 
shrugged and said, ‘Meeh.’ I think I need to get new friends”.664  What is 
interesting about MDL’s comment is that it is situated within the context of her 
own clearly signalled appreciation of the film.  Her questioning of her friends’ 
responses in this instance, unlike those of Ebert, Hanley or jeffrsun, is not 
couched in terms of who would go to see such a film, or even who would like it.  
Rather it is their indifference in face of the movie that is a cause for concern.  It 
is that they have failed in MDL’s view to engage with the film on an appropriate 
affective level, seeing it as she did as “horrifying and cruel”.665 
Violent films like Wolf Creek clearly problematise certain kinds of 
relations with the text, and as I have sought to argue throughout this chapter, the 
problem of the ‘imagined’ spectator is rooted in the ‘media effects’ debates.  
Nowhere is this more true than in one comment written by a woman named 
Josie on the TimeOut London website, that deserves to be quoted in full: 
I did not find this movie scary. It is undeniably full of tension, 
but my over-riding emotion was one of anger and sadness that 
sexual violence towards women can be seen as entertainment. 
Shame on the director that he would apply his talents to such 
degrading images of women. What the hell would motivate him 
to put what are, after all, his very disturbing fantasies onto film, 
perpetuating the disgusting myth held by so many men that 
women exist to be abused.  I am sure the director would not 
deny that many sick minded men would in fact find scenes in 
this film a turn on. We know that such men exist and thrive on 
violent pornography and snuff movies. Why would you want to 
bring this kind of thing to the masses. The only scary thing 
about this movie is what it shows us of mens imaginations, and 
how acceptable violence towards women really is in society. 
We all, as women, know how terrifying it would feel to be so 
abused, we do not need to have it so graphically portrayed in 
the name of entertainment. Shame on you Greg McClean. 
Whatever your good intentions for the film, however 'artistic', 
for me and many many other women you have failed, and that 
saddens and scares me more than any so called horror film 
ever could.666 
Josie’s fear is clearly rooted in the idea that this kind of representation will 
perpetuate the myth that abuse and violence against women is acceptable or 
even ‘normal’ within society.  Debates about whether Wolf Creek does, or even 
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attempts to perpetuate this idea notwithstanding, what is most interesting about 
Josie’s argument is the way in which she reinforces it with respect to the 
‘potentially abnormal or deviant viewers’ of the film: the “sick minded men” who 
would “find scenes in this film a turn on”.667 
Josie’s dismay is clearly rooted in a concern for how the viewing of such 
a film will affect specifically male, viewers.  Josie’s argument against such 
depictions is clearly born out of a belief that watching sexual violence on the 
screen can have real social effects.  Her condemnation of the film then, centres 
around the idea that ‘normal’ women – who already “know how terrifying it would 
feel to be so abused”668 - may fall victim to the ‘sick minded men’ who ‘thrive on 
violent pornography and snuff movies’ and would ‘find scenes in this film a turn 
on’.669  In this respect, women and men are constructed as diametrically 
opposed, both in their relation to ‘abuse’, and in their response to the film.  
Women are the victims of violence and abuse, while men are clearly implicated 
as the perpetrators, given that ‘men’s imaginations’ gives rise to ‘very disturbing 
fantasies‘ about the acceptability of such behaviour within society.   
However Josie’s fear is not restricted to the possibility of direct ‘media 
effects’, her comment mobilises very real fears about appropriate relations with 
the screen.  In this respect Josie specifically speaks “as a woman”670 and clearly 
differentiates between her own ‘normal’ response to the film, which was one of 
anger, sadness and fear – and that of the ultimate pathologised ‘other’, the ‘sick-
minded man’ who will exhibit the ultimate ‘deviant’ response and become 
aroused.  Josie therefore clearly constructs ‘womens’’ terror at the thought of 
abuse as the ‘normal’ response to this movie, while the ‘deviancy’ she identifies 
in the director’s “disturbing fantasies” and “men’s imaginations” more generally, 
is obviously seen as a quality of the ‘male gaze’.  The slippage between the ‘sick 
minded men’ and ‘men’ more generally, is clearly indicated in her fears about 
bringing “this kind of thing to the masses”, as well as in her assertion that “so 
many men” believe in the myth “that women exist to be abused”.671  
But while Josie’s views may be quite reactionary, and her argument 
overly simplistic, what Josie’s comment makes explicit are some of the 
gendered assumptions that are implicit in many other reviews and discussions.  
That the film may be viewed by those who are ‘sick-minded’ – the sexual deviant 
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or otherwise deficient individual who gets his kicks from watching violence 
against women.  That watching this sort of violence will harm the viewer and/or 
society, either by perpetuating the myth that violence against women is 
‘normal’.672  Or that the image will physically damage a person673 leading 
otherwise ‘normal’ men to commit acts of violence.674   All of which are built on 
the public perception of the media effects debates. 
What is more, Josie’s construction of the ‘imagined’ spectator-subject of 
films like Wolf Creek as being ‘sick’, ‘twisted’ or ‘deviant’ is clearly the dominant 
model within public debate.  As such, when participating in a mainstream, 
commercial web-forum those people who like and appreciate such films must 
situate themselves in relation to this model, either but defending themselves and 
their pleasures against such accusations, or by appropriating such terms.  
Commenting on a very positive review of Wolf Creek on Mermaid Heather’s blog 
for example Jed Cooper suggested that:  
One thought kept going through my ”sick puppy" mind while 
watching this flick once it sped up - this is very real world ... I 
can easily see this happening for real… But what I can not 
figure out is ... how can such a pretty, intelligent, athletic, 
sweet young thing have such a sick, twisted, perverted mind 
like me (smiling and clapping).675 
Similarly, one commentator on IMDB.com pointed out “sick puppy that I am, was 
hoping to see the "head on a stick" carried out a little more”676 while another 
admitted “I like walking out of the theater asking myself ‘why did I just watch 
that?’ And ‘am I a sick monkey for enjoying it?’”.677  What these comments 
suggest is not only that these commentators understand how their pleasures 
and their comments will be understood by very many others, but in the case of 
Subovon in particular s/he clearly demonstrates that s/he is actively engaged in 
a process of introspection, and interrogation about his or her own motives for 
engagement with the text, and pleasures s/he finds there.   
Moreover, these are not isolated cases.  It would seem that many of 
those who do actually appreciate films like Wolf Creek do in some way reflect on 
their own responses, question the source of their own pleasure and situate 
themselves in relation to discourses that construct their enjoyment of such 
                                               
672
 Josie, on TimeOut London 
673
 jeffrsun, ‘IMDb user reviews for Wolf Creek (2005)’ 
674
 Ebert, (1981) 
675
 Jed Cooper, user comment on Heather Santrous, ‘Wolf Fever’, MermaidHeather, 26th Feb 
2006, http://mermaidheather.blogspot.com/2006/02/wolf-fever.html, (accessed 24th June 2010) 
676
 vvalenescu, ‘IMDb user reviews for Wolf Creek (2005)’ 
677
 Subovon, ‘IMDb user reviews for Wolf Creek (2005)’ 
  
 
 200 
movies as ‘deviant’ and sick.  Within reviews of the film, the problem of 
enjoyment resurfaces time and time again.  Michelle Thomas writing for 
FutureMovies.co.uk for example, reflects “a few weeks ago I was surprised and 
dismayed by how much I enjoyed The Devil’s Rejects.  My reaction to Wolf 
Creek reassures me that I’m neither sick nor twisted”.678  And similarly, Ethan 
Alter of the Film Journal International suggests the difficulty in finding pleasure in 
a film like Wolf Creek is that, “the people who do appreciate the movie (you can't 
really use the word "enjoy" when talking about a film like this) will find 
themselves on the defensive, explaining how they can recommend something 
that's so cruel, it's almost painful to watch.”679  Indeed even Nigel Floyd of 
TimeOut admits that, “being a specialist horror film critic has its perils. Whenever 
the genre enters one of its grislier phases, female friends start to question how a 
seemingly feminist-friendly man could enjoy and write about such apparently 
misogynist fare.”680  Although these critics clearly had a different view of the film, 
what they share is an understanding that ‘enjoyment’ in the context of a bloody, 
brutal and violent film is not only personally problematic, but is likely to elicit 
significant criticism from one’s peers, precisely on the grounds that it may 
indicate that one is either “sick and twisted” or potentially “misogynist”.   
 In addition, reviewers and commentators frequently claim to feel guilty 
about taking pleasure in films like Wolf Creek which suggests not only a 
significant degree of reflection on their own engagement with the text, but that 
they somehow find themselves falling short of some internally conceptualised 
standard.  As Nathan Rabin, writer for avclub.com puts it, “Wolf Creek is the kind 
of well-executed sleazefest that makes audiences feel not just creeped-out but 
downright dirty”.681  While customers at EasyCinema.com were less ambiguous 
in their expressions of guilt: 
This has to now be in my top 10 fave Horror flicks and i guess 
(even though it somehow feels wrong)682 
Graphic, sadistic violence perpetrated on the three friends in 
this film left me feeling slightly guilty about watching the story 
unfold683  
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The result is gritty, uncomfortable and one almost feels guilty 
for watching...684  
Difficult to watch, but impossible not to be impressed with, this 
is either going to be a viewers’ guilty pleasure, or an instant 
turn off. Me, well I watched it twice.685  
While the sheer number of expressions of guilt about viewing and enjoying the 
film Wolf Creek found on this single site was in itself remarkable, it is a customer 
review of Hostel that perhaps sheds the most light on why individuals would feel 
the need to express this guilt publicly. ”It's a real treat of a film!!!!! Rent it! Enjoy! 
I did, no soul searching about did I/how I / enjoyed it, I just enjoyed a visceral 
roller coaster of thrills”.686  
What this customer’s comment clearly suggests is that s/he is aware of a 
prevailing social expectation that one ought to engage in some level of soul 
searching about whether and how s/he enjoyed the film.  Despite having refused 
to engage in this process, the fact that the review is couched in these terms 
suggests that this person is situating his or her pleasures within the context of a 
cultural climate in which the individual is implored to interrogate his or her 
engagement with such texts.  The fact that s/he feels the need to tell others that 
s/he simply refused to do this may be seen as a resistive act.  In refusing to 
justify his or her pleasure on a public forum, we might see this customer as 
talking to those who may feel guilty, or who feel they ought to feel guilty, for 
taking pleasure in such films.  This one customer is then, in some sense, 
attempting to give this group of viewers permission not to feel forced into 
introspection, but to simply rent and enjoy the film.  
 Moreover this problematisation of ‘enjoyment’, and the concomitant 
experience of guilt during and after viewing, is not restricted to Wolf Creek, 
rather it extends to the ‘genre’ more generally.  Indeed, many user reviews of 
‘torture porn’ suggested that while they had not abandoned taking pleasure in 
viewing these films, their relationship to the film is experienced through the lens 
of social pressure and cultural disapproval.  Commenting on The Hills Have 
Eyes for example, Ian Davies suggests that it is “not the kind of film you can 
admit to enjoying, but one that could easily be classed as a guilty pleasure”.687  
The implicit threat of social censure therefore appears to lead to individuals 
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being somewhat circumspect in admitting to taking pleasure in viewing this kind 
of film.  Surprisingly, it also led one British viewer to offer advice on how best to 
enjoy not only a socially problematic but banned film Murder Set Pieces, without 
having to face difficult questions about one’s viewing habits.  “This is a guilty 
pleasure, a film that makes you sit with the remote control in case somebody 
walks into the room while you're watching it.  You don't want to try explaining 
this film to a non-horror fan. Trust me, they won't get it.”688  And as this review 
suggests, claims to have enjoyed such films are often bracketed off as a 
pleasure that only a fellow horror fan, or gorehound could understand.   
I read someone's post that thought Eli Roth should be tried for 
murder as "only a psychopath could even think of this" 
HAHAHAHAHA sorry but that's funny! The movie was NOT 
targeted at your type of audience, so go back to watching steel 
magnolias and leave the horror for us!...So as for everyone 
who didn't like it or think it's just plain wrong...there are us 
twisted sick F***'s who enjoyed it! and WE are who it's truly 
made for....689 
While all of these comments can be seen to resist other viewers’ normative 
construction of the film and its ‘imagined’ spectatorial pleasures as deviant, 
many of these reviewers nevertheless position themselves in relation to this 
‘dominant model’.  That is, within the context of a mainstream, commercial 
website, targeted at the ‘majority’ audience, these reviewers produce 
themselves as the ‘deviant other’ whose enjoyment and pleasure is a cause for 
concern.  So while these horror fans may well discuss the film and themselves in 
entirely different terms within the context of a horror fan forum, within the 
confines of the IMDb, they show an awareness of the assumptions and 
prejudices that surround their pleasures.  So while DVD_Connoisseur’s 
awareness of the problematic nature of this highly controversial film leads 
him/her to suggest hiding one’s consumption of it from those who are not 
already part of this interpretive community, bowerqueen takes a different tack.  
Rather than offer up strategies by which the fan community might enjoy their 
pleasures without social censure, she chooses instead to address the 
mainstream audience, defending both the film and those who enjoy it against 
criticism.  As such she simultaneously, attacks the pathologisation of the 
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filmmaker at the same time as she appropriates a ‘deviant’ identity as a twisted 
sick F***, as both a symbol of her fandom and as a defiant act. 
 And this is no isolated case.  Among the 4,297 reviews just under 3% of 
users made comments that explicitly suggested that their sense of identity 
and/or subjectivity had been shaped by these normalising discourses.  Of that 
3%, 30 individuals acknowledged or appropriated the construction of their 
pleasures as sick or deviant, as bowerqueen does; 27 viewers questioned their 
sense of self in face of unexpected responses and pleasures, (for example 
“What sort of person am I that I rent these things and enjoy them?!?!”690); and 55 
expressed guilt, shame, feeling dirty and/or like they wanted to take a shower 
after having watched one of these films.  But unlike the somewhat resistive act 
of classifying the film as a ‘guilty pleasure’, many of the reviewers claimed to 
have experienced this shame on a deeply subjective level.  As one reviewer put 
it, “I watched the movie Chaos alone and regret it deeply...I actually couldn't 
move at one point during the film because I was in shock. I felt ashamed and 
horrified that I was watching this all alone...”691  While another reviewer 
suggests, “I hated myself for getting a thrill out of it....”692  Although there is 
significant variation between the films: awareness of one’s construction as sick, 
for example was most strongly associated with Murder Set Pieces; while 
expressions of guilt and shame, as well as the questioning of one’s subjectivity 
was most strongly associated with Last House on the Left and The Devil’s 
Rejects. 
What all this seeks to suggest is that individuals who enjoy ‘torture porn’ 
films not only understand themselves as subjects within a wider discursive 
framework informed by the ‘media effects’ canon, but that within the context of a 
mainstream, commercial website like IMDb they actively situate themselves and 
their pleasure in relation to this discourse, albeit in various different ways.  
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that in this context individuals 
experience some degree of social or cultural pressure to interrogate their own 
motives and pleasures in watching these films, and to modify their behaviour in 
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face of such widespread suspicion about those who enjoy such films.  However, 
given the sheer volume of people who report feeling guilty, ashamed or dirty for 
enjoying these films, there is a clear suggestion that the normative standards 
produced by these discourses are being internalised by at least some viewers.  
These mainstream discourses then can be seen to be successful in not only 
constituting a model of ‘appropriate’ affective relations, but what this research 
suggests is that the scrutiny of the majority audience has the capacity to shape 
the way in which individuals understand themselves as subjects.  So while those 
who ‘enjoy’ such films may not simply accept their position as a ‘deviant other’, 
the language of pathology that surrounds certain kinds of pleasures in relation to 
these films can be seen to influence the kinds of spectatorial subjectivity that 
viewers adopt in relation to depictions of sexual and sexualised violence 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
  
My concern in this chapter has been to examine the construction and 
circulation of what Barker et al might term ‘figures of the audience’,693 and to 
explore how these figures might influence the regulation of contemporary 
cinema.  My contention throughout has been that these ‘figures’ pervade not 
only the ‘official’ discourses of ‘media effects’, regulatory debates and recent 
legislation, but that these ‘figures’ are also consistently constructed and referred 
to within the wider, popular discourses of cinema.  That is, in discussions of 
culturally problematic films both professional critics and members of the public 
can be seen to draw on their assumed knowledge of these ‘imagined’ spectators 
in order to justify their vilification of these films.  In this regard, I have sought to 
demonstrate that these ‘figures of the audience’ are not necessarily consistent 
with real viewers’ reception of and responses to certain kinds of media content, 
but rather they are subject positions that are consistently constructed through 
multiple discourses in order to justify both the statutory regulation of cinema, and 
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the informal social control that viewers themselves attempt to exert over one 
another. 
 I have sought to show that despite the fact that ‘media effects’ research 
has scarcely proven that violent media causes quantifiable effects within the 
social world, the behaviourist model upon which many of these studies rely has 
nevertheless exerted a profound influence on the cultural context in which film 
regulation takes place.  As we have seen, concern about the suitability of certain 
media forms has increasingly become less a question of the text’s intrinsic 
qualities of indecency and/or offensiveness, and has become more a question of 
the text’s assumed effect upon the spectator.  Such a shift may very well be 
positive in so far as it accepts the social and historical specificity of such 
judgements.  However, the assumed spectator of any given text, both within the 
context of UK legislation and regulation, and in the wider context of ‘harm’ 
proposed by the ‘media effects’ research, is not necessarily considered to be a 
rational and critically equipped adult, but may very well be constituted as either a 
‘vulnerable’ child, or a ‘deviant’ sexual predator.   
In the particular case of depictions of sexual or sexualised violence the 
‘media effects’ canon can be seen to produce a very specific model of the 
‘pathological’ spectator that has been taken up not only within official regulatory 
discourses, but also by both film critics and viewers.  As such this ‘figure of the 
audience’, this ‘imagined’ spectator, exerts a significant influence over both the 
statutory regulation of contemporary film, as well as the more everyday 
instances of attempted normative social control over the reception of these films.  
Questions of a text’s suitability therefore begin to circulate increasingly around 
this ‘imagined’ spectator and the problem of his (and it is emphatically his) 
potential arousal and/or enjoyment of images of sexual and sexualised violence, 
despite the fact that studies attempting to associate ‘sexual deviancy’ with 
increased arousal in response to viewing sexually violent acts have been shown 
to be significantly flawed.   
Throughout this chapter discussion of British national policy has been set 
within a wider Anglo-American context.  This has been done for three primary 
reasons. Firstly, the findings of predominantly US based ‘media effects’ research 
have exerted an enormous influence over the terms of public debate about film 
regulation within the UK, and as a result have become the foundation of recent 
UK policy and legislation.  Secondly, the dominance of American film at the UK 
box office, not to mention the global marketplace, has meant that the American 
film industry has occupied, and continues to occupy, a position of enormous 
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cultural power.  The American film industry has therefore not only defined 
dominant narrative, and perhaps even ideological, norms within UK cinema, but 
has had a privileged position in defining what counts as ‘mainstream’ and 
concomitantly, what kinds of themes and depictions will be pushed to the 
margins.  But perhaps most importantly, I have been concerned to explore how 
members of the public may or may not mobilise their own ‘figures of the 
audience’ when discussing the genre of ‘torture porn’.  I therefore chose to 
explore web-based discussions and reviews surrounding the film Wolf Creek. 
And here too American cultural production tends to predominate, setting a 
significant context within which web-based discussions take place.   
Web-based discussions were chosen for this study for a number of 
reasons, namely the ease with which the data could be stored and analysed and 
the ease of access to viewer’s comments, both in terms of the resources 
required, as well as the sheer volume of information that was readily available.  
As both David Gauntlett694 and Henry Jenkins have pointed out, the web offers 
“an incredibly rich resource for audience research.”695  Indeed, in terms of the 
wealth of user-generated material available, Jenkins suggests that one might 
compare this “embarrassment of riches with the forty-two letters that form the 
corpus of Ien Ang’s” seminal work on the viewers of Dallas.696  Moreover, 
individuals are choosing to spend more and more of their leisure time online,697 
and so the world wide web provides an increasingly significant context within 
which the reception of film is both shaped and communicated.   
 The focus of the research on the reception of films featuring sexual 
and/or sexualised violence was also a significant factor in the choice to access 
online discussions.  As Martin Barker and his colleagues found in their research 
into the audiences of sexual violence, drawing conclusions about viewers’ 
constructions of a ‘pathological other’ who may be aroused or titillated by such 
scenes was made more difficult by the fact that participants were being asked to 
reflect on the BBFC’s position with regard to these issues.698  In this respect, 
conducting unobtrusive research which made use of unsolicited material written 
by viewers allowed me to assess the extent to which these ‘figures’ were being 
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constituted and mobilised within viewer’s reviews and discussions without 
inadvertently provoking their formation through the research itself.  Further, as 
Barker et al also noted, many participants within their study felt a high degree of 
ambivalence in admitting to being aroused when watching this kind of film.699  
Unobtrusive research was therefore seen to have the added advantage of being 
able to capitalise on the relative anonymity of the web in order to capture 
moments of candour that individuals may or may not have wanted to express 
face to face.  As Nicolas Hookway suggests in relation to his own work on blogs, 
this anonymity  
enables bloggers to write more honestly and candidly, 
mitigating potential impression management...This…gives 
blogging a confessional quality, where a less polished and 
even uglier self can be verbalized. One can express one’s 
faults, one’s mishaps – whatever might be difficult to tell as we 
‘enter the presence of others’… in face-to-face relations.700 
While my concern in this chapter has actually been to demonstrate that online 
review sites are performatively structured in relation to a range of cultural 
norms701 about how one ought and ought not to respond to scenes of sexual 
violence, it was nevertheless felt that the ease with which users could create a 
profile and post to mainstream, commercial sites like IMDb allowed some 
individuals to respond in ways they may not have if their identity were known.  
For example, one user who reported feeling “ashamed and horrified” for having 
watched the film Chaos appeared to have created the account for the sole 
purpose of ‘confessing’ his/her horror, as no other activity is recorded for this 
user.702   
But whilst the choice to draw on reviews and comments posted on 
mainstream, commercial websites was taken in order to explore how ‘figures of 
the audience’ were being constructed and used by mainstream viewers, as 
opposed to how they might be constituted within specific fan-based subcultures, 
making use of this data was not without its problems.  In the first instance, the 
very limited amount of demographic information about age, gender and 
nationality, meant that certain forms of analysis were closed off, or would have 
relied on stereotyping on the part of the researcher.  For example the sheer 
volume of information about the use of coping strategies to ‘get through’ films of 
this kind, such as hiding behind cushions or watching only during daylight hours, 
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coupled with some limited self-disclosed personal information seemed to 
suggest a distinctly gendered dimension to the process of viewing.  But without 
consistent data, it was difficult to draw any solid conclusions. 
More troublesome was the issue of nationality.  It was my intention to 
show how a ‘pathological subject’ was constructed within both official regulatory 
discourses and the more popular discourses of professional film reviews and 
user-generated discussions.   At the outset of the study I identified the IMDb as 
a key resource, partly because of the wealth of information to be found there, 
and partly because of the site’s widespread reputation and use amongst 
filmgoers in the UK.  The IMDb was therefore seen as a key context in which 
reception was produced and discussed.  However, the predominantly American 
character of user reviews on the site may well have influenced my findings.  
However, it should be noted that of the twenty nine viewer comments that have 
been directly quoted in this chapter, eighteen were strongly suspected to be 
British, either by virtue of identifying themselves as such or by posting their 
comments on a specifically British commercial site, although in one instance, an 
IMDb user was assumed to be British because of his/her use of British 
language/spelling.  Of the remaining, all from IMDb, seven either identified as, or 
were strongly suspected to be American, leaving one Canadian contributor, and 
three who simply did not provide enough information.  Although there were 
profound differences in terms of individual responses to the film, the concerns 
expressed about the potentially deviant ‘other’, or the experience of guilt and 
shame did not seem to differ between the IMDb and specifically British sites.   
Similarly, among the twelve professional reviews and cultural 
commentaries used here, six were from the US and six were from the UK, and 
broadly speaking the concerns they expressed, whether about the treatment of 
women and its potential effect on the audience, or about the other critics’ vitriolic 
responses, did not seem to differ.  Indeed, both American and British audiences 
have been found to share in a common discursive base for these discussions, 
and to express shared cultural anxieties within this international forum.  
Nevertheless, while I have tried to present the regulation of film in the UK within 
an Anglo-American context simply because of the enormous influence the USA 
has had on the terms of UK debate over depictions of sexual violence, the 
decision to treat web-based reception practices as one that transcends national 
borders may well have led to a glossing of the nuances of the specifically 
national character of viewer’s readings and interpretations.  
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It is also important to note the specificity of web-based reception 
practices and the people who engage in them.  Clearly in drawing on unsolicited 
comments on web-based film review sites, data has been limited to those who 
are both willing and able to share their thoughts and opinions in this way.  
Although there is little in the way of demographic information for the particular 
users of the sites under discussion, on the strength of studies about web use 
more generally, it is unlikely that this self-selected group of users are 
representative of the population at large.  The decision to create a profile and 
share one’s thoughts on a high-profile public forum like the IMDb may also skew 
the sample, and so one must be careful not to over generalise on the strength of 
these reviews. 
 Moreover, as I have already suggested these online spaces are 
performatively structured according to the prevailing community norms.  As 
such, while individuals may produce themselves, and ‘others’, as particular kinds 
of viewing subjects, we must be careful about making assumptions about how 
this might translate into other contexts.  For example, reports of guilt and shame 
may tell us much about how an individual chooses to reflect on the experience 
of viewing within the very particular context of the user review section of IMDb or 
EasyCinema.com, but it tells us little about the actual moment in which a film is 
consumed and experienced, and nor does it discount the possibility that the 
same individual may present themselves and their responses in a very different 
way within another online forum.  This may be particularly true of horror film 
fans. 
 The mainstream, commercial sites chosen for this study, I would 
suggest, attract a large and diffuse ‘majority’ audience.  As such, I would argue 
that it is this group who set the terms of the discussion, and by extension it is 
their conception of the ‘pathological other’ that holds sway within these spaces.  
While Barker et al’s study demonstrated that fans of particular films might also 
mobilise certain models of the ‘other’ in the course of their discussions, their 
study also demonstrated these groups’ awareness that in many instances they 
are constructed as the ‘problem’ for mainstream audiences.  A fan’s self-
presentation within mainstream websites like the IMDb may be quite different to 
how he or she might choose to present his or her self within a closed forum 
specifically aimed at a ‘connoisseur’ or ‘cult’ audience.  In this respect, it remains 
to be seen whether those people who self-categorised as ‘sick’ or ‘twisted’ within 
this mainstream forum would continue to present themselves in this way in other 
contexts.  And similarly, further research needs to be done to discover whether 
  
 
 210 
the experience of guilt and shame continues within other, more specialised 
contexts.   
In spite of these limitations, what I hope to have demonstrated is that the 
legacy of US based ‘media effects’ research has led to a climate in which the 
‘imagined’ spectator has not only become a central term around which issues of 
UK legislation and film regulation circulate, but that within a wider Anglo-
American debate over controversial film, the regulation of cinema is undergoing 
a significant process of subjectification.  That is, within both public and 
institutional debate about the regulation of film, the figure of the deviant or 
vulnerable spectator becomes the locus around which questions of ‘appropriate’ 
depictions of sexual or sexualised violence revolve.  The ‘problem’ of cinema 
has thereby been focused on one or two specific ‘subject positions’’ constructed 
within the ‘media effects’ research.  As we have seen within UK regulation, the 
BBFC are required by law to take account of these ‘vulnerable’ and ‘deviant’ 
subjects in the process of making their classificatory and censorship decisions, 
even for films aimed at an adult audience.   
Within the wider Anglo-American public debate about the film Wolf 
Creek, although the film represented a significant cause for concern for a 
number of viewers, in neither the US nor the UK did these commentators call for 
the film to be cut or banned by an institutional authority.  Instead, efforts were 
directed towards the ‘problematisation’, ‘stigmatisation’, or even ‘pathologisation’ 
of those who may ‘enjoy’, ‘embrace’ or simply want to see the film.  This 
problematisation of the viewer extends from simple name calling, through to 
suggestions that those who choose to watch a film like this are in need of 
‘introspection’, and at the furthest extreme, professional help for their ‘sick 
minds’.  Moreover, this process of differentiation between the ‘normal’ and the 
‘deviant’ continues within mainstream Anglo-American web-based discussion, 
where it is used to categorise both audience behaviours and individual affective 
responses in face of the film.  Although there are clear struggles over how one 
ought to feel when watching a film like Wolf Creek, concern clearly circulates 
around whether potential viewers will respond ‘appropriately’ to the events that 
they witness on-screen.  From concerns that the viewer will not engage 
seriously with the film and will instead laugh at the perpetration of violence, 
through to the considerable fear that certain ‘sick-minded men’ will engage 
erotically with the film.  
This differentiation between the ‘normal’ and the ‘deviant’ viewer, as well 
as between ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ behaviours and affective responses in face of 
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the film, however, does not simply describe an objective set of criteria.  Rather 
this process of differentiation both within ‘media effects’ research and in popular 
debate is prescriptive insofar as it defines a normative standard that constitutes 
‘appropriate’ forms of spectatorship.  As such, reception of any individual film 
featuring graphic scenes of sexual violence takes place within a cultural climate 
that implores that the viewer not only behaves appropriately within the cinema, 
but as we have seen, there is significant evidence to suggest that viewers are 
also incited to internalise these debates and interrogate their own engagements 
and responses in relation to these normative standards.  Of course any 
individual viewer is free to refuse to take up this discursively produced subject 
position in relation to the film.  As I have already suggested, there is significant 
evidence to suggest that particular fan communities may well understand 
themselves and their relations to such films in very different terms to those 
circulated within the commercial mainstream, and so watching such a film within 
this context may well produce very different readings and responses. 
Nevertheless, these discourses taken together construct a highly 
normative definition of appropriate textual relations and responses, which 
appear to be internalised by at least some members of the audience.  As such, 
these discourses taken together can be seen to mobilises the language of 
pathology in an attempt to exert a degree of informal social control over the 
consumption of cinema in the contemporary age.  The process of 
subjectification, understood broadly as both the constitution and mobilisation of 
a pathological subject within discourse, and the incitement for individuals to 
produce themselves as ‘normal’ and/or ‘appropriate’ viewers, can therefore be 
seen to supplement the regulatory practices of bodies like the BBFC.  And as 
such, this process of subjectification represents a form of governmentality that 
seeks to persuade the viewer to regulate their own viewing practices, by either 
eschewing certain cultural forms, or by managing their own subjective 
responses to such films.  
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Horrific Subjects:  
 
The Morality of Looking in Michael Haneke’s  
Funny Games and Gaspar Noé’s Irréversible 
 
 
 
 
“When you show violence on screen it may be taken as cool, 
appealing, as something worth imitating. I always run the risk 
of being misinterpreted but I am not going to help viewers in 
their violent fantasies.”                                                     
      - Michael Haneke703 
 
 
"If I had shaken the camera around…I would have been in the 
rapist's head. Also, I would have felt like getting horny, which I 
didn't want. I'm part of the male club, I know what we are."                                                                                                                       
       - Gaspar Noé704 
 
 
At first glance, Michael Haneke’s Funny Games and Gaspar Noé’s 
Irréversible seem diametrically opposed.  On the one hand Haneke’s Funny 
Games presents a self-reflexive polemic against what Haneke sees as morally 
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bereft depictions of graphic violence within mainstream cinema and the 
unthinking spectators who take pleasure in consuming it.  While on the other 
hand Noé secured his status as the enfant terrible of French cinema with his 
explicit and brutal depiction of rape and violence in Irréversible.  But though 
these two directors take vastly different stances on whether one ought to be 
looking at explicit representations of violence, as the quotes above suggest, 
what they share is a somewhat pessimistic view of the spectator and their 
relationship to the spectacle of brutality.  As a result, and as I will seek to show 
in this chapter, both Haneke and Noé adopt similar devices to disrupt and 
problematise the ‘pleasures’ of viewing violence.  And while both these films can 
be seen to mobilise the cultural fears exemplified in the figure of the ‘passive’ 
spectator of apparatus theory and the potentially ‘deviant’ spectator of the 
‘media effects’ debates, what separates these two films are the directors’ 
strategies for overcoming these perceived spectatorial predispositions. 
What I want to suggest in this chapter then, is that both of these films 
have been produced within the context of debates about the effects of viewing 
media violence.  And in common with the preceding chapters of this thesis, I will 
seek to argue that both Funny Games and Irréversible, each in their different 
way, should be seen as both a refusal of institutional censorship as a means of 
regulating cinema and a vision of how the spectator might be appropriately 
‘disciplined’ in order to take up an appropriate relation with on-screen violence.   
Both filmmakers are of course, on record as being fundamentally 
opposed to statutory censorship.  Gaspar Noé in particular appears to regularly 
defy the BBFC to intervene in his brutally violent and shocking films.  In 2002 
Noé declared that he would rather withdraw Irréversible, a gut-wrenching 
depiction of rape and revenge, from circulation in the UK than allow the BBFC to 
cut the film.705  More tellingly, speaking to one British journalist about his film 
Seul Contre Tous,706 Noé suggested that he “would have liked to have had it 
banned, since it would have shown that he ‘had made something shocking’”.707  
Similarly, while Funny Games represents an unequivocal denunciation of screen 
violence, and a concerted attack on the American film industry for its role in 
making violence “consumable”,708 Haneke does not see his film as a call for 
increased statutory or even industry regulation.  As he puts it, “If you start 
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banning or cutting things…the market will just disappear under the counter. It 
won’t go away.”   Instead, he aims “to make people a little more aware of their 
role as consumers”.709   
As such, Funny Games, in its unequivocal and aggressive questioning of 
the spectator’s relationship to the onscreen torture and violence can be seen to 
explicitly contribute to the increasing subjectification of film regulation, wherein it 
is the consumer of ‘extreme’ images who is increasingly monitored, policed and 
disciplined, rather than the ‘extreme images’ themselves.  And despite being 
more elusive, and perhaps even contradictory in its construction of spectatorial 
relations, Noé’s film, no less than Haneke’s is concerned with both the possibility 
of ‘deviant’ responses, and the constitution of ‘appropriate’ relations with the 
screen.   In this respect, I will seek to demonstrate that what began in the 
disciplinary practices of the ‘media effects’ tradition, in their identification of 
certain categories of ‘pathological’ viewers and responses, has not only worked 
its way into the contemporary regulatory framework, and the wider popular 
discourses of cinema, but also into reflexive representations of film violence 
themselves.  Here the matter of regulation is less an issue of the censorship or 
control of the availability of images, and more a question of what the individual 
spectator ought to choose to view, as well as how s/he ought to respond to 
images of violence. 
 
 
 
Pathologising the Spectator in Funny Games 
 
 
There is no denying that Michael Haneke’s Funny Games is a tough film 
to watch.  Originally released in 1997, this brutal German language film presents 
the disturbing tale of a family taken hostage in their holiday home by two 
sociopathic young men, who proceed to torture them, both physically and 
psychologically, before killing them, unceremoniously, one by one.  Throughout 
the film the camera focuses relentlessly on the family’s pain and suffering, giving 
“back to violence”, as Haneke puts it, “that which it is: pain, a violation of 
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others.”710  As such, the film persistently underlines the horrific nature of the 
violence depicted, as well as launching a vehement attack on the screen 
violence that pervades contemporary film.  Funny Games was variously 
described by Haneke as a “’counterprogram’ to Stone’s Natural Born 
Killers711”712 and an “anti-Tarantino film”.713  Similarly, his shot for shot, English 
language remake of the film, is presented as a reaction to “all that torture-porn 
shit that is so prevalent in American cinema and American life.”714  But while 
Haneke, is outspoken in his views of the American film industry for its role in 
making violence “consumable”,715 the target of his critique within Funny Games 
is not the film industry per se, but the audience, whose narrative desires and 
willingness to consume such depictions underpin the presentation of graphic 
violence on our screens.  Funny Games therefore, refrains from a misguided 
pastiche of contemporary media and instead chooses to address the spectator 
directly, consistently challenging and chastising the audience for their voyeuristic 
complicity in scenes of degradation and torture.   
Beginning around twenty minutes into the film Haneke ‘breaks the fourth 
wall’ by having one of the murderous protagonists turn to the camera and wink 
directly at the spectator in the midst of a ghoulish game in which Anna Schober 
is sent to find the family dog, apparently beaten to death with a golf club.  Indeed 
there are a number of moments in which this same protagonist, most commonly 
referred to as Paul during the film, turns to the camera in order to question 
and/or accuse the viewer for their investment in scenes of torture and violence.  
As such Funny Games can be seen to employ this direct address in order to 
question the spectator about the nature of their relations to the family’s suffering, 
as well as their expectations and investments in scenes of violence.  For 
example, when Paul announces their intention to kill the family by the morning, 
he asks the spectator directly “Do you think they have a chance of winning?  
You are on their side aren’t you?”.  And when Georg begs for the family’s ordeal 
to stop, Paul asks the spectator “Is that enough?  But you want a real ending, 
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with plausible plot development, don’t you?”.  Similarly, the two young men 
justify their continuing persecution of the family on the grounds: “Don’t forget the 
entertainment value!”.  If they were to stop, “We’d all be deprived of our 
pleasure”, since “We’re not up to feature film length yet.”  And during one ‘funny 
game’, that Paul calls ‘The Loving Wife’, he takes the gag from Anna’s mouth 
whilst telling her “The dumb suffer in unspectacular fashion.  We want to offer 
the audience something and show them what we can do, right?” 
On the one hand then, these self-reflexive moments within the film, place 
responsibility for the continuing sadism and suffering of the family squarely on 
the shoulders of the film industry, and the demands of contemporary filmic 
conventions of ‘spectacle’, ‘plausible plot development’ and the need to fill the 
traditional 90min format.  In its use of the direct address and self-reflexive asides 
Funny Games can be seen to subvert, what in Haneke’s view is, a willfully 
sadistic and deeply manipulative form of filmmaking.  Moreover, as Catherine 
Wheatley puts it, they shatter the illusion of the spectator’s unmediated access 
to the fictional world.716  Narrative motivation, trajectory and resolution are all 
exposed in Funny Games as the arbitrary, and essentially meaningless and 
unnecessary grounds for the presentation of violence and suffering, for the 
pleasure of the viewing public. 
This desire to expose the codes and conventions that underpin the 
thriller genre as a whole, and ‘torture-porn’ specifically, reaches its apogee 
towards the end of the film when Anna grabs a gun and shoots her tormentor, 
Peter.  Paul however, responds by searching for the remote control and 
rewinding the scene, reflexively revealing the spurious nature of the film’s own 
narrative logic, and the senseless, unnecessary nature of the violence being 
depicted, a point underlined by Paul’s mocking fabrications when asked why he 
and Peter are doing this.  In Funny Games there is no motive and no logic over 
and above the relentless visitation of pain and suffering, and there will be no 
pleasure in the violent revenge and ultimate triumph of the victim, or the escape 
of the ‘final girl’, indeed, at the end of the film, Anna will be unceremoniously 
dumped in a lake to drown, without a struggle.   
The scene is obviously notable because it subsumes the narrative to the 
extra-textual representation of the media apparatus.  Less obvious though, is 
that this scene represents the only graphic depiction of violence within the film.  
It is clearly designed to provide the viewer with a brief moment of hope for the 
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family, and a pleasurable catharsis in seeing an end to both the family’s and 
one’s own suffering.  As Haneke might put it, “I make the audience fall into all 
kinds of traps, and then I show them that they've fallen into these traps.”717  The 
trap in this case being the desire to see this act of violence carried out, for their 
pleasure.  However, in thwarting Anna’s revenge, Haneke deliberately draws the 
spectator’s attention to their own complicity with and desire for this spectacle of 
violence within the film.  The film questions the spectator’s relation to the 
spectacle of suffering by asking the spectator directly whether ‘You are on their 
side aren’t you?’, but in the end it concludes that it is the desire to consume 
such images that is pathological, irrespective of who we choose to identify with.  
In this and other scenes the film deliberately highlights the spectator’s 
investment in the violence visited on an innocent family, they have paid their 
money to see a family tortured and killed and the director is grimly determined to 
fulfil that promise for the full length of a feature film.  
Haneke himself characterises his films as "polemical statements against 
the American 'taking-one-by-surprise-before-one-can-think' cinema”,718 or more 
accurately, a reaction against “the disempowerment of the spectator”719 that 
such cinema entails.  As he puts it, “with Hollywood films, the manipulation of 
the viewer is so total that they don't know they're being manipulated.”720  Haneke 
undoubtedly wants “the spectator to think”, and his intention within his films is “to 
rape” them “into autonomy and into independence.”721  Portrayals of violence are 
therefore shown to be the responsibility of both the Hollywood machine, and a 
product of consumer demand.  And what makes the film all the more torturous 
for the audience is precisely Haneke’s use of a direct, confrontational address, 
that interrogates the spectator about his/her desires and pleasures in face of 
such a film.  As Catherine Wheatley suggests, Haneke’s intention is to expose 
the codes and conventions of Hollywood cinema “as devices for manipulation”, 
at the same time as he confronts “spectators with their own participation in the 
scopic act”.722   
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More particularly Wheatley argues, that Haneke deliberately constructs 
an ‘unpleasureable experience’ for the spectator, which is  
redoubled as the spectator comes to the realisation that their 
initial unpleasure was the result of the frustration of certain 
desires – desires which, in fact, may be the reverse of 
admirable.  The spectator thus may enter into an experience of 
the unpleasureable emotions of guilt or shame, as they realise 
that they are watching something (or want to watch something) 
that they ought not to be watching (or wanting to watch).723 
During the scene in which the family’s young son Schorschi is shot dead for 
example, the camera refuses to witness the violence, focusing instead the 
dispassionate image of Paul making a sandwich in the kitchen, whilst we hear 
the violence play out in another room.  This scene then, illustrates what Tarja 
Laine describes as the central paradox of the film in which “the viewer occupies 
the same emotional level as the Schobers, while at the meta-narrative level s/he 
is invited to share the point of view of the psychopathic killers”; a paradoxical 
relation that is not only disturbing to watch but that “forces us to acknowledge 
our own position with respect to violence in the media.” 724  As Christopher 
Sharrett suggests, it is a key moment in which “we are forced into an awareness 
of our own impatience at not being able to see what we ought to wish won’t 
happen”.725  And by extension we, the spectators, are forced to interrogate our 
own pathological desire to watch the brutalisation and murder of an innocent 
young boy.   
Of course Sharrett’s analysis relies on the universalistic assumption that 
the viewer does actually feel impatient to watch the scene of death, during this 
scene, rather than relieved that s/he is being spared the ordeal.  But 
nevertheless, it is clear that Haneke is refuting the conventions of Hollywood 
action cinema precisely in his refusal to focus on the (violent) narrative action.  
But Haneke also makes a moral choice not to “use a fascist aesthetic to achieve 
an anti-fascist goal”, and run the risk of making “the violent image alluring”.726  
Indeed as the opening quote of this chapter suggested, in Haneke’s view “when 
you show violence on screen it may be taken as cool, appealing, as something 
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worth imitating.”727  And he fundamentally refuses “to help viewers in their violent 
fantasies.” 728   
When we do return to the scene of Schorschi’s murder, we are 
presented with a protracted shot of a blood splattered television as the killers 
prepare to leave, the literal depiction of the impact of violence on the screen.  
The camera then cuts to a ten minute take of the parents’ wordless grief seen in 
long shot.  Anna struggles to her feet to switch off the steady meaningless drone 
of motor racing, and slowly their shocked silence turns to ravaged howls for their 
lost son.  If any scene in the film exemplifies Haneke’s desire to give back the 
pain of violence it is this one. 
The blood soaked screen of the television quite obviously symbolises the 
central place Haneke accords TV in the dissemination of violent imagery.  But 
he is also concerned about its impact on the social fabric, particularly in its 
contribution to widespread alientation and “our collective loss of reality and 
social disorientation”,729 as we succumb to the everyday simulation of reality 
presented in the media.  As Haneke puts it, “Our experiential horizon is very 
limited. What we know of the world is little more than the mediated world, the 
image. We have no reality, but a derivative of reality, which is extremely 
dangerous”. 730  His fear about the particular impact of screen violence on the 
social world is hinted at in the final scene of the film, where Peter and Paul 
briefly discuss the difference between fiction and reality: “But the fiction is 
real…You see it in the film...So it’s as real as the reality you see.”   
In this context, the glamourisation of violence, or the failure to show the 
consequences of violent action within fiction begins to seem very ominous 
indeed.  Fiction, for Haneke, is not bracketed off by the viewer as ‘unreal’ but is 
absorbed as a prosthetic memory: “implanted memories”,731 “the experience of 
which we have never lived”732 but nevertheless threaten to disrupt our 
“subjective autonomy”,733 as they “become experiences that film consumers both 
possess and feel possessed by.”734  As Landsberg suggests, this concern with 
“the experiential nature of the spectator’s engagement with the image”,735 has a 
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long history of being associated with a concern over ‘media effects’, and the 
particular capacity of media to act as a site of social conditioning.   
However, Landsberg argues, that the Baudrillardian assertion that 
contemporary media has brought about a fundamental collapse between the 
real and the simulacrum, between the real and the hyperreal, and the 
consequent disappearance of any authentically real experience, rests on the 
weary assumption that there ever was an ‘authentic’, ‘unmediated’ reality to 
begin with.  Rather she asserts, “the real has always been mediated through 
information cultures and through narrative.”736  More relevant to our discussion 
here though, is to point out Haneke’s explicit and implicit construction of the 
spectator as passive, uncritical, intensely vulnerable to suggestion, and 
potentially dangerous, insofar as they might adopt the callousness of fictional 
violence as their own, and/or be persuaded to both enjoy and enact their violent 
fantasies.  Haneke’s aim within Funny Games then, is not only to attempt to 
force the spectator out of an unthinking passivity and confront his/her own 
(reprehensible) desire for violence, but as Catherine Wheatley suggests, it 
invites “the spectator to engage morally with the film.”737 
Haneke’s use of the long take, for example, is a reaction against the 
intensely mediated experience of television.  It is a refusal to manipulate the 
viewer through montage.  Instead offering up “time to understand what one 
sees…Not just understand on an intellectual level, but emotionally”,738 and in the 
process to “shift responsibility back to the viewer”739 to contemplate what they 
are seeing on the screen.  As Rhodes puts it, the long take forces “spectators to 
assume a more active role in interpreting the representation of reality before 
them.  No longer are spectators guided by the close up, the edit, the montage 
sequence; instead they are [in Andre Bazin’s terms] ‘forced to discern’”.740  
Moreover, as Wheatley suggests, Funny Games is a film which deliberately 
attempts to provoke the experience of guilt and shame, prompting the spectator 
into a “moral thought space”741 as they seek out the source of their complicity 
with the cinematic medium. 
 Indeed Wheatley asserts that: 
Mainstream cinema usually frees us of this sense of guilt by 
providing us with the rational oblivion that undermines any 
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ability to feel guilt.  Haneke’s films, however, restore us to this 
state of guilt, bringing us back to an awareness of our moral 
values, and so forcing us to engage morally with the film in the 
same way that we engage with society.  The director and his 
film thus act as a force of social conscience for the cinematic 
spectacle.742 
However, I refute the implication that our sense of guilt and shame ‘naturally’ 
pre-exist the act of viewing, disavowed in our encounter with the Hollywood 
apparatus and simply restored to us within Haneke’s cinema, the question of 
whether a fiction film should be dealt with “in the same way that we engage with 
society” notwithstanding.  Such a view obscures the power relations between 
the filmmaker and the spectator, in his assumptions about what the spectator’s 
narrative desires actually are, and in his construction of how viewers ‘ought’ to 
engage with both images of violence and with society more generally.  Indeed 
Wheatley herself admits that “Haneke…might seek to preclude the ‘wrong’ 
responses” to his film, although she contends that this “does not equate to a 
desire to instil the ‘right’ response…the goal is moral reflection in and of itself”.743  
Either way, Haneke can clearly be seen to delimit and define ‘appropriate’ 
viewing relations with his film, and by extension, to images of screen violence 
more generally.   
 There is no doubt that Funny Games was intended by Haneke as “a slap 
in the face and a provocation”744 that attempts to force the audience to take 
personal responsibility for the consumption of graphic portrayals of violence and 
to question their own motives for doing so.  And as such, Funny Games can 
therefore be seen not only to assume that the spectator’s relations to screen 
violence are pathological, but it also deliberately inserts itself into contemporary 
media effects debates as a disciplinary practice that seeks to educate and 
reform the spectator into more ‘appropriate’ relations with the screen.  Haneke’s 
critical intervention in the issue of screen violence therefore, is not a question of 
censorship.  Rather, in directly confronting its viewers and forcing them to 
question their relationship to the horrific events being depicted within the film, as 
well as raising viewers’ awareness of their role in perpetuating the production of 
‘extreme’ violence more generally, Funny Games is a film that actively attempts 
to bring about the ‘subjectification’ of film regulation.  
 That is, Funny Games, represents a key cinematic text in which the 
‘problem’ of screen violence is solved not through the banning of the film or the 
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cutting of scenes that transgress our cultural boundaries of what is acceptable, 
but by transforming the problem of the regulation of screen violence into a 
technology of the self.745  Indeed as S.F. Said put it in The Telegraph, Funny 
Games is a film that “works on more than one level. There is the story, but then 
there is the level of our own reactions, of which we become increasingly aware. 
This is a director who wants not just to entertain you, but to expand your self-
knowledge.”746  To put it another way, Haneke’s film proposes that if we wish to 
stem the flow of the production of ‘extreme’ violence within film, the answer is 
not the regulation and control of images and/or texts, rather it is a matter of 
exerting power over the individual spectator and persuading him or her to 
regulate their viewing habits on ethical grounds.  Indeed as Wheatley herself 
suggests the question of morality within the film, is not so much a question of 
whether such portrayals of violence ought to be produced and circulated, but 
rather, “In Funny Games the moral problem centres on the spectator’s 
realisation of themselves as a scopophilic subject.”747   
However, “as Foucault has pointed out, there is no way of living as an 
ethical subject except through certain modes of subjectification, involving 
monitoring, testing and improving of the self”.748  Funny Games is a film that 
proposes not only a set of moral codes which, to paraphrase Nikolas Rose, is 
identifiable in the language it uses, the ethical territory it maps out, the attributes 
of the person that it identifies as being of ethical significance, the ways of 
evaluating them it proposes, the pitfalls to avoid and the goals to pursue,749 but it 
also provides a set of ‘techniques of the self’.  That is, “models proposed for 
setting up and developing relationships with the self, for self-reflection, self-
knowledge, self-examination, for the deciphering of the self by oneself, for the 
transformation one seeks to accomplish with oneself as object.”750  As such, 
Funny Games represents more than a simple polemic against screen violence, it 
is more properly to be considered part of a wider cultural discourse over how 
violent films ought to be governed in the absence of state intervention.  A 
discourse in which the question of regulation is a question of what the individual 
spectator ought to choose to view, as well as how he or she ought to respond to 
‘extreme’ imagery.  To borrow from Nikolas Rose once more, in face of 
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increasing liberalisation Michael Haneke’s Funny Games can fruitfully be seen 
to engage with the pervasive cultural problem of “how free individuals can be 
governed such that they enact their freedom appropriately.”751  
 
 
 
The morality of looking 
 
 
Within Funny Games Haneke not only attempts to problematise the 
pleasure the spectator derives from watching screen violence, but actively 
attempts to bring about a situation which Sobchack argues is common in our 
cultural attitude towards non-fictional representations of unsimulated death, 
where “the very act of looking at the film is ethically charged, and this act is itself 
an object of ethical judgement.”752  Haneke, therefore not only refuses to show 
scenes of violence on ethical grounds, but in the one instance where violence is 
directly represented on-screen, Haneke forces the spectator into a position of 
ethical responsibility for both the act of viewing, and the narrative desire that 
underpinned its appearance. 
 Sobchack argues that within our culture, although fiction film must meet 
some minimum ethical requirements in order to for its visions of death to be 
deemed acceptable, this kind of ethical problematisation refers only to the non-
fiction film.  Indeed, in her view “fiction films inspect death in detail, with the 
casual observation of realism, with undisguised prurient interest, or with formal 
reverence…Indeed…death in our fiction films has become a commonplace – 
rather than taboo – visual event.”753  Moreover, “the emotions we feel”, “the 
values we risk” and the “ethical significance” we attach to the act of looking, 
differs “in kind as well as degree from the way we respond to death in the 
documentary.”754  While Sobchack is undoubtedly correct about the generic, not 
to mention social and historical, specificity of the ethics of looking, what 
Sobchack reminds us of is that cinema and film are already bound up in moral 
discourse.  And acts of looking, both by the filmmaker and by the spectator are 
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already subject to moral scrutiny.  Haneke’s intervention then is less an attempt 
to subject spectatorial relations to ethical examination, but an effort to extend 
and intensify pre-existing structures of ethical problematisation to 
representations of screen violence.  That is not to say that these representations 
are not already subject to moral discourse, but rather, in Haneke’s view the 
current system of ethical regulation is clearly insufficient.   
Indeed, the moral problem presented by representations of violence, or 
more particularly sexual violence, can be clearly demonstrated with Gaspar 
Noé’s Irréversible.  In a tale, told backwards, about the brutal rape and beating 
of a young woman after a party, and the misdirected revenge taken by her 
current lover and her ex-boyfriend, Noé, unlike Haneke, chooses to present 
extremely graphic and brutal representations of violence and rape.  Subsequent 
discussions about the film in the press frequently revolved around the issue of 
its morality.  Stuart Jeffries of The Guardian for example, explicitly asked the 
central protagonist of Irréversible, Vincent Cassel, “what is the moral justification 
for such a film?” 755   While Gaspar Noé himself was challenged at the Edinburgh 
Film Festival, and is reported to have replied: “Rape happens in life. Why can't it 
be shown on screen so people can have a clearer vision of it? On a moral level, 
you can't object.”756  In both these cases those responsible for the production of 
the film are being made to account for the morality of their decision to represent 
such extreme violence on-screen.  And for Noé at least, the decision to show 
such an extreme act of violence is justified on the basis of its relation to real acts 
of violence that occur every day.   
Similarly, the question of the morality of such a portrayal is at the heart of 
David Edelstein’s review, where he suggests that: 
It could be argued that this is the only moral way to present 
violence, so that it hurts…But there is nothing moral about 
Irréversible—only sneeringly superior and nihilistic…Noé's 
camera leers at Bellucci…He's on the verge of implying that 
such quivering ripeness can't be left unmolested…that by 
natural law it ought to be defiled.757 
Noé then is clearly being held morally accountable for his ‘act of looking’, but 
perhaps more importantly, the spectator’s ‘act of looking’, particularly at scenes 
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of rape, is also presented as problematic.  As we saw in the last chapter, 
suspicion surrounds those who are perceived to enjoy such imagery, with 
Angelique Chrisafis explicitly asking “why would any woman – or man – like a 
film like this?”758  While Jessica Winter commenting that she observed a number 
of people leave the cinema “after – not during – the already infamous 
desecration of Alex…having gotten what they paid for”,759 and likening their 
“furtive attraction” to this scene of violence as being like that of an adolescent 
with a half-formed conscience and incomplete sense of shame.760  
 However it is not just the look of the ‘other’ that is problematised within 
the press as Edelstein’s review makes abundantly clear:  
It's difficult to know what to do during those nine minutes in 
which Bellucci lies prone, moaning and weeping, while Prestia 
convincingly simulates a violent buggering. You can stare at 
her cleavage or at her long, extended leg. You can close your 
eyes and wait for the sounds to end. You can leave—although 
Noé would probably consider that a victory; he'd call you a 
bourgeois ‘pussy.’761 
Edelstein therefore exemplifies those who hold themselves “ethically responsible 
for his or her visible visual response”762 to graphic images of rape, struggling to 
find an appropriate way to respond to the images presented to him.  And 
similarly, Leslie Felperin suggests that: 
To not walk out is at the very least to collude with it…To watch 
it is to participate in its economy of pleasure and pain, to 
submit. You can't even question whether the rape scene 
'needs' to be shown - it's the whole point of the movie...And 
therein lies Irréversible's irresistible power…It forces us to 
assess our relationship to the on-screen action, and our status 
as viewers, through an unsettling display of violence, [and] 
voyeurism763 
Interestingly, both Felperin and Edelstein both comment on Noé’s allusions to 
Kubrick, and suggest that calling the rape victim Alex, serves to remind us of the 
protagonist of A Clockwork Orange,764 whose eyes were prised open as he was 
forced to watch all manner of atrocities in order to cure him of his desire for 
‘ultraviolence’.  And indeed, a reading of both the murder at the beginning of the 
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film, and the rape halfway through can easily be read, through their graphic and 
unrelenting manner of presentation, as a kind of aversion therapy. 
On the surface then, Noé’s approach to the representation of extreme 
violence may appear to be diametrically opposed to Haneke’s, in so far as he 
refuses to look away from the gruesome acts that he portrays, preferring instead 
to present unrelenting scenes of violence that push the viewer to the edge of 
their tolerance.  However, that is not to say that his film Irréversible condones or 
supports the glamourisation, or commercialisation of screen violence.  Indeed 
what I want to suggest is that Noé’s film, no less than Haneke’s, is a 
‘provocation’ and ‘a slap in the face’ that attempts to confront its audience and 
unsettle the complacent and unthinking consumption of graphic violence 
promoted by the Hollywood mainstream.   But where Haneke seeks to challenge 
the ubiquity of screen violence, posing the fundamental question of whether we, 
as viewers, ought to be consuming this kind of imagery as entertainment, 
Irréversible is a film that presenting depictions of violence in the form of a visual 
assault, as Felperin suggests, opening up a space for self-reflection, prompting 
the viewer to interrogate their own relations and responses to such imagery and 
to develop an ethical self-understanding of their consumption of such images.  
 
 
 
Aversive relations 
 
 
While the graphic portrayals of violence within Irréversible might easily 
be read as appealing to a macabre and prurient interest, when placed within the 
context of the film as a whole, it becomes clear that these scenes are designed 
to provoke maximum revulsion within the spectator.  Indeed, like Funny Games, 
Irréversible employs a number of techniques to disrupt the pleasurable 
consumption of violence, and promote an ‘appropriate’ or ‘ethical’ relationship to 
the violent spectacle.  The film begins for example with wildly spinning camera 
work, that is accompanied by a soundtrack that contains a 27-hertz tone, 
purportedly used to disperse riots765 by inducing nausea766 in the listener, as the 
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spectator is lead through a half glimpsed vision of a subterranean S&M club, 
before we see a confrontation and a brief scuffle before one of the protagonist’s 
arms is deliberately broken, and the perpetrator is punished by being beaten to 
death with a fire extinguisher.  Within the scene, the camera work effectively 
disorients the spectator preventing any real connection to the images or events 
on-screen until the moment of graphic violence itself.  The result I would argue is 
one of shock rather than excitement, titillation or pleasure, and the attempt to 
underscore this scene with a nausea-inducing sound effect, clearly signals the 
director’s intention that this scene should be profoundly visceral and unpleasant.   
This spectatorial position is reinforced by the narrative structure of the 
film, which presents a familiar rape/revenge plot backwards.  The spectator has 
no connection with the characters whatsoever, and so any pleasure s/he might 
have gained in seeing justice served for the horrific and brutal attack on Alex is 
effectively thwarted.  In confronting us with this image at the beginning of the 
film it denies the spectator both any knowledge of why this attack is being 
carried out and of any emotional connection to the characters within the scene.  
Indeed it is only after we witness the Alex’s rape in the subway that the 
spectator is permitted any form of empathetic relationship with the protagonists 
of the film.  The spectator in this scene is therefore effectively alienated from the 
events taking place, and further, even if we as spectators attempt to regain a 
small source of cathartic pleasure in seeing justice served by reconstructing the 
plot imaginatively, we discover that this revenge attack has been perpetrated on 
the wrong person, while the rapist stands casually by.   
During the rape scene itself, Noé also attempts to create a highly visceral 
response in the viewer, particularly through his use of the long take.  As Noé 
puts it, “if you see…other movies dealing with rape or crime or killing, it's like the 
information goes through the screen - 'this guy has been killed; this woman has 
been raped' - but you don't have the emotional sensation of having seen 
anything”, and then “There are movies when rape is long and then it becomes 
as painful as it could be on the screen”.767  And this sense of deliberately making 
the encounter as painful for the spectator as possible is reinforced by the 
camerawork within the scene, where a totally static camera stands in stark 
contrast to the wild and disorienting movement that has marked the camera 
work up until this point.  With the camera fixed to the floor, the spectator is 
instead invited to take up the victim’s perspective, and focus, relentlessly, on her 
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pain and suffering throughout the nine minute ordeal.  In this respect Noé like 
Haneke, adopts the long, static take as a way of giving back the pain and 
suffering of violence.    
Indeed, as Haneke himself suggests, the long take is a device that shifts 
responsibility back to the viewer.768  It creates a space for the spectator’s own 
critical reflection.  And as Felperin argues, the spectator is ‘forced to discern’ 
what their own relationship and responses to the events being depicted actually 
are.  In this sense, Noé may not use a direct address to question the viewer, as 
Haneke does, but by confronting the spectator with such an arduous and 
protracted scene of violence, he effectively opens up a space for critical self-
reflection.   
Moreover, this impetus for the spectator to question his or her 
relationship to the rape is reinforced by the appearance of a man in the early 
stages of the attack, who clearly witnesses what is happening, but rather than 
intervene, walks off.  His inaction not only draws attention to the spectator’s 
powerlessness to intervene and stop the rape from happening, but also prompts 
the spectator to assess their relations to the sexual violence on-screen.  The 
unknown witness in the subway is disturbing for the spectator, partly because of 
his refusal to intervene and stop the rape from happening, thereby saving both 
Alex and the spectator from the ordeal.  But perhaps too, this man can be seen 
as the literal representation of Sartre’s ‘footsteps in the hallway’, who catches 
the spectator in the act of looking, provoking a sense of shame for their 
voyeuristic complicity before the rape itself has even begun.   
For Catherine Wheatley, the failure of Irréversible is precisely in the 
spectator’s experience of powerlessness within the scene.  So where she sees 
Haneke as promoting the spectator’s active engagement with the text, Noé’s film 
simply “positions the spectator as feminized, passive…a subject who can act 
only to consent or refuse to consent (epitomized in the case of film by Haneke’s 
‘ideal’ spectator who leaves the cinema in disgust) is, in fact denied subjectivity 
completely.”769  However, as Matt Hills argues in his book The Pleasures of 
Horror, debates over the activity or passivity of the spectator, often tell us less 
about spectatorial relations than present moralising depictions of the audience, 
which then become “part of the discursive production of audiences as objects 
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calling for, or refuting, mechanisms of governmental and social control.”770  
Instead he suggests we must turn our attention to the question of how 
audiences are discursively constructed, and how audiencehood is performed.  
 But while an in-depth study of how audiencehood is performed is beyond 
the scope of this chapter, not to mention the fact that Barker et al have already 
conducted a thorough investigation into the reception of sexual violence in 
Irréversible,771an analysis of the way in which Noé himself constructs the 
audience is aposite here. 
 
 
 
The problem of arousal 
 
 
Within the popular press, the question of arousal was central to many 
evaluations of the morality of the film.  And the question of Noé’s own arousal 
was a matter of some speculation.  Richard Horgan of the online review site 
FilmStew.com, for example, claimed that Gaspar Noé unequivocally stated that 
he had actually become aroused during shooting of the rape scene.772  While 
Noé himself declared that “If I had shaken the camera around…I would have 
been in the rapist's head.  Also, I would have felt like getting horny, which I didn't 
want.  I'm part of the male club, I know what we are.”773  This admission of the 
possibility of his own arousal while shooting the scene was of course, still 
enough to garner shock among reviewers.774  Although in Noé’s defence, in 
other interviews his choice of words has been less provocative, and his 
admission that he “would have felt ashamed of shaking the camera above her”, 
because “That would be like sharing the rapist's point of view”,775 seems to 
present a clearer indication of his sense of ethical responsibility in shooting the 
scene.  Indeed, Noé is known to have actively criticised the scene of rape in 
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Straw Dogs776 for allowing the audience “the thinking space to believe that she 
might just be enacting a distant fantasy and enjoying herself.”777 
Nevertheless, in this admission there is also a hint of Noé’s own attitude 
towards the spectator; that the portrayal of cinematic rape, and violence holds 
the ever-present possibility of arousal for the audience.  And the traces of this 
kind of spectatorial relation remain within the film.  In the first scene of violence 
for example, in the gay S/M club, the scene is witnessed by a number of mostly 
seated spectators.  A film is being projected against one wall, suggesting that 
this is an audience assembled to watch S/M pornography.  As Marcus has his 
arm violently broken and is threatened with rape, the assembled crowd yell and 
jeer, with one man clearly shown excitedly masturbating to the spectacle.  When 
the assailant is repeatedly hit in the head with a fire extinguisher, the crowd are 
mostly stunned into a mute passivity, with only one or two delighted claps, and 
shouts of ‘awesome!’ coming from the off-screen space. 
The setting of the scene in a gay club has drawn criticism about his 
portrayal of the gay community, to which I might add my own criticism over the 
depiction of the S/M community, which is here portrayed as those who enjoy 
both perpetrating and viewing violence, rather than those who engage in 
consensual acts.  Noé however defends himself against accusations of 
homophobia by pointing to the fact that he makes a cameo appearance in the 
club.  Moreover, he claims that “The point of shooting in the gay club was that I 
wanted a space that was entirely male…It wasn't about gay sexuality, it was 
about male sexuality.”778  And this, I think, is key to Noé’s vision of the spectator.  
That is, male sexuality is at its root pathological, bound up in aggression and 
violence, and that scenes of violence and rape may well be consumed by the 
male spectator as both thrilling and arousing. 
In this context, the rape scene can be seen to play on the potential for 
arousal.  As Alex, makes her way down into the subway for example, the 
camera follows closely at her back, gazing lovingly at her bare shoulders and 
her body sheathed in “the sexiest dress we could find for her”, in nude silk, 
“designed right on her breast”.779  There is no doubt that Alex is presented to the 
viewer as an erotic object, leading Felperin to suggest that “the scene is all 
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about provocation”, making her feel “queasy” because of its “seductive 
ambiguity”.  Indeed, Felperin bravely criticises the film for 
coaxing out of me, as a female viewer, a certain sado-
masochistic engagement.  From Kinsey onwards, surveys on 
female sexuality (admittedly many of them scientifically 
questionable) have found well over half the female population 
have fantasised at one point about being dominated, or even 
raped, and the film plays with and engages these fantasies. 780 
Indeed, as Alex puts it as the three central characters make their way to the 
fateful party, “Sometimes a woman’s pleasure is the pleasure that the man 
feels…” 
Irréversible undoubtedly flirts with the possibility of arousal when 
watching the scene, but the visitation of pain and suffering is too protracted, too 
relentless in my view, for all but the most determined to extract an erotic thrill 
from the scene.  And indeed, as I have already suggested, the lingering shots of 
Alex as she enters the subway are clearly punctuated by the appearance of the 
unwilling witness to the scene, whose refuse to get involved and stop the rape 
from occurring prompts reflection on how one ought to act if one were to witness 
such an event.  Which in turn, as I have previously argued, prompts the 
spectator to evaluate their own relation to the scene.  The spectator then can be 
seen to be deliberately provoked into an eroticised relation with the image of 
Alex, which is then cut short by an incitement to moral reflection. 
 
 
 
Trauma 
 
 
 The film can therefore be seen to deliberately provoke unpleasure, as 
Wheatley would phrase it.  Moreover, the film can clearly be seen to position the 
spectator in an ‘ethical’ relation to the scenes of violence.  It disrupts the 
spectator’s cathartic pleasure by refusing any kind of empathetic relation to the 
scene of revenge.  It thwarts the act of revenge itself.  It employs cinematic 
techniques designed to provoke nausea and physical discomfort.  It uses the 
long take in order to put the pain and suffering back into scenes of violence.  
And it prompts the viewer to reflect on their relationship to the central rape 
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scene.  In this respect, Noé’s film clear resembles Haneke’s insofar as it seeks 
to regulate the viewer’s relation to scenes of violence. The key difference 
between the filmmakers then, remains in their decision about whether or not the 
portrayal of graphic violence is justifiable. 
 For critics like Felperin and Edelstein, the argument that “the only moral 
way to present violence, so that it hurts”,781 is ultimately flawed, not least 
because the assumption that a “coolly discreet mise en scène automatically 
annuls identification with the rapist”, is at best “wishful thinking” and somewhat 
“less than emotionally honest”.782  However, while it is true that the spectator’s 
identification can never be guaranteed, the final part of the film gives us a clear 
indication of the assumptions Noé makes about the spectator’s relations with the 
scenes of violence. 
 As I have already suggested, the first scenes of the film, give an 
extremely nihilistic view of the violent and destructive nature of masculine 
sexuality.  And it is worth noting at this juncture that this vision gives way by the 
end of the film to a valorisation of the sublime, life-giving potential of femininity.  
For Vincent Cassel, this depiction leads him to declare the film a “pro-female 
movie”.783  But while it may romanticise the vision of woman-as-mother, it can by 
no means be considered a feminist film.  The essentialist vision of gender it 
presents is objectionable enough, even before we note that Alex is permitted 
only two moments of agency within the film.  One is to take a pregnancy test, 
which works only to secure her status as an idealised vision of femininity and to 
exacerbate the pathos of the ending.  The other is her decision to leave the 
party without an escort, an act for which she is brutally punished.   
 Nevertheless, in the scenes in the latter part of the film, as the three 
make their way to the party, as Alex and Marcus awake in bed together, and in 
Alex’s discovery of her pregnancy, there are frequent ‘echoes’ of Alex’s rape.  
Alex’s comment that “a woman’s pleasure is the pleasure that the man feels” for 
example, is, in view of the spectator’s knowledge of what is about to occur, 
exposed as hopelessly naïve and an ultimately dangerous myth about women’s 
complicity in their sexual domination.  Similarly, in the bedroom scene, when 
Marcus’s hand covers Alex’s mouth, when he pins her to the bed, spits in her 
face and announces “I wanna fuck your ass”, the spectator is persistently 
reminded about what is about to happen.   
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 On one level it might appear that Marcus’s behaviour is simply a watered 
down reflection of the rapist’s.  Or to put it another way, the rapist represents a 
vision of masculine sexuality taken to its logical extreme, Marcus’s expression of 
his desire therefore simply underlines the notions that all men, to a greater or 
lesser degree are brutal and violent animals.  A point that is only confirmed by 
our knowledge that it is Pierre, the sensitive, reserved intellectual who will 
eventually beat a man to death.  However, on another level, we might note the 
sense of loss and destruction that pervade these intimate scenes between Alex 
and Marcus.  So while some critics have suggested that these are simply tender 
moments made ugly by their allusions to the central rape,784 I would contend, 
that this sense of ease and freedom that Marcus and Alex have with one 
another, and indeed Alex’s relation to her own sexuality, are shown to have 
been violently destroyed and can never be reclaimed.  Indeed, given the 
sequencing of the scenes, one might argue that we are invited to view these 
scenes as memories of a lost past, a past shattered by violence and the desire 
for revenge. 
 However, this sense of loss and destruction hinges on the spectator’s 
experience of Nachträglichkeit, a Freudian notion directly translated as an 
experience of ‘afterwardness’, which is used by Freud to account for the way in 
which traumatic moments are relived after the event.  As Jean LaPlanche 
explains: 
Trauma, never comes simply from outside…even in the first      
moment it must be internalized, and then afterwards relived,      
revivified…trauma consists of two moments…First, there is the 
implantation of something coming from outside. And this 
experience, or the memory of it, must be reinvested in a 
second moment, and then it becomes traumatic.785 
The spectator’s discomfort during the scene where Alex discusses her sexuality 
on the subway, the ‘ugliness’ the spectator sees in the scene between Alex and 
Marcus in the bedroom, and the pathos of Alex’s discovery that she is pregnant, 
all hinge on the spectator’s internalisation of a traumatic experience.  And Noé 
attempts to reactivate this experience of trauma again and again during the 
latter part of the film.  Despite Noé’s ostensibly nihilistic view of the male 
spectator, the success of these scenes hinges on the spectator having 
experienced the scene as a personally traumatic event, rather than an arousing 
sexual display. 
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  In this respect, Irréversible might be considered as part of the genre that 
Janet Walker refers to as ‘trauma cinema’, which “like traumatic 
memories…feature vivid bodily and visual sensation over 'verbal narrative and 
context'”.786  Like the opening scene of Saving Private Ryan,787 these films make 
use of devices like fragmented editing and disorienting camera angles in order 
to “create in viewers a sense of disorientation and moral ambiguity designed to 
echo the experience of…trauma.”788  This use of filmic strategies designed to 
promote disorientation, not to mention physical nausea, is clearly depicted in the 
early scenes within the nightclub.  Indeed, if we re-read the film through this lens 
we can clearly see how the film itself represents Marcus and Pierre’s experience 
of trauma. 
As Maureen Turim points out, “ironically one of the effects of trauma is to 
distance the self not only from one's memory, but also from the experience of 
others, and from any collective formation.”789  The sense of absolute alienation 
from both the events and the characters appearing onscreen at the beginning of 
the film can therefore be seen as a representation of the protagonists’ 
experience of utter bewilderment brought about by their experience of trauma.  
Indeed the structure of the film as a whole might meaningfully be perceived as 
the Pierre and Marcus’ gradual reclamation of both their memories of the night, 
and a return of their empathetic relations with others. 
 Moreover, within this context, the point at which Pierre is seen to brutally 
murder another man, despite his characterisation as distanced, cerebral, and 
lacking passion, can be seen as a filmic representation of Nachträglichkeit.  That 
is, the confrontation between Marcus and this man, whom they believe to be the 
rapist, holds echoes of Alex’s assault.  The man pins Marcus to the floor, breaks 
his arm and threatens to rape him.  Pierre responds by repeatedly smashing not 
just his head, but his face, an act reminiscent, though vastly exaggerated, of the 
rapist’s beating of Alex’s face against the floor of the subway after her ordeal.  
However, what I want to suggest here is that Irréversible is a film that 
does more than simply represent another’s trauma, rather it attempts to create 
an experience of ‘prosthetic trauma’ within the viewer.  And this I think is the key 
difference between the visions of Haneke and Noé with regard to their 
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disciplining of the spectator in order to bring about ‘appropriate’ relations with 
the screen, and to the real world more generally.  Haneke sees the ‘prosthetic 
memories’ produced as a result of watching graphic depictions of violence as 
being inherently dangerous, potentially leading what he characterises as a 
vulnerable, uncritical viewer into a callous relation with real life violence.  Noé, 
by contrast, uses not only graphic, but highly aversive portrayals of screen 
violence in order produce ‘prosthetic memories’, which are capable of 
expressing not only the horror of violence itself, but its potential to destroy lives. 
As Alison Landsberg might put it, Noé attempts to create “a bodily 
memory for those who have not lived through it”, experienced in such a visceral 
way that it becomes “part of one’s personal archive of experience, informing not 
only one’s subjectivity, but one’s relationship to the present and future”.790  
Landsberg, despite the dangers inherent in the mass media’s systems of 
representation, nevertheless sees cinema and mass media more generally as 
having an enormous potential to become a site of transfer, in which people 
might gain access to a range of “sensually immersed knowledges, knowledges 
which would be difficult to acquire by purely cognitive means.”791  Moreover, as 
the first act of violence within the film demonstrates, the creation of these 
prosthetic memories does not depend on an identification with either the 
perpetrator or the victim per se.  Its success cannot be judged by whether we, 
as spectators, are positioned as either active or passive.  Rather, it is the 
intensity and quality of the spectator’s experience that becomes a matter of 
research and debate. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
What I hope to have shown in this chapter is what links these films is 
more than the fact that they seek to produce an ‘ethical’ cinematic subject with 
culturally ‘appropriate’ responses to screen violence.  In spite of their differences 
in terms of how they each choose to represent issues of violence on the screen, 
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both of these films can be seen to reflect on the horror of violence.  Each 
attempts to force the viewer to question the narrative conventions and textual 
pleasures that surround violent imagery in cinema, and each expresses a 
fundamental revulsion and horror with regard to acts of violence.  And by 
employing alternative strategies to both disrupt the narrative flow and challenge 
contemporary codes and conventions that underpin contemporary 
representations of violence, each offers an alternative vision of how the 
spectator might be forced out of a position of unthinking and complacent 
consumption of violence to a position of self-awareness, and critical 
engagement. 
And while each ostensibly shares a somewhat pessimistic view of the 
potential spectator, constructions which mobilise many of our cultural fears 
about the uncritical passivity, and potential deviancy of those viewing violence, 
the key difference between these two filmmakers is in the strategies they use in 
order to prompt the spectator to engage in moments of self-reflection and to 
produce ‘appropriate’ relations with on screen violence.  So while Haneke 
explicitly moralises, refusing to condone the act of looking by presenting images 
of violence, and directly confronting the spectator with his or her assumed 
uncritical consumption of violence, Noé sees the act of looking as a way of 
reinforcing the horror of violence, a way of provoking an experience of 
‘prosthetic trauma’ within the spectator that has the capacity to reorient their 
relations to violence, both real and fictional.   
Haneke can be seen to pursue a Brechtian strategy that seeks to 
challenge the spectator’s passive and uncritical consumption of screen violence 
by forcefully reminding the viewer of their assumed investments in the text.  As 
such, Haneke persistently indicts his audience for viewing the film.  Indeed, 
when speaking about the moral lesson the film attempts to impart, Haneke 
suggested that “anyone who leaves the cinema doesn't need the film, and 
anyone who stays does!”792  For many critics it was this contempt for the very 
people who had gone to watch his film that was the undoing of Funny Games.  
As Mark Kermode put it:  
It is this contempt… which makes Funny Games such an 
unappealing proposition. Being scared can be fun. So can 
being repulsed - up to a point. But being stiffly lectured on why 
you are such a bad person for wanting to watch any of this 
stuff in the first place gets a bit wearing. After all, who wants to 
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pay to see a film whose creator apparently hates them for 
paying to see his film?793 
Or as Anthony Lane summed it up in his review, when Haneke chooses to break 
the fourth wall and query the nature of the viewer’s engagement with the scene 
of violence before them “we don’t feel nearly as chastened or ashamed as 
Haneke would like.  We feel patronised.”794    
Haneke can therefore be seen to make use of what Sobchack terms the 
intersubjective quality of film in order to make the choice to view screen violence 
an issue of moral conduct, and more specifically to make the viewer ethically 
responsible for his/her own act of looking.  That is, in recognising the film as an 
intentional ‘subject’ within the world, the viewer appreciates the reciprocal nature 
of this awareness, and accepts that s/he is also a subject for others.  In the 
particular example of Funny Games, the viewer is not only aware of the way in 
which the film sees the world, but is forced into a recognition of how the film 
sees them.  However, what they find is far from flattering. 
Funny Games can be seen to position the spectator as a passive and 
morally bereft subject who needs to be prompted into a process of self-reflection 
and a more critical relationship with the film.  In this respect, Haneke constructs 
the film as an ethical encounter in which the spectator is invited or impelled to 
pass judgement on the issue of screen violence.  Crucially though, Haneke asks 
that this judgement is arrived at through an interrogation of oneself as a viewing 
subject.  As such, the film is part of a wider disciplinary discourse that sees the 
spectator as the primary target for control, and by addressing the spectator 
directly within the film, Haneke attempts to mobilise a process of subjectification.  
That is, Haneke attempts to regulate images of screen violence, not by calling 
for institutional or state sponsored censorship, but by inciting the spectator to 
engage in a process of introspection.  His hope is to draw the spectator’s 
attention to the way in which his/her choice to consume such images makes 
him/her complicit in the depiction and dissemination of film violence.  As such, 
Haneke hopes to regulate not simply through the market, but through the 
subjectivity of the film viewer.  To paraphrase Matt Hills, to prompt the spectator 
to question “am I sort the sort of person who chooses to watch and take 
pleasure in such films?” 
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In this respect, Haneke borrows liberally from a discourse that constructs 
the audience of screen violence as a ‘pathological other’.  However, Haneke 
neglects the insight that the work of researchers such as Barker et al have given 
us.  That is, even avid consumers of violent imagery are unlikely to think of 
themselves in these terms.  Indeed, Barker et al demonstrated that this group of 
viewers, like many other sections of the film-going community, produce 
themselves as ‘normal’ subjects by asserting their difference from this ‘imagined’ 
viewer.  Haneke therefore mobilises many of the features of the popular debate 
over screen violence, but in failing to acknowledge the audience’s own sense of 
cinematic subjectivity in the face of such depictions, he succeeds only in 
alienating the viewer, not only from the scenes of violence as he intends, but 
from the ideological point of the film itself.  This strategy may have been 
successful for some, for one can never completely eliminate the theoretical 
possibility that some viewers might take up a position identical to that which 
Haneke intended.  However, I would suggest that the conflict between the 
empirical audience’s demonstrated desire to produce themselves as ‘normal’ 
subjects and the Funny Games’ insistence that engaging with the film is a 
fundamentally pathological act ultimately provokes a rejection of the film’s 
textual address.  The only truly successfully engagement with the film is for the 
viewer to see it as addressing the ‘imagined other’, in which case Haneke’s 
desire to provoke the spectator to reflect on themselves and their desires falls 
short of its target.  Read in this way, the film succeeds only in repeating 
widespread assumptions about an ‘imagined’ set of ‘pathological others’. 
 By contrast, Noé can be seen to mobilise similar debates, but is more 
successful in his project insofar as he addresses the spectator in quite different 
terms.  That is, at the beginning of the film, in the S/M club, we see a clear 
depiction of the ‘pathological others’ who are aroused and excited by scenes of 
extreme violence.  However, the spectator is never asked to align themselves 
with these ‘others’, indeed one might argue that the spectator is encouraged to 
position themselves as being quite different.  That is, they have the opportunity 
to compare their own textually constructed experience of revulsion, horror and 
bewilderment with the excited hoots of encouragement and delight that emanate 
from the onscreen audience.  Noé therefore creates a space for the viewer to 
produce themselves as a ‘normal subject’ who is appropriately shocked and 
horrified by the scene. 
Rather than position the spectator as complicit with this scene of 
violence, Noé uses it to establish the spectator’s visceral, embodied relation to 
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the screen.  This visceral relation is far from an unthinking one however.  
Instead, it produces what Sobchack might call a materialist aesthetics and 
ethics, in which the spectator is encouraged to experience the scenes of 
violence within Irréversible intersubjectively.  The spectator is encouraged to 
recognise that those depicted on-screen are made of the ‘self-same’ flesh that 
they are, and as such, to experience the scenes of violence, particularly the 
scene of rape, as an invitation to contemplate what it is to suffer the absolute 
“diminution of subjectivity” .795  Crucially though, Noé invites the spectator to 
experience this through the body.  In this respect, he asks the viewer to give up 
a Brechtian position of critical distance, and to engage with the scene by 
contemplating his/her own vulnerability.  The ethics of the scene therefore hinge, 
not on a rejection of screen violence, but in deliberately heightening one’s 
response to it. 
However, a direct comparison between the efficacy of these two films 
may be a little unfair.  While I have worked hard within this thesis to demonstrate 
that depictions of sexual violence and the sexualised violence to be found in 
genres such as torture porn are subject to a widespread public debate over their 
acceptability, it is clear to me that sexual violence is a particular cause for 
concern within contemporary culture.  While Haneke sets out to attack fictional 
screen violence as a whole, only loosely connecting his concerns with the genre 
of torture porn, Noé’s film is more or less defined by the protracted scene of 
rape.  As such, while Haneke attempts to provoke a debate over the morality of 
screen violence, by virtue of its use of sexual violence Noé’s film is already 
subject to a moral discourse.  
Indeed, following Sobchack’s discussion of the scene of death within 
documentary, I would like to contend that within the context of British culture, in 
which scenes of sexual violence are intensively regulated by the BBFC by virtue 
of their potential to produce harm, filmmaker’s are all but obliged to inscribe 
such scenes as ethical spaces.  That is, the manner in which the scene of 
sexual violence is depicted within a film is open to “slow scrutiny”796 by the 
spectator and the censor alike.  In this respect, the filmmaker must visibly 
respond to the fact he has broken a visual taboo and justify this cultural 
transgression.  As Sobchack puts it, the filmmaker must present a “morally 
framed vision” that marks “the ethical stance of the filmmaker” as being “not only 
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responsive but responsible”.797  However, it would be wrong to assume that this 
is merely the demand of the censors, and similarly, such questions are not 
confined to an analysis of the text.  Indeed, it is telling how frequently Noé was 
asked in both interviews and in Q&A sessions to account for his choices within 
the scene.  In this respect, we might see these encounters with the both the 
press and the public as a series of concrete social situations in which Noé was 
asked not merely to justify his choices, but to ‘perform’ his ethical relation to the 
scene of sexual violence.   
As Sobchack suggests though, it is not only the filmmaker who must 
account for his/her ethical relation to the scene of sexual violence, “the viewer is 
– and is held – ethically responsible for his or her visible visual response.”798  On 
the one hand, Sobchack suggests that the viewer is asked to judge the 
filmmaker for his/her visible visual choices in the representation, and on the 
other s/he is asked to judge his/her own ethical response to the scene.  
Sobchack’s characterisation of the culturally transgressive visual encounter 
therefore suggests that the viewer is expected to engage in a process of self-
reflection.  But further, as I have tried to show within this thesis, the viewer must 
also ‘perform’ their ethical response to such images, not just to reassure 
themselves of the appropriateness of those responses, they must also perform 
their ethical relation for others.   
First and foremost, the viewer’s response is open to the immediate 
scrutiny of the wider audience during viewing.  As I have already suggested, 
what is considered an appropriate reading or response to the screen is highly 
culturally specific, and will vary amongst specific film viewing communities.  
What is acceptable at a local multiplex will therefore differ from a screening 
directed at a cult audience at the local arthouse cinema.  Moreover, not all 
viewers choose to abide by the cultural mores of the viewing context; a fact that 
is demonstrated in the last chapter by the anecdotal reports of individuals being 
evicted from theatres by members of staff.  However, the fact that responses are 
regulated in this way suggests that there is a high degree of consensus within 
particular reception contexts regarding to how one ought to visibly respond to 
such depictions. 
Moreover, as I sought to show in the last chapter, viewers also perform 
their ethical relation to particular films and to scenes of sexual violence after the 
fact.  As we saw, in user-generated reviews and discussions individuals 
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recounted their experiences and frequently produced themselves as spectatorial 
subjects in the course of these exchanges.  In the process they could be seen to 
situate themselves in relation to debates about ‘pathological others’, and to 
interrogate the nature of their enjoyment of these films.  Again while such a 
performance is profoundly shaped by the community mores of the particular web 
space, viewers can nevertheless be seen to perform a predominantly ethical 
relation to the text, at least insofar as they attempted to produce themselves as 
‘normal viewing subjects’.  Though once again it is worth pointing out, that even 
here there are significant moments of resistance and refusal. 
Nevertheless, this suggests that Sobchack is correct in her assertion that 
the viewer is held accountable for their responses to scenes of sexual violence 
by those around them, and in many respects they are expected to ‘perform’ an 
appropriate relation to the text.  But perhaps more interesting is the notion that 
the prevailing culture may profoundly shape the “response-ability” of any 
individual viewer.  That is, that the particular discourses that circulate around 
depictions of sexual violence may actually work to ‘sensitise’ the viewer in 
particular ways.  In viewing a scene of brutal rape like that found in Irréversible it 
is not only culturally appropriate, but highly culturally desirable for the viewer to 
enter into a relation with the scene that will produce a profoundly aversive affect.  
Indeed as some viewers noted in the previous chapter, not being appropriately 
horrified or sickened by such a depiction is a significant source of concern, both 
for oneself and for others.  In this respect, we might suggest that the viewer is in 
some sense prompted by the wider discourses of cinema to actively pursue an 
intersubjective relation to such images, to engage with them both viscerally and 
empathetically, as a way of producing these appropriate responses for oneself.  
In this respect, the viewer of scenes of sexual violence can be considered to be 
regulated, not only from the outside, through cultural expectations and concrete 
performative encounters with others, but to actively regulate their own 
spectatorial relations in order to produce themselves as a ‘normal’ and 
‘appropriate’ cinematic subject.  Crucially though, we must recognise that the 
film itself and its particular form of address is merely one discourse among many 
that seek to produce ‘appropriate’ relations between viewers and scenes of 
violence. 
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Disciplining the Spectator:  
 
Subjectivity, the Body and Contemporary Spectatorship  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 All research projects are by their very definition a learning experience.  
And many, like this project, bring about somewhat unexpected results.  So while 
this project began with the relatively simple premise of reinserting the body back 
into film theory in a way that accounted for the constructed nature of the 
spectator’s corporeal experience, what I discovered in the process of analysis 
was wholly unanticipated.  My initial plan of revealing the constructed nature of 
spectatorship generally, and the specific disciplinary practices that were 
employed by film texts, film marketing, press reviews and popular discussions of 
mainstream film, clearly demonstrated that although the body was widely 
neglected within film theory, it was nevertheless a central term within discourse, 
a key site for the creation of the filmic experience in post-classical, high concept 
cinema, and a source of information about the quality and effectiveness of a film 
for everyday viewers.   
 Indeed what the first part of this thesis demonstrates is that, contrary to 
the assertions of metapsychological theory, classical spectatorship is not an 
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inevitable result of the cinematic apparatus, but as film, theatre and social 
historians have discovered, it is the result of a whole series of disciplinary 
practices and regulatory decisions that worked together to subdue the audience, 
orient them to the screen, and engage in a privatised relationship with the 
images and narrative presented there.  In this respect, spectatorship was formed 
not only through the development of particular textual practices but through the 
regulation, monitoring and policing of spectators’ material bodies in the physical 
spaces of reception. 
  Classical spectatorship should therefore be considered to be the result 
of a series of disciplinary practices that exert control over the body of the 
individual.  It is important to note, however, that these regulatory practices that 
occurred within nineteenth century theatres and early twentieth century cinemas, 
were not simply imposed on the viewing public by theatre managers.  Indeed, 
while cinema owners clearly pursued strategies designed to reduce social 
interaction and activity within the auditorium, like dimming the house lights and 
fixing the chairs to the floor, facing in the direction of the screen, these tactics 
were supplemented by the audiences’ own concern with displaying appropriate 
forms of behaviour in public spaces.   As such the docility of the spectating body 
is not simply a precondition for classical spectatorship, but a normatively defined 
social practice that is performed by the individual in the process of viewing.    
 In this respect the early history of cinema can be seen as a period in 
which models of appropriate behaviour were being not only being codified but 
were also being internalised by the spectator.  The docility of the spectating 
body was therefore not only stringently policed by the institution, but was subject 
to social sanction by other members of the audience.  These deeply normative 
social judgements, I would suggest, led to the willing subjectification of the 
individual, which ultimately produced a peculiarly modern form of subjectivity: 
the spectator.  The history of spectatorship is therefore both a history of 
institutional control over the body, but more importantly, it is an account of the 
individual’s own adoption of techniques of the self, that allowed entry into a 
pleasurable engagement with the cinematic text. 
 As a result, the film text should by no means be considered the singular 
or even the primary site in the formation of the corporeal address.  Rather, as I 
have sought to show, in the wake of competition with domestic media 
technologies, cinema has attempted to define itself precisely as an ‘experience’, 
rather than a simple source of narrative pleasure.  Moreover, the specificity of 
the cinematic experience is absolutely bound to its delivery of a corporeal mode 
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of address: whether that be the thrill-ride of an action film or the having your skin 
crawl in a horror film.  Mainstream film marketing therefore promotes its 
products on their ability to provoke physical excitement, kinetic effects and a 
visceral experience, for the spectator.  But perhaps more importantly, viewers’ 
themselves actively pursue intense forms of physical experience within the 
cinema. 
What I have sought to show, however, is that these forms of promotion 
should be considered to be disciplinary practices central to the constitution of 
the corporeal address within cinema.  In particular, these discourses demand 
that the viewer prepare themselves for the experience they will encounter within 
the cinema, particularly in the case of violent and horrific films.  And what I have 
sought to argue is that this incitement to prepare oneself prompts the viewer to 
engage in a process of constructing a specific form of cinematic subjectivity 
suitable to the specific address employed by these films.  As such, film 
marketing does not simply promise to deliver physical sensations and thrills to 
the spectator, but actively encourages him/her to enter into a particular mode of 
reception, to actively create themselves as corporeal subjects in order to fully 
appreciate the particular form of experiential address offered by the film.  
Moreover, the controversy that surrounds particularly violent or horrific 
films can be seen to operate as an incitement to discourse, effectively prompting 
the spectator to engage in a process of monitoring their relations and responses 
to the depictions on-screen.  On the one hand, this process of self-monitoring, 
self-regulation and self-control exhibited by the viewers of violent film actively 
contributes to the intensity of the experience, simply by heightening their 
awareness of their own physical and emotional responses to the film.  But on the 
other hand, this process of self-monitoring also begins to implicate the ‘self’ in 
the process of film viewing.  And this was key to the entirely unexpected findings 
of the research project as a whole. 
That is, while a study of mainstream cinema yielded information about 
the centrality of the body and the corporeal address within contemporary 
cinema, underpinning these everyday mediations of the film event was 
something darker and perhaps more instructive in the mechanisms of cinema’s 
disciplinary practices.  What this project slowly revealed is that the physical 
address of cinema was a source of considerable cultural anxiety.  And an 
exploration of the limits of this form of corporeal address began to reveal 
something altogether more profound, namely the degree to which the viewer’s 
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subjectivity and sense of self was bound up in the peculiarly corporeal quality of 
contemporary cinema’s spectatorial relations. 
Until this point, my analysis of the construction of the spectator had 
revealed only the extent to which the disciplinary practices of the film text, 
marketing campaigns, press reports and popular discussions of cinema 
represented “a 'mechanics of power'…[which] defined how one may have a hold 
over others’ bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that 
they may operate as one wishes”. 799  That is, how spectatorial relations were 
being shaped through discourse in order to promote and intensify a corporeal 
engagement with the filmic text.  My analysis of the regulatory discourses of 
cinema demonstrated something quite different. 
 Of course, the body remained a central term within the discourse of 
media effects and concern about film’s capacity to arouse its viewers, both 
sexually and in the more diffuse sense of heightening their autonomic levels of 
excitement, took a privileged place in regulatory discourses.  However, at the 
point at which the corporeal address of cinema reached the limits of social 
acceptability, the discursive construction of the spectator attained a wholly 
different character, and the disciplinary strategies found within these discourses, 
began to address themselves more thoroughly to a normative policing of 
spectatorial subjectivity. 
Within the discourses of media effects in particular, male sexuality and 
its capacity for arousal in the face of extreme violence represented a key fear.  
As such this perceived potential for deviancy stood out as a key focus for 
research, a target of popular anxieties, a crucial determinant in regulatory 
decisions.  And as a result of this personification of the problem of ‘extreme’ 
cinema, it became increasingly clear that in contemporary cinema, debates over 
the acceptability of filmic representations of violence, and more particularly 
sexual violence, were focused less on the intrinsic qualities of the text and more 
on the assumed qualities of the potential spectator.  
 More importantly, within popular debate about controversial cinema, the 
question of regulation rarely called for the censoring of texts.  Rather, within this 
discursive arena, regulation was constructed either as a matter of eschewing 
these texts altogether, by effectively ‘policing’ these inappropriate materials 
through the market, or more surprisingly, it became a matter of regulating 
spectators themselves.  In this respect, in my study of Wolf Creek, there were 
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frequent explicit calls and implicit suggestions that those who viewed this kind of 
problematic filmic material should be subject to social sanctions, though 
throughout the debate, a number of normative strategies were employed by 
those who did not see the representation of (implied) sexual violence as suitable 
material for ‘entertainment’.  Commentators frequently ‘problematised’, 
‘stigmatised’, and even ‘pathologised’ those who were considered to ‘enjoy’, 
‘embrace’ or simply want to see the film.  This problematisation of the viewer 
extended from simple name calling through to suggestions that those who 
choose to watch a film like this are in need of ‘introspection’, and at the furthest 
extreme, professional help for their ‘sick minds’.  
Implicit, in these somewhat bullying reviews was a concern to prevent 
and avoid inappropriate relations with the screen.  But perhaps the most 
surprising, and unexpected, outcome of this research was the discovery of the 
extent to which viewer’s themselves internalised these characterisations, using 
them either as a means of resisting their construction as ‘sick’ and/or ‘deviant’, 
or as a means of evaluating their own relations with the screen and bringing 
them into line with ‘acceptable’ models of response.  In this sense, the 
subjectification of film regulation operates in two senses.  In the first instance, 
we can trace the construction of the spectatorial subject that defines the need 
for continued institutional regulation and/or the use of market forces to prevent 
the continued circulation of the cinematic text.  While in the second instance, we 
can begin to address the ways in which the individual spectator internalises and 
mobilises this construction, and begins to shape their own sense of identity 
and/or subjectivity in light of it. 
This subjectification of film regulation, can also be traced within film texts 
themselves.  And in this respect Michael Haneke’s Funny Games and Gaspar 
Noé’s Irréversible, provided two illuminating case studies.  In an analysis of each 
of these films there are clear manifestations of the ‘deviant’ spectator 
constructed within the regulatory discourses.  The possibility of the spectator’s 
enjoyment and arousal, and the potential for screen violence to achieve lasting 
effects was present within the films.  And in both cases, the director’s 
constitution of the spectator was, at least initially, a thoroughly pathological 
vision.  Moreover, in each case, the problem of screen violence was to be 
solved through a realignment of the spectator’s relations with the portrayal of the 
violent act.  As such, both of these films represent key texts in the process of 
bringing about the increasing subjectification of film regulation. 
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But where Haneke’s film suggests that the only appropriate response to 
screen violence is for the spectator to refuse to engage, and ideally to leave the 
cinema – effectively regulating through the market - Noé adopts and intensifies 
the corporeal address as a method of provoking aversive responses from the 
viewer.  Nevertheless, in each case, the director can be seen to be targeting the 
spectator as the key site of filmic regulation, and engaging in a process that 
seeks to ‘discipline’ the spectator’s relationship to on-screen violence as a 
means of bringing about what they consider to be ‘appropriate’ relations with the 
text.  What the comparison of these two films neatly demonstrates is that the 
debate over exactly what is appropriate is a continuing one, and the outcome 
has by no means been decided. 
Inevitably, a research project like this has its limitations, and moreover, 
raises far more questions that it is able to answer.  The study for example has 
clearly focused on the question of adult viewing, leaving unquestioned – or at 
least unanalysed – the very specific constructions and disciplinary practices that 
pervade children’s viewing.  And while I feel I have demonstrated that regulatory 
discourses are thoroughly gendered, specifically problematising male sexuality, 
space has not permitted an analysis of the particular ways in which women are 
constructed, addressed or indeed how they respond to these discourses.  And 
indeed, while I feel have successfully shown that individuals internalis, and 
make sense of their own spectatorial relations in light of the figures of deviancy 
that circulate around ‘extreme cinema’, the specific nature of this internalisation 
and the problems it raises for the subject’s relations to itself have not been 
addressed, although, this key aspect of my findings demands further research 
and exposition.  
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